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little to our understanding of environmental performance.  The discussion section 
considers the limitations of these data, as well as the theoretical and policy implications 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Despite the extent and cost of corporate crime (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; 
Simpson, 2002; Sutherland, 1961), it receives substantially less research attention than 
street crime, even in the current context of headline making corporate scandals (e.g., 
Enron, WorldCom, etc).  Criminology and criminologists have focused almost 
exclusively on violence, property, and drug crimes, offenses generally associated with 
society’s lower classes.  However, a small body of work has accumulated on the etiology 
of corporate crime and, to a lesser extent, the control of corporate crime.   
On the etiological side, criminologists have found an association between a 
variety of company characteristics and corporate misconduct.  Empirically, factors such 
as corporate structure (e.g., diversification, structural complexity, and size), finances 
(e.g., profitability), political environment, and corporate culture have been linked to 
corporate crime.  Although the results are not always consistent, as a whole they suggest 
that firm-level factors are important to understand corporate crime.   
On the control side, the deterrent effect of regulation has been the main emphasis.  
Studies have assessed the specific deterrent effect of EPA inspections (Deily and Gray, 
1991; Gray and Deily, 1996; Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Liu, 1995; Magat and Viscusi, 
1990; Nadeau, 1997); EPA enforcement (Nadeau, 1997); and OSHA plant and industry 
inspections (Cooke and Gautschi, 1981; Gray and Scholz, 1993; Robertson and Keeve, 
1983; Scholz and Gray, 1990;).  However, there is relatively little work on deterrence at 
the firm-level and those studies are inconclusive; some show a deterrent effect while 
others find little enforcement response (Block, Nold, and Sidak, 1981; Braithwaite and 
Makkai, 1991; Jamieson, 1994; Simpson and Koper, 1992). 
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Bad Corporate Actors 
Most of this research attempts to distinguish the characteristics of offenders and, 
to a lesser extent, how to return these offenders to compliance.  The focus then is on the 
“bad corporate actors.”  Similar to the “hot spots” and cohort studies that identify chronic 
offenders, these studies identify and classify the criminal corporation, plant, or facility.  
Sutherland, for instance, found that 97 percent of the offenders in his sample of 70 
corporations were recidivists and another 60 percent could be classified as habitual 
offenders (1961).  Clinard and Yeager (1980) show that 50 percent of the 477 
manufacturing corporations in their study re-offended during a two year tracking window 
(1975-1976).  Although the percent of chronic offenders is much smaller, one can find 
similar patterns when looking at the environmental offender (Bandyopadhyay and 
Horowitz, 2006; Magat and Viscusi, 1990). 
Extreme Volunteerism 
Yet, criminologists have virtually ignored the flip side of the coin—the substantial 
degree of compliance and overcompliance among firms.  Rates of compliance are 
particularly high in the type of crime of interest in this study--environmental crime.  
Studies of pulp and paper mills using data from the 1980s (Magat and Viscusi, 1990) and 
in the 1990s (Kagan, Gunningham, and Thornton, 2003) find compliance rates of 75 or 
higher.  Overcompliance is also high.  In a sample of mostly water treatment plants, 
Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) find that plants pollute only 60 percent of their 
permitted levels.  This overcompliance is not limited to plants; firms also go above and 
beyond legal requirements and are encouraged to do so.  For instance, the Environmental 
Protection Agency operates several programs in which firms may volunteer to reduce 
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pollution beyond what is required by law, including Green Lights (which later partnered 
with Energy Star Buildings Program), 33/50, and Wastewise programs.   
This sort of compliance and even overcompliance occurs despite less than 
rigorous regulation.  EPA policy states that facilities considered major sources of 
pollution must be inspected once per year.  However, given the lack of resources at EPA 
and the enormity of the regulation task, this small amount of monitoring may not even be 
carried out.  When violations are detected, penalties are limited.  The bulk of the response 
to EPA violations is informal, cooperative in nature, and relatively lenient (Harrington, 
1988; Hunter and Waterman, 1996).  With the low risk of enforcement and the limited 
nature of the penalties, one might expect firms to pollute freely.  Yet, they do not.   
Explaining Compliance 
Criminology has shown little interest in this extreme compliance and 
overcompliance.  Hirschi’s (1969) argument that we should shift the focus from studying 
crime to studying conformity has not filtered its way into the criminological work on 
corporate crime.  Yet, we must ask: Why do firms comply with the law?  Traditional 
economic models assume that regulation explains both compliance and noncompliance.  
Thus, firms are only likely to take costly measures to improve performance when it is 
likely that they will be caught and penalized.  Yet, this assumption of “amoral 
calculators” does not explain why profit-maximizing companies would comply with laws 
that are weakly enforced (Kagan et al., 2003).  Additional explanations are required to 
understand why firms comply (and even overcomply) with legal requirements when 
regulation is lax.  As Kagan and colleagues state: “the degree of variation in, and the 
 
 4
motivation for, corporate behavior may be much broader than many researchers have 
imagined” (p. 52).   
Corporate Citizenship 
Although often overlooked in the criminological work on corporate crime, firms 
might comply because of moral obligation, or duty.  The “normative case” for 
compliance can be grounded formally in theories of moral philosophy such as social 
contract theory.  Corporations exist in society only with the cooperation and commitment 
of society.  Thus, there is an implicit agreement that in order to have a “license to 
operate,” firms must be responsive to societal needs (Smith, 2003).  Firms may vary in 
the extent to which firm culture promotes ethical actions beyond what the law requires; 
the moral duty or obligation to contribute to and be responsive to societal needs.  This 
“business ethics” approach to compliance suggests that firms can be arrayed on a 
continuum of corporate social performance or corporate citizenship, but this idea and its 
implications for the etiology and control of corporate crime has not made its way into 
criminology in a substantive way.   
Current Study 
In this study, I will explore the implications of corporate citizenship for 
understanding corporate compliance and returns to compliance.  In theory, corporate 
citizenship may help explain the variation in compliance that does not seem to be 
accounted for by regulation.  Corporations that take duty seriously, that are a different 
type of firm, may be less likely to offend.  As Clinard and Yeager (1980) note, “A 
corporation that emphasizes profits above business ethics and ignores corporate 
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responsibility to the community, the consumers, or society is likely to have difficulty 
complying with legal norms” (p. 58).   
The concept may also inform our understanding of how firms respond to 
sanctions.  There is considerable variability in sanction response across companies.  In 
the event of noncompliance, EPA generally begins sanctions at the lowest level of 
severity—warning letters or phone calls.  Many firms return to compliance with this 
limited intervention.  Yet, others do not.  In these cases the EPA is forced to increase the 
severity of penalties to achieve a return to compliance.  Corporate citizenship may 
account for these different responses to sanctions. As with the individual-level deterrence 
studies, sanction effects may vary because the main effects mask differences in the effect 
of sanctions by firm type; companies that are “good citizens” in the social performance 
arena can be considered a different type of firm than those that care less about social 
responsibilities.  Firms on the high end of corporate social performance theoretically 
should have better compliance records, however, even good citizens may still have 
instances of noncompliance.  Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) notes that certain 
seasons and random high-level discharges are problematic for many plants.  In the event 
of noncompliance, good citizens may be more likely return to compliance even when the 
sanction is low.  Those lower on the continuum of citizenship may need more stringent 
enforcement to achieve the same result.   
It is important to bring corporate citizenship into criminology because the concept 
can inform both academic work and policy.  Criminologists have explored a variety of 
firm-level factors that might lead to non-compliance, but have overlooked potential 
explanations for extreme compliance.  Adding corporate citizenship to models of 
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corporate compliance may expand our knowledge of the etiology of corporate crime.  In 
addition, if companies vary in citizenship in a way that is related to compliance, it may 
help regulators target limited enforcement resources.  Regulators may be able to reduce 
the frequency of inspections for good citizens and redirect the time and resources toward 
the “bad corporate actors” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gray and Scholz, 1993).  
Finally, there is little guidance for regulators to determine what kind of penalty to impose 
(aside from high evidentiary requirements for moving to the judicial system) on 
noncompliant firms.  Information on corporate citizenship may help regulators determine 
what sort of penalty would be most effective at returning firms to compliance.  The “bad” 
firm may require harsher, punishment-oriented strategies while the noncompliance of 
“good” firms may be resolved with more cooperative actions (Scholz, 1984).  Studying 
these questions in relation to environmental crime is particularly important because of the 
potential harm associated with water (and other kinds of) pollution.  For instance, 
reducing the level of oxygen in the water or dramatically changing the temperature kills 
aquatic organisms and disrupts the food chain.  The damage is not limited to wildlife and 
the environment; toxic chemicals released into waterways can cause birth defects and 
death if ingested. 
I will explore the etiology and control of environmental crime using a unique data 
set.  These data build on the existing corporate crime literature by measuring 
noncompliance earlier in the process and by allowing for a more sophisticated 
construction of the dependent variable.  In the few existing studies, researchers rely 
primarily on court case data to identify corporate environmental offenders.  The data used 
in the current study are collected much earlier in the system.  The Clean Water Act 
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(CWA) requires plants to report monthly water pollution levels to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).  When pollution levels are higher than permitted amounts, the 
EPA has the authority to use sanctions (e.g., warning letters, administrative actions, civil 
and criminal cases).  Thus, these self-report data circumvent the selection problem 
inherent in court case data (particularly in the environmental arena).  In addition to 
providing information earlier in the crime production process, the self-report data allow 
the examination of gradations of conformity (compliance versus overcompliance).  Self-
reported pollution limits and discharges can be used to construct the degree of 
compliance and track it over time.  Thus, with this unique data set, I can explore the 
relationship between citizenship and violations, compliance, and overcompliance.   
These data also add to the environmental literature because they are designed to 
test firm-level questions.  Researchers that have used EPA self-reports to examine 
environmental performance construct samples at the plant-level.  However, the corporate 
crime literature suggests that firm characteristics (e.g., structure and culture) may produce 
similar records across plants owned by the same firm; thus, examining environmental 
performance at the firm-level may provide additional insight regarding the etiology of 
environmental behavior.  In the current data, the sample was created at the firm-level and 
then plants owned by the firm were tracked.  The data represent a universe of firms 
operating in the pulp and paper, steel, and oil industries in 1995 and all of their major 
water plants (in the same industry). 
Although the questions of interest are ultimately posed at the firm-level, the 
descriptive analysis will begin at the plant-level.  Given that the firm-level unit of 
analysis is new, it is important to explore the patterns of environmental behavior at both 
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levels.  To compare to other environmental work, three measures from the previous 
literature are used to describe the plant-level patterns: a dichotomous measure of 
violation/compliance; the number of violations; and the compliance ratio (portion of limit 
that is discharged).   The plant-level environmental information is next aggregated to the 
firm-level (by combining all plants owned by each company) and the patterns of 
environmental performance are described with the same measures at the firm-level.  
Given the research questions and their grounding in the corporate crime literature, the 
questions of interest are ultimately explored at the firm-level.  Data on traditional 
predictors of firm misconduct such as firm size and finances have also been gathered.  
Added to these data are two corporate citizenship measures that allow an examination of 
the effect of corporate citizenship on environmental performance and returns to 
compliance.  Given the complexities, newness, and limitations of the data, I explore these 
questions in a primarily descriptive way (i.e., correlations, mean differences, and simple 
regression models).   
In the next section, I begin with a discussion of environmental crime and the 
legislation that created this analytic concept.  Because the data utilized are drawn from 
the Clean Water Act, this piece of legislation is the main focus.  Next, the definitions and 
assumptions of the corporate crime literature that suggest the need to examine firm-level 
environmental performance are outlined before moving into the relevant theoretical and 






CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
In the United States, efforts to protect the environment began over 100 years ago 
(i.e., the Refuse Act of 1899) and environmental legislation has since grown (Shover and 
Routhe, 2005).  Although federal legislation existed prior to the 1960s and 1970s, the 
majority of environmental protection laws were passed during this period of 
environmental activism (Clifford, 1998).  Toward the end of the 20th century legislators 
extended the list of environmentally harmful behaviors by passing the Clean Air Act 
(1963); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (1972); the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (1976); the Clean Water Act (1972); the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(1976); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (1980).  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is charged with implementing 
and overseeing these pollution control acts.  It was created in 1970 by executive order to 
be one of the agencies that regulates and manages health and environmental policies 
passed by Congress.  The EPA has no overall environmental protection strategy; 
legislation and regulation vary for each pollution control act (Clifford, 1998).  Water 
pollution regulations, the focus of this study, are among the few laws that require firms to 
submit self-reports of pollution behavior.  
The first comprehensive federal regulation of water pollution was the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.  In 1977 the act was amended and renamed the 
Clean Water Act (CWA). It was amended again in 1981 and a new Clean Water Act was 
passed in 1987.  The ultimate goal of the acts was to reduce water pollution from point  
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source;1 thus, the acts created the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) to regulate the discharge of pollutants into the water.  Potential polluters must 
submit an application for a permit to discharge and are assigned technology-based limits 
(Clifford, 1998; Freedman and Jaggi, 1993).  Industrial users must submit reports 
(usually monthly) of permitted and actual levels of pollutants released into the water. 
The environmental movement and subsequent legislation spawned the term 
“environmental crime.”  Because this is a relatively new analytic and legislative 
designation, definitional clarify has not yet been achieved.  This ambiguity is due in part 
to the diversity of behaviors that could be called environmental crime (e.g., ranging from 
littering to wildlife endangerment to intentional discharge of hazardous substances into 
waterways) and variation in the potential harm associated with these acts.  Environmental 
crime can be defined legally as a violation of statutes designed to protect the ecological 
and physical environment (Shover and Routhe, 2005).  Some authors argue that the use of 
the word “crime” requires that the act fall under criminal law, which requires proof of 
intent; other violations should be called environmental “illegalities” (Shover and Routhe, 
2005).  Yet, the law makes no such distinction.  Under the CWA, criminal sanctions may 
be used for violations designated as negligent, knowing, knowing endangerment, or 
knowing falsification of information or tampering with monitoring equipment (Clifford, 
1998).  For example, violations may be designated as “negligent” if a company dumps a 
highly toxic chemical into a local river without knowledge about potential harm if the 
company should have known that the chemical would cause considerable damage 
                                                 
1 A point source is an identifiable waste stream, usually a pipe or a ditch that is tied to an industry or 
facility (Clifford, 1998; Freedman and Jaggi, 1993).  Point sources are contrasted with nonpoint sources—
“an unconfined contamination of water from the land into a body of water” (Clifford, 1998, p. 100).  
Examples of nonpoint sources include runoff from city streets or agricultural fields (Clifford, 1998).   
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(Clifford, 1998).  Thus, legally, criminal enforcement of the CWA does not require 
intent.2  In addition, Sutherland argues for the inclusion of behaviors that fall under 
regulatory law in the study of crime because the only distinction between regulatory 
violations and “crime” is the process by which they are sanctioned (see above).  For this 
study, environmental crime is defined as acts that violate legislative requirements, 
whether punishable by civil, regulatory, or criminal sanctions.  Environmental crimes 
may be too diverse to make blanket statements that apply to every subtype.  Thus, it is 
important to focus on narrowly defined forms of environmental crime to advance 
theoretical understanding and inform policy decisions while also assessing similarities 
and differences across crime types to build more general knowledge (Shover and Routhe, 
2005).  To this end, I focus on one type of environmental crime: industrial discharges.   
At the facility-level, industrial discharges are the result of complex production 
processes and may have many determinants aside from deliberate human or corporate 
action.  For example, industrial discharges that are above the permitted levels are 
sometimes the result of uncontrollable factors such as seasonal weather patterns and 
random spikes (Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz, 2006).  Some might also consider 
environmental performance to simply be the result of production levels; when production 
is low the facility will comply or even overcomply (pollute significantly less than legally 
allowed).  However, these factors do not eliminate the behavioral component.  In fact, it  
 
                                                 
2 The legislation has little guidance as to where the line falls between administrative, civil, and criminal 
enforcement.  Thus, in practice, those cases that receive the most severe enforcement (criminal) are those in 
which intent can be established (Clifford, 1998).  Because of the difficulty associated with establishing 
intent in environmental crimes, criminal sanctions are rarely utilized (Clifford, 1998). 
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may be much stronger than one might assume.3   
The bulk of previous work on environmental performance has been conducted at 
the facility-level (e.g., plants, mills, and oil refineries) because facilities hold 
environmental permits.  Yet, plants are often owned by larger entities—corporations.  As 
shown in Figure 1A and 1B, the structure of the corporation and its ancillary units can 
take two different forms (i.e., functional or multidivisional).  Each organizational 
structure has implications for how the corporation/parent company interacts with its 
subsidiaries and facilities.  The parent company has more direct control over daily 
decisions in the functional form while the ancillary units are more independent in the 
multidivisional form.  Regardless, in both forms the levels of management in each 
                                                 
3 First, seasonal variations are built into permits; facilities are given higher limits on pollution during 
problematic seasons (e.g., during extremely cold months some facilities are given higher limits on pollution 
because they cannot run as efficiently).  The EPA also attempts to take random spikes into account when 
constructing permits.  For example, although monthly limits are more stringent (to achieve an overall low 
level of pollution), facilities are given higher limits for daily pollution levels to account for random spikes.  
While one might argue that the leniency given during certain months or on a daily basis are not enough to 
address the problem, these issues are built into the permit to some degree.  Thus, any remaining differences 
across firms in environmental performance (violations, compliance, or overcompliance) are likely the result 
of steps the firm has taken (e.g., technology, equipment, checks on the system) to achieve the desired 
performance.   
Second, production levels are built into permits.  Permits are based on an estimate of actual 
production levels, rather than plant capacity.  In addition, permits can even include tiered limits—limits 
that vary according to current production levels.  Research also indicates that environmental performance is 
not simply the result of production levels.  Kagan et al. (2003) find that production and environmental 
performance are not even closely correlated.  In their sample of 14 pulp and paper mills, the correlation 
between production and two types of pollutants are low and are not statistically significant.  As the authors 
note, “The efficacy of primary and secondary effluent treatment systems varies primarily not with the 
volume of wastewater processed but with the capacity and efficiency of the systems and how well they are 
maintained and operated” (p. 61, italics added).  Larger mills have to build larger systems to have pollution 
levels similar to those of smaller mills, but can maintain a clean record if the equipment and controls are 
well designed and operated (Kagan et al., 2003).   
Overall, factors such as season, randomness, and production may account for some variation in 
environmental performance.  However, it is unlikely that these factors account for all of the variation.  
Evidence suggests a behavioral element to environmental performance.  If the remaining variation is all due 









subunit connect all units to the parent company and its policies.  While it is important to 
recognize the different units involved in industrial pollution, the corporate crime 
literature provides compelling reasons for exploring firm-level compliance. 
INSERT FIGURES 1A and 1B HERE 
Corporate Crime: Definitions and Distinctions 
Although falling under regulatory law and commonly referred to as 
“noncompliance” rather than “crime,” Sutherland justifies the criminological study of  
illegal (non-criminal) acts in his seminal work—White-Collar Crime.4  Sutherland (1961) 
referred broadly to crime committed in the course of one’s occupation as “white-collar 
crime,” but typological definitions of white-collar crime have since parceled out a smaller 
number of more homogeneous behaviors for study (Braithwaite, 1985).  Corporate crime 
has been distinguished from other forms of white-collar crime by the motivation for and 
the beneficiary of the offense.  Clinard and Quinney (1973) distinguish corporate crime 
from occupational crimes as those committed by corporate officials (and the corporation 
itself) for the corporation.  Similarly, Braithwaite (1984) defines corporate crime as 
“conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Sutherland argued that the main difference between crimes of the lower class and white-collar crimes was 
the implementation of the law.  People in positions of power have control over what becomes law and what 
body of law their behaviors fall under.  Studying convicted offenders limits the true variability in crime 
because few white-collar criminals are criminally convicted.  Definitions of white-collar crime must go 
beyond the criminal law to include regulatory violations; behaviors that would have a reasonable 
expectation of conviction if tried; and behaviors that would result in conviction if not for social or political 
influence.  Thus, Sutherland subsequently defined white-collar crime as “a crime by a person of high social 
status and respectability in the course of his [sic] occupation” (Sutherland, 1949, p. 9).   
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proscribed and punishable by law” (p. 6).5  
These definitions clearly prioritize the organizational context as a conceptual key 
to understanding corporate crime.6  It is argued that “most corporate crimes cannot be  
explained by the perverse personalities of their perpetrators” (Braithwaite, 1984, p. 2).  
Instead, these definitions locate the causes of corporate crime in the goals, structure, and 
culture of the organization (Pearce, 2001).  The organizational goal most commonly 
linked to crime is profitability.  In the context of slowing or falling profits, managers and 
employees may resort to criminal practices to attain performance goals (Shover and 
Bryant, 1993).  Structural complexity refers to the degree of spread and segmentation in 
an organization’s structure.  The argument is that complexity may provide opportunity 
because it decreases communication and managerial control (Finney and Lesieur, 1982).  
Corporate culture, generally thought of as a shared set of norms and values that give rise 
to typical behavior patterns, may contain crime-facilitative components (Shover and 
Bryant, 1993). 
As with corporate crime in general, it has been argued that the origin of and the 
responses to environmental crime are significantly linked to organizational forces 
                                                 
5 Some scholars have argued that the corporate crime concept is too narrow; however, Pearce 
(1993) argues that corporations are unique entities and the separation of corporate from occupational crime 
is justified.  First, corporations have very unique and narrow goals as compared to other kinds of 
organizations; they are explicitly designed to pursue profit.  When costs must be cut to maximize profits 
firms may resort to illegal methods.  The design of corporations also makes them unique.  Public 
corporations have shareholders, who may also be more concerned with profits than the methods used to 
obtain them.  In addition, responsibilities are dispersed throughout corporations making it difficult to ever 
pinpoint an individual at fault.  The difficulty associated with penetrating the complex structure protects 
corporations from legal liability.  Corporations are also frequently protected from the consequences of their 
own actions.  For instance, employees tend not to live in areas polluted by environmental noncompliance.  
Finally, globalization has created powerful multi-national corporations, making it difficult for nation states 
to control firm behavior.  I would argue that corporations are unique entities and the case for studying their 
behavior separately is compelling.   
6 The organizational focus is not meant to endow a corporation with volitional properties.  Scholars still 




(Shover and Routhe, 2005).  On a limited basis corporate crime scholars have begun to 
examine the association between organizational variables and environmental crime, 
considering it one type of corporate crime (Hill, Kelly, and Agle, 1992; McKendall and 
Wagner, 1997).   
In this study, corporate citizenship is added as a theoretical explanation of 
environmental performance and sanction responsiveness.  I will explore how citizenship 
relates to various levels of performance (violations, compliance, and overcompliance) 
while taking into account the traditional organizational-level predictors and some 
explanations drawn from the environmental literature (i.e., variability in discharges).  To 
proceed, a definition of corporate citizenship is necessary.  Although not fully developed, 
the idea of citizenship has been raised in other fields and mentioned (but never tested) in 
some environmental literature.  Firm citizenship may explain a substantial degree of the 
variation in firm environmental records.   
Defining Corporate Citizenship 
 Much of the work on corporate citizenship has been done in the business and 
society field.  Thus, this section begins with an outline of the work in this field that has 
attempted to define citizenship in a more concrete manner.  The problems with using 
these models of corporate citizenship are briefly discussed and a more conceptually 
useful definition is provided. 
A variety of terms have been used to describe the relationship between business 
and society.  The ideas begin with the assumption that business and society are 
interpenetrating and thus firms must be socially responsible to this shared environment.  
Therefore, at the most basic level, businesses have some obligation to society beyond 
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profitability.  Yet one might ask specifically what kinds of obligations businesses have 
and how business should define this vague term “society” (Clarkson, 1995).  Scholars 
have made some progress in trying to answer these questions, but each new development 
has been treated as a “free-standing, implicitly competing idea” (Wood, 1991, p. 691), 
often with yet another new term placed on an only slightly modified definition.  While 
some of these free-standing ideas have been pulled together under the rubric of 
“corporate social performance,” fundamental differences remain within and between the 
competing perspectives producing confusion as to the appropriate terminology, 
conceptual definitions, and measurement frameworks.   
Modern academic discussion of the relationship between business and society 
began in the 1950s with the term “social responsibility,” but debate surrounding the 
concept was most rigorous in the 1970s (Carroll, 1999).  While business and society 
scholars were attempting to define the social obligations of the business community, 
economists were aggressively denying any such obligations.  To acknowledge both 
economic and social concerns, scholars included economic responsibility in the definition 
of social responsibility.  For example, in Carroll’s (1979) three-dimensional model, social 
responsibility is “the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society 
has of organizations at a given point in time” (p. 500).  Carroll (1979) purposely brings 
economics into the definition of social responsibility to counter those who argue that 
“social” responsibilities are subversive to economic success (e.g., Friedman, 1962).     
Recently, however, a new approach has influenced conceptualization of business 
“responsibility.”  Wood (1991) argues that Carroll’s four principles of social 
responsibility (economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary) are not principles at all, rather 
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they are the domains within which principles are enacted.  A principle, she argues, 
“expresses something fundamental that people believe is true, or it is a basic value that 
motivates people to act” (p. 695).  Social responsibility is the expectation society places 
on business as an economic institution, on individual organizations, and on the 
individuals within the organization and these principles (should) motivate human and 
organizational behavior.7  In general, scholars describe social responsibility as societal 
expectations of business that provide the motivation for socially responsible behavior by 
companies.   
Over time, researchers shifted the focus to more pragmatic concerns, arguing that 
social responsibility placed too much emphasis on motivation rather than performance 
(Ackerman and Bauer, 1976).  The term “corporate social responsiveness” loosely refers 
to the method companies use to fulfill a social obligation (Carroll, 1991).  For instance, 
Carroll (1979) defines the responsiveness component as “a philosophy, mode, or strategy 
behind business (managerial) response to social responsibility and social issues” (p. 501).  
Carroll (1979) draws on earlier work that describes four possible strategies: 1) a reactive 
process in which the company consistently fights the requirements; 2) a defensive process 
in which the company does only what is required; 3) an accommodative approach in 
which the firm is somewhat progressive; and 4) a proactive response in which the firm 
leads the industry.  This approach is too descriptive for Wood (1991) who argues that 
                                                 
7 The Principle of Legitimacy describes societal expectations of business as an institution that must avoid 
abusing its power; it is based on the idea that society has the right to maintain a balance of power among 
institutions and to define legitimate functions.  The Principle of Public Responsibility represents 
responsibilities at the organizational-level; businesses are responsible for outcomes related to their specific 
involvements in society.  Thus, the content of responsibility might vary by company, depending on its areas 
of primary and secondary involvement.  The Principle of Managerial Discretion states that managers are 





social responsiveness should outline the actual processes the company goes through to 
ensure socially responsible behavior.  For example, she discusses environmental 
assessment (monitoring and assessing environmental conditions, knowing the context); 
stakeholder management (understanding toward whom the corporation has 
responsibilities); and issues management (devising and monitoring internal and external 
processes for managing a company’s response to social issues) as social responsiveness.  
Over time, responsiveness has come to be synonymous with the process companies have 
in place to ensure that social concerns are addressed.   
The term “corporate social performance” (CSP) has pulled the above ideas into a 
single framework while adding a third component—“social issues management.”  This 
component consists of issue identification, issue analysis, response development (Wartick 
and Cochran, 1985).  Policy is a direct extension of the social responsiveness process.  
However, “social issues management” is described as a process and is, thus, difficult to 
distinguish theoretically from responsiveness.  Consequently, Wood (1991) treats the 
third component as outcomes rather than issues management.  Outcomes may include 
social impacts, programs used to implement responsibility and responsiveness, and 
policies developed to handle social issues.  Thus, as a whole, corporate social 
performance is a three-part model.  Although the specific models vary, the general theme 
is that corporate social performance involves policies, actions, or social impacts that 
result from specific processes designed to address social issues (social responsiveness) 
and are motivated by principles of social responsibility.  For example, Wartick and 
Cochran (1985) describe social performance as the “underlying interaction among the 
principles of social responsibility, the process of social responsiveness, and the policies 
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developed to address social issues” (p. 758).  Wood (1991) argues that social 
performance is not an interaction, but rather “A business organization’s configuration of 
principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, 
programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal relationships” (p. 
693).   
The three-dimensional model of corporate social performance has also been 
challenged by other approaches.  Largely because of difficulties experienced when trying 
to collect data that fits into these conceptual models (an issue to which I will return), 
Clarkson (1995) advocates stakeholder satisfaction, regardless of companies’ motives for 
keeping stakeholders happy, as a measure of CSP.  Rather than attempting to identify 
responsibilities, stakeholder theory begins by looking at potential groups and the relation 
of the firm to these groups (Freeman 1984).  As Clarkson notes, companies are free to 
decide the extent to which they will “acknowledge, recognize, or pursue obligations and 
responsibilities to their stakeholders” (p. 105).  While there are legal requirements for 
obligations to some stakeholders (health and safety of employees), companies do not 
have legal obligations for some behaviors (employee career development).  Any evidence 
of acknowledging some stakeholders may be evidence of corporate social performance.  
He suggests that we can place corporations on the four-part descriptive scale originally 
proposed by Carroll (1979) to further distinguish among firms (Reactive, Defensive, 
Accomodative, Proactive).   
The models discussed here (which are only the most prominent of many 
variations) differ substantially from one another.  Even after reviewing the business and 
society literature it is unclear whether corporate social performance is a set of 
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responsibilities, a state, a process, an outcome, or the management of stakeholders.  
Despite the different approaches, all of them have a common thread; consistent with the 
earlier (more abstract) definitions, each approach defines social performance/citizenship 
as a commitment to society that is broader than “mere compliance.”  Given this 
commitment, the current models mainly differ in what criteria distinguish “good” from 
“bad” corporate citizens.  Firms might rank higher in citizenship because they take on 
additional (social) responsibilities; have specific decision-making processes; have certain 
policies, or have good relationships with multiple stakeholders.  However, it seems that 
any of these criteria could be potential outcomes of good citizenship/social performance; 
the firms’ sense of commitment to society likely produces these outcomes.  And in fact, 
conceptualizing citizenship in this way fits nicely into the criminological literature on 
corporate culture.   
Criminologists generally define corporate culture in terms of its potentially 
criminogenic components (Hochstetler and Copes, 2001; Shover and Hochstetler, 2002).  
For Barnett (1986), industry culture is “a set of commonly shared attitudes, techniques, 
and rationalizations which condition the likelihood that owners, managers, and 
employees within the typical industry enterprise will use illegal means to pursue 
economic goals” (p. 555).  However, culture is likely a broader construct than techniques 
of neutralization and may include attitudes toward the social role of business—concern 
for the publics’ wants and desires (Stone, 1975, 1991).  Qualitative work suggests that 
organizational messages regarding the moral importance of competing goals (e.g., 
profitability versus environmental safety) confront managers in the workplace (Yeager, 
2005).   
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Conceptualizing citizenship as one part of corporate culture is also consistent with 
other work.  Scholars have made theoretical arguments that ethical climate is only one 
dimension of organizational culture (Cullen and Stephens, 1989; Victor and Cullen, 
1988).  In addition, Maignan et al. (1999; 2001) find that citizenship is empirically 
associated with other elements of corporate culture.8   
Conceptualizing citizenship as a state is consistent with some of the business and 
society models and criminological work on corporate culture, but the issue of motivation 
remains.  Why do some firms act as good citizens?  Is it economics?  Is it 
morality/altruism?  Some scholars even suggest that motivation is irrelevant (Clarkson, 
1995).  Yet, citizenship as a moral obligation can be consistent with social responsibility 
and social performance models as well as stakeholder theory.9  In addition to being 
consistent with the business and society models, the idea of moral obligation has a larger 
theoretical basis; it can be grounded formally in theories of moral philosophy such as 
social contract theory.  Corporations can only exist in society with the cooperation and 
                                                 
8 Using survey measures of the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary obligations to various 
stakeholder groups, Maignan et al (1999, 2001) explore the cultural antecedents of citizenship.  The authors 
define culture as the pattern of assumptions a group has invented, discovered, or developed to cope with 
problems.  Based on this definition, the authors expect that organizational culture may influence how 
decision-makers manage relationships with stakeholders.  The authors test three dimensions: market 
orientation (extent to which a firm adopts the marketing concept and puts the customer at the center of its 
strategy), humanistic orientation (importance attributed to support and harmony among workers), and 
competitive culture (importance assigned to winning and rewarding employees for outperforming one 
another).  Using LISREL, the authors find that humanistic culture, market orientation, and humanistic 
orientation are all significantly associated with citizenship.  Competitive culture is not significantly 
associated with citizenship, either as a facilitator or an inhibitor (Maignan, Ferrell, and Hult, 1999).  Using 
regression the authors find that a customer-centered market orientation is significantly associated with 
higher levels of overall citizenship and each of its dimensions.  The other elements of culture are not 
consistently related to citizenship: humanistic orientation is positively associated with economic citizenship 
and competitive orientation significantly decreases legal citizenship (Maignan and Ferrell, 2001). 
9 Although economic motives for citizenship are sometimes acknowledged, moral obligation is included as 
motivation for citizenship in the social responsibility and the three-dimensional social performance models.  
While some scholars argue that motivation is irrelevant to stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995), others 
discuss instrumental and normative motivations for stakeholder management, much like the social 




commitment of society.  Thus, there is an implicit agreement that in order to have a 
“license to operate,” firms must be responsive to societal needs (Smith, 2003). 10  
Theoretical perspectives in criminology also allow for the consideration of duty among 
economic actors.  Etzioni (1988) suggests that although the economic actor will seek 
pleasure, the actor will also seek duty.  Finally, at least some firms seem to use a 
deontological basis for ethical decisions.  Victor and Cullen (1988) find that employees 
are able to discern different types of ethical environments and these vary by firm; some 
firm climates train employees to base ethical judgments on egoism (self-interest); some 
on benevolence (joint-interest); and others on principle (deontology).11   
Thus, I consider corporate citizenship to be a state (of corporate culture) that is 
motivated by morality and altruism.  I define corporate citizenship as the degree to which 
firm culture promotes or inhibits a moral commitment to society that is broader than 
“mere compliance.”  After reviewing the literature on the etiology of corporate crime, 
corporate compliance, and plant-level environmental record, I will outline why and how 
firm citizenship may be linked to environmental record.  I will then review the literature 
on sanction effects at both the firm and plant-level before linking citizenship to sanction 
responsiveness. 
The relevant literature is drawn from several fields that vary in terms of the 
approach (explaining crime versus explaining conformity), the unit of analysis (the firm 
versus the plant) and the data (case data versus self-reports).  The firm-level corporate 
                                                 
10 The idea of the moral obligations of business is also grounded in history.  Several authors have traced 
these ideas back to Christian Scriptures, Jewish traditions, Eastern religious and philosophical traditions, 
and Western Philosophers (Bowie, 1991; Epstein, 1998).   
11 Victor and Cullen (1988) suggest that benevolence (joint-interest) is the basis for social responsibility 
while I argue that social responsibility has a deontological basis.  This difference in conceptualization is not 




crime focuses almost exclusively on explanations of firm offending, with little emphasis 
on conformity (or extreme conformity).12  With one exception (Dooley and Fryxell, 
1999) the subset of studies using environmental crime as the dependent variable are 
limited methodologically.  Because very little data exists on corporate crime—especially 
at the firm-level with regard to environmental crime—they primarily examine court case 
outcomes and  responses to hypothetical vignettes (see, e.g., Clinard and Yeager, 1980; 
Hill et al., 1992; Alexander and Cohen, 1996; McKendall and Wagner, 1997; Paternoster 
and Simpson, 1996; Simpson, 2002).   
Research at the plant-level is most common.  These studies examine the actual 
environmental record of the plant (self-reports) rather than relying on a subset of 
violations.  The studies use 1) self-reports of violations; 2) of the level of pollution; and 
3) of the pollution relative to the permit as the dependent variable.  Because of the 
substantial degree of compliance and overcompliance in the environmental area, the 
plant-level literature attempts to explain conformity more often than the corporate crime 
literature (with some exceptions).   
While the approach and unit of analysis differ, many of the explanations for 
compliance and/or violation are similar across the two fields.  For example, firm 
characteristics (profits, size) are theorized as critical to our understanding of corporate 
misconduct.  Many of these same characteristics have been applied to at the plant-level.  
For example, plant size has been linked to environmental violations.  In addition, some 
                                                 
12 An alternative view would be to treat the “opposite” side of the risk factors as “protective” factors linked 
to compliance.  For example, low profitability may increase corporate crime because of profit squeeze 
(strain), the perceived benefits of crime (neoclassical), or the constrained access to goals (anomie).  Firms 
that are economically healthy and viable, however, are protected from the risks.  Therefore, firm profits or 
some other “protective factors” may increase compliance. 
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plant-level studies have included parent company characteristics to predict plant 
violations and pollution levels.   
The explanations for compliance and overcompliance are also similar.  The few 
studies (mostly outside of criminology) that have examined pro-social corporate 
outcomes (compliance and overcompliance) generally discuss formal sanctions and extra-
legal sanctions (e.g., stock market sanctions, community pressure).  These explanations 
for compliance are mirrored in the plant-level literature.  In the following review the two 
bodies of literature are integrated when the explanations overlap.  Differences in the unit 
of analysis are noted.  However, in some instances the plant-level literature contains 
explanations that are unique from the firm-level research.  These studies are discussed 
separately.   
Etiology of Noncompliance 
Theoretical explanations and empirical studies of corporate crime generally focus 
on explaining criminal participation; firm-level theories and studies often point to factors 
that might increase the willingness of corporate decision-makers to engage in corporate 
misconduct (Shover and Bryant, 1993).  Performance pressure, organization size, and 
organizational structure and complexity have been theoretically and empirically linked to 
various types of corporate crime, although not always consistently (see McKendall and 
Wagner, 1997 for summary).  Theoretical explanations also emphasize a role for 








  Early research showed that firm profitability decreased the likelihood of illegal 
corporate behavior, including unfair trade (Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975) and antitrust 
(Asch and Seneca, 1976).  Using more sophisticated methods, some more recent studies 
tend to find a null relationship between firm profitability and crime.  Firm profit is 
unrelated to financial crimes (Jamieson, 1994; Simpson, 1986) and non-financial crimes 
such as discrimination cases (Baucus and Near, 1991) and OSHA and environmental 
cases (Hill et al., 1992).   
Some studies do, however, find a weak but significant negative relationship 
between firm profit and the same offense types.  Firm profitability decreases total, 
environmental, labor, and manufacturing cases (Clinard and Yeager, 1979, 1980) as well 
as willful and repeat OSHA violations (McKendall, DeMarr, and Jones-Rikkers, 2002).  
Profit trends have also been linked to corporate misconduct.  Firms experiencing a 
decline in financial performance over a five year period (1971-1975) are more likely to 
be charged with violations (Keane, 1993).  Low rates of growth in sales, employment, 
and/or assets lead to more convictions for environmental crime (Alexander and Cohen, 
1996; Clinard and Yeager, 1980) and total firm misconduct (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).  
Firm financial performance is also a factor in managers’ decisions to offend.  Vignette 
study results suggest that managers are significantly more likely to engage in price fixing, 
bribery, fraud or EPA violations if the act will give the organization an edge over foreign 
competition or the act will result in substantial savings for the firm, controlling for 
individual-level predictors (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996).   
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Still, a few studies find profitability to be positively correlated with offending.  
Using EPA and U.S. Coast Guard enforcement actions as a measure of environmental 
violations, McKendall and Wagner (1997) find that profitable firms have more serious 
environmental violations (e.g., court proceedings) per 1,000 employees than smaller 
firms.  Simpson (2002) also finds that managers’ intentions to offend were higher when 
the firm was experiencing a growth in sales.13   
Despite the variability in findings, theoretical discussions of corporate and white-
collar crime continue to include poor financial performance since it may increase 
offender strain.  However, other explanations for the relationship can be drawn from 
neoclassical or anomie perspectives.  The neoclassical model suggests that firms may 
offend because the financial benefits outweigh the costs of crime (Cohen, 1999).  Anomie 
theory suggests that companies will innovate when legitimate means to ends are blocked 
or when legitimate behavior does not pay off (Vaughan, 1983).  Regardless of the 
theoretical rationale, firm economic health has figured prominently in explanations for 
corporation crime.   
The environmental literature has also examined the relationship between firm 
profits and plant-level outcomes.  The literature is equivocal.  Studies by Gray and 
colleagues find that firm profits (net income over capital stock) are unrelated to air 
pollution at the plant-level (Gray and Deily, 1996; Gray and Shadbegian, 2005).  
However, others find that firm profits are negatively correlated with pulp and paper plant 
emissions and positively correlated with plant control technology (Kagan et al., 2003).  In 
                                                 
13 Simpson (2002) reports several other effects that are counter to other vignette findings.  Unlike 
Paternoster and Simpson (1996), Simpson (2002) finds that intentions to offend are higher when the act 
will save the firm a small amount of money (as opposed to a large amount) and are lower when the firm is 
losing ground to foreign competitors. 
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addition, higher gross return of the parent company is associated with fewer water 
violations among pulp and paper plants (Helland, 1998). 
Industry Profit 
 Studies indicate a significant association between industry profitability and 
corporate crime.  The specific direction of the effect varies by crime type and study.  
Baucus and Near (1991) find a curvilinear relationship between industry growth rate and 
discrimination, antitrust, and product liability cases among Fortune 500 firms; firm 
misconduct was higher during times of industry scarcity (low profits) and industry 
munificence (high profits). 
Industry munificence/growth in sales has been linked to financial offenses 
(Alexander and Cohen, 1996; Jamieson, 1994) as well as environmental and total 
convictions (Alexander and Cohen, 1996).  Although the findings are consistent for 
environmental crimes (Alexander and Cohen, 1996; Clinard and Yeager, 1980) the effect 
is reversed for other types of misconduct.   
Also consistent with Baucus and Near (1991), some studies find that firms in 
depressed industries engaged in more illegality as well as specific crime types (Clinard 
and Yeager, 1980; Keane, 1993).  Likewise, Simpson (1986) finds that industry 
profitability (manufacturers’ added value) significantly decreases antitrust offending, 
although the effect varies by anticompetitive crime type.   
Organizational Structure 
 Size 
 Overall the literature suggests a positive relationship between organization size 
and financial crimes (Asch and Seneca, 1976; Baucus and Near, 1991; Dalton and 
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Kesner, 1988; Jamieson, 1994; Simpson, 1986) as well as non-financial crimes such as 
discrimination (Baucus and Near, 1991) and environmental cases (Alexander and Cohen, 
1996).  This relationship has been established using a variety of firm size measures, 
including counts of employees, sales, gross revenues, net profits, capacity to render 
services, and quantity of assets held by the firm (McKendall and Wagner, 1997).  
However, the findings are not entirely consistent.  For example, McKendall and Wagner 
(1997) find that size (average sales) is unassociated with serious and nonserious 
environmental violations.  Similarly, firm size does not significantly influence managers’ 
intentions to engage in bribery, pricefixing, fraud, or EPA violations (Paternoster and 
Simpson, 1996; Simpson, 2002). 
The majority of the studies that find an association between size and illegal 
behavior use absolute measures of the dependent variable that do not take company size 
into account (e.g., violation counts/non-rates).  Some argue that absolute measures best 
reflect the hypothesis and opportunity theory explains the positive relationship between 
firm size and offending—large firms simply have more opportunities to engage in illegal 
activities.  However, other researchers argue that proportionate measures should be used 
to take into account differences in activity/opportunity (McKendall and Wagner, 1997). 
Any remaining association between size and offending may suggest that large firms are 
criminogenic in other ways (not just opportunity).  The theoretical disagreement suggests 
that a solid conclusion cannot be drawn.  However, some studies that use a proportional 
measure continue to find an association between firm size and violations per unit size, 
particularly for EPA (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Hill et al., 1992) and total (Clinard and 
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Yeager, 1980) violations.14  While further study and theoretical discussion is clearly 
needed, the evidence suggests that larger firms engage in more illegal behavior.   
Environmental studies have also examined the effect of firm size on plant-level 
emissions and violations.  Several studies find that firm size (measured as number of 
employees or sales) is unrelated to air pollution (Gray and Deily, 1996; Gray and 
Shadbegian, 2005) and to the number of water pollution violations at plants (Yeager, 
1987).  However, Grant and colleagues find that larger firms (number of employees) own 
plants with higher Toxic Release Inventory emissions rates (Grant and Jones, 2003; 
Grant, Jones, and Nell, 2004).   
Finally, environmental studies have examined the relationship between plant size 
and plant noncompliance.  Overall the literature also suggests a positive relationship 
across regulatory area.  Major manufacturing plants have more water violations (Yeager, 
1987); larger plants tend to have higher toxic release inventory emissions rates (Grant, 
Bergesen, and Jones, 2002; Grant and Jones, 2003; Grant et al., 2004); and larger plants 
are less likely to be in compliance with air pollution regulations (Gray and Deily, 1996; 
Gray and Shadbegian, 2005).  On the other hand, Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) 
find that large Publicly Owned Treatment Works (water treatment plants) have a lower 
probability of violation than small ones.   
Complexity 
 Structural complexity represents the “degree of spread and segmentation in an 
organization’s structure, reflecting the combined effects of horizontal, vertical, and 
                                                 
14 Interaction effects may explain the variability in findings.  Although a lack of profit may provide 
motivation for illegal behavior and organizational size may provide opportunity, a strong ethical climate 




spatial differentiation” (McKendall and Wagner, 1997, p. 627).  Structural complexity 
may provide opportunity because it decreases communication and managerial control 
(Finney and Lesieur, 1982).  Employees may engage in behavior with little risk of 
detection but they also may not receive information necessary to make law abiding 
choices (McKendall and Wagner, 1997).  Using survey and 10K information about the 
number of sites and number of divisions, McKendall and Wagner (1997) find that 
structural complexity is unrelated to environmental offending.   
Studies have also examined diversification; firms that operate in more industries 
are likely to have complex structures as they increase the spread and segmentation in 
operations.  Most empirical studies have found that diversification is unrelated to 
different types of corporate misconduct, measured by court and agency cases (Clinard 
and Yeager, 1980; Cochran and Nigh, 1987; Hill et al., 1992; McKendall and Wagner, 
1997).  However, diversification does emerge as a significant predictor in the single study 
that examines actual emissions (legal Toxic Release Inventory emissions) rather than 
case outcomes. Dooley and Fryxell (1999) aggregate plant-level releases up to the firm-
level and find that diversified firms (the number of two-digit industry categories in which 
the firm operates) with extensive depth in each industry (number of four digit industry 
categories in which a firm operates divided by the number of two-digit categories) have 
higher emissions than firms using other diversification strategies.  This effect is mainly 
due to the breadth of the diversification (rather than the depth).   
Organizational decentralization might also result from structural complexity.  
Firms that have more spread and segmentation in structure may have less centralized 
control.  Using survey measures of the locus and dispersion of decision making, two 
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studies find that decentralization is unrelated to environmental and/or OSHA offenses 
(Hill et al., 1992; McKendall and Wagner, 1997). 
Regardless of how it is measured, complexity has more consistent effects when 
the plant environmental record is examined in the larger corporate context.  The number 
of sites owned (Gray and Deily, 1996) or being a large plant embedded in a wider 
corporate structure (Grant et al 2002) increases illegal behavior.  In addition, chemical 
plants that are subsidiaries of larger organizations have significantly higher TRI (legal) 
emissions rates (Grant and Jones, 2003). 
Corporate Culture 
In addition to the connections drawn between profits, company structure (e.g., 
size, diversification, etc), and firm behavior, organizational misconduct is also linked to 
corporate culture.  In fact, organizational culture has been employed to explain many 
aspects of organizational performance.  Yet, a review of the empirical evidence on the 
organizational culture reveals the need for further work to demonstrate its relevance.  In 
addition to a lack of consensus on the definition of culture, the studies tend to suffer from 
methodological weaknesses (Shover and Hochstetler, 2002). 
Although culture is considered an important part of the explanation, there is little 
consensus on the definition of corporate culture.  Approaches range from the beliefs of 
top management to dress norms and stories people tell (for a review, see Shover and 
Hochstetler, 2002).  One definition stresses that culture is created when firms make the 
initial investment to establish a particular set of values in workers; this investment 
produces a culture that is defined in terms of homogeneity in tastes, technologies, and 
beliefs (Lazear, 1995).  Once established, workers will behave in the desired fashion 
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without intensive monitoring by the firm.  “Corporate cultures evolve endogenously, 
having lives of their own,” although the process by which it evolves is not well  
understood (Lazear 1995, p. 90).15  Specific definitions of corporate culture vary on 
several fronts: whether culture operates as an incentive or a control mechanism; whether 
culture is explicit or implicit within the firm; and whether we can define the aspects of 
and observe culture itself or only manifestations and reflections of culture are observable.  
Despite this variation, most of the definitions of culture include the notion of a shared set 
of norms and values that give rise to typical behavior patterns.16  While many agree that 
culture is shared norms and values, ideas regarding exactly what is shared are less 
developed.   
In part because of the definitional ambiguity but also because of methodological 
flaws, research on organizational culture as it relates to any kind of organizational 
performance is lacking.  Most research on organizational cultures utilizes a case study 
method.  Although clearly appropriate for small homogeneous units, this method has also 
been applied to complex organizations.  “Studies in which probability samples, 
longitudinal designs and clearly specified models are employed are exceedingly rare” 
                                                 
15 Although the development of corporate culture is not well understood, scholars have argued theoretically 
that both external and internal environment contribute to the creation of corporate culture.  External 
environment, such as economic trends and cultures of competition, have been mentioned as a possible 
factors.  Researchers have also argued that industry has a powerful influence on organizational culture, as 
companies could not survive if they developed strategies, structures or processes that conflicted with 
industry success (Gordon, 1991).  Yet, while the culture of all companies within an industry may be similar 
they are not identical.  Although external environment likely contributes to corporate culture, many 
scholars agree that internal factors, particularly the stance taken by top management, is the critical 
determinant of culture (Hochstetler and Copes, 2001).   
16 Although cultures may give rise to typical behavior patterns, organizational cultures are not necessarily 
completely homogenous, especially as they increase in size and complexity (Hochstetler and Copes, 2001; 
Shover and Hochstetler, 2002).  Scholars have distinguished “strong” cultures as those where patterns of 
belief are shared throughout the company.  It is also possible that different units may develop distinct 
cultures or even subcultures (Gordon, 1991).  Research on ethical climates also shows variation in climate 
within organizations.  However, despite the variation, firms can usually be characterized according to a 
dominant ethical climate (Victor and Cullen, 1987).   
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(Shover and Hochstetler, 2002, p. 8).  Most studies of the effect of organizational culture 
on crime suffer from the same shortcomings discussed above (e.g., definitional 
ambiguity, case study approach) in addition to often focusing on high-profile or 
unusually harmful (i.e., atypical) crimes (Lee and Ermann, 1999).  Even when using well-
specified models, culture is often not directly measured and instead is invoked post hoc to 
explain unusual findings (Shover and Hochstetler, 2002).  For instance, Clinard and 
Yeager (1980) speculate (although they have no direct measures) that organizational 
culture explains the residual variation in violation rates across industry that is not 
explained by economic predictors.  Simpson and Koper (1992) find that companies 
located in the auto or oil industries are significantly more likely to recidivate than firms 
in other industries, including can, chemical, steel, and tire industries.  Because the authors 
control for certain financial and legal conditions, they suggest that some unmeasured trait 
of the industry, either structural or cultural, significantly influences corporate recidivism.  
However, industry culture is not directly measured.   
Despite these limitations, a body of work has begun to accumulate which, as a 
whole, can provide insight into the behavioral consequences of corporate culture.  Diane 
Vaughn’s (1996, 2001) case study of the Challenger launch decision is one of the most 
well-known and comprehensive studies.  It goes a long way toward demonstrating that 
organizational culture can have an enormous impact on decision-making.  Specifically, 
Vaughn found that three factors—cultural belief system in the work group, the culture of 
production, and structural secrecy—produced a culture at NASA that (over time) 
accepted technical deviation.  The work groups saw the launch of the Challenger under 
uncertain conditions to be conforming and normal, not deviant.   
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Additional data links culture to criminal outcomes.  In qualitative interviews, 40 
senior, division, and middle level executives in the folding-box industry explained the 
price-fixing conspiracy cases that occurred in the industry in 1977 in cultural terms.  
Executives discussed company culture broadly, arguing that the distinct history of the 
industry led to a different set of rules and frequent (illegal) price agreements (Sonnenfeld 
and Lawrence, 1978). 
Quantitative studies that include culture are limited.  Evidence suggests that the 
ethical nature of firm culture—measured with survey data—may influence environmental 
offending in interaction with other firm characteristics, although the direct effects were 
not significant (McKendall and Wagner, 1997).  Yet, using a different research design, 
the effects are mixed.  Paternoster and Simpson (1996) find that managers report higher 
intentions to engage in pricefixing, bribery, fraud, and EPA violations when illegal 
behavior is common in the firm even after controlling for individual moral evaluations.  
In contrast, reporting on another study Simpson (2002) finds little effect of industry or 
firm culture (the act is common within the firm or industry) on managers’ intentions to 
offend.  The direction of the effect was positive as expected, but not significant.   
Plant-level studies bolster the relevance of firm culture.  The compliance rate at 
plants owned by the same firm is significantly related to compliance at the plant under 
study.  Thus, the culture of the company may transcend the plants to create a similar 
environmental record across plants (Gray and Deily, 1996). 
Etiology of Compliance 
 Other studies of environmental behavior attempt to explain compliance.  Many of 
these explanations apply at both levels of analysis—firm and plant.  Some specific 
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examples apply to only one entity (e.g., firms deal with shareholders), but the theoretical 
construct (extra-legal sanctions) applies to both. 
Costs and Benefits: Legal 
The traditional economic assumption is that firms (or plants) comply when the 
costs of noncompliance are higher than the benefits.  They comply to avoid legal 
sanctions.  The firm-level deterrence literature is fairly mixed, but some studies—
including those conducted at the plant-level—suggest that EPA inspections act as a 
deterrent.  However, inspections represent additional EPA monitoring rather than 
enforcement.  EPA sanctions may have less of an impact.  When violations are detected 
penalties are limited (Cohen, 2000).  The bulk of the response to EPA violations is 
informal, cooperative in nature, and relatively lenient (Hunter and Waterman, 1996).17   
Whether sanctions act as a deterrent is an empirical question.  Yet even if 
sanctions do not act as a deterrent in the traditional sense, they may still explain 
compliance.  Plants may comply because they may not realize how low penalties are for 
violations.  Hammit and Reuter (1988) cite survey evidence that small quantity hazardous 
waste generators overestimate the chances of government monitoring (as cited in Cohen 
2000).  An alternative argument is that firms/plants comply to avoid increased 
enforcement (Harrington, 1998).  Firms with a history of noncompliance may be 
                                                 
17 For instance, EPA considers the determination that “no current action is warranted” an enforcement 
action (Hunter and Waterman, 1996).  Using NPDES data for the years 1975-1988 and 1986-mid 1994, 
Hunter and Waterman (1996) rate enforcement actions in a severity scale ranging from zero to seven.  The 
authors find that of the more than 27,000 enforcement actions conducted in the earlier time period,  only 
102 (0.4 percent) were the most severe kinds of sanctions (civil penalties or contempt actions).  By far, 
actions that ranked between 0 and 2 on the scale were the most common response to violation.  The 
category including warning letters (ranked 2 on the scale) represented 40 percent of the actions (20 percent 
of the actions received a score of zero severity).  When penalties are issued, they tend to be low.  In 1995 
the mean administrative fine imposed by the EPA was $32,000; fines ranged from $500 to $5000.  In 1995, 




subjected to higher monitoring and larger fines.  The threat of increased sanctions 
encourages other firms to remain compliant without enforcement agencies actually 
increasing overall levels of enforcement.  In deterrence lingo, firms remain compliant 
because of experiences with vicarious punishment.   
Regulation may also explain overcompliance (polluting less than legally allowed).  
Although current regulations do not require firms to overcomply, some scholars believe 
that overcompliant firms gain a more powerful and influential voice in the formation of 
future regulations and hence a competitive advantage.  Overcompliance signals 
lawmakers that tighter restrictions are possible; in turn, tighter restrictions increase the 
costs for rival companies (Harford, 1997).  Overcompliance may be anticipatory behavior 
on the part of companies who anticipate more stringent future regulation (Arora and 
Cason, 1996).  However, given the high degree of compliance/overcompliance, it seems 
that additional explanations are necessary. 
Costs and Benefits: Extra-Legal 
Firm Shareholders 
 Harford (1997) suggests that firms may comply because of shareholders.  
Shareholders will not invest in firms that engage in environmentally risky practices; this 
places too much risk on their investment.  Thus, firms will comply in order to attract and 
please investors.  Evidence does suggest that firm stock prices suffer following negative 
publicity about the firm’s environmental record.  The EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory 
(TRI) requires firms to publicly report legal emissions over a specified amount.  When 
the first disclosure TRI was made, researchers found a significant reduction in the market 
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value for some firms.  The average firm experienced a -0.3 percent negative abnormal 
return (Hamilton, 1995).   
Reputation can work as a cost or a benefit.  In fact, losing individual and firm 
prestige can lead to company reform (Fisse and Braithwaite, 1983).  As Simpson (1998) 
states, “informal social control exerts more power over human behavior than does formal 
social control and, in the case of corporate crime, it may be even more relevant in the 
crime control equation than it is for street criminals” (p. 105).  On the other hand, 
reputation may provide rewards.  Firms have taken notice of consumer willingness to pay 
more for environmentally friendly products.  Firms with more consumer products may 
overcomply to establish a reputation as a “green” company and attract these customers 
(Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995). 
Community Pressure 
 Community and other informal pressure (e.g., from consumer boycotts, 
employees, and environmental groups) represents the plant-level equivalent and may 
push plants to be compliant.  For example, Kagan et al. (2003) discusses the idea of 
“social license;” that plants must meet social expectations for emissions in additional to 
legal expectations.  The authors show that mills with more active local environmental 
groups and those that had been subjected to anti-chlorine campaigns by Greenpeace had 
lower pollution emissions (Kagan et al., 2003; Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton, 
2004).  Similarly, another study showed that TRI emissions were related to the number of 
associations, churches, and small retail establishments in a county (Grant et al., 2004).  
However, the relationship between community characteristics and pollution levels may 
depend on neighborhood type: poor and minorities communities tend to have higher 
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levels of pollution.  Moreover, results may also depend on model specification and the 
dependent variable of interest.   When studies include plant with community 
characteristics, the latter are no longer associated with emission rates (Grant et al., 2002; 
Grant and Jones, 2003; Grant et al., 2004).  Using a different pollution measure [Publicly 
Owned Treatment Works (POTWs)] Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) find that 
POTWs in poorer, nonwhite communities have a higher probability of violation.  
Community pressure may also not be as effective with certain types of plants. 
Other Plant-Level Explanations 
The plant-level literature contains some explanations that are unique from the 
corporate literature.  Three of these explanations (i.e., plant age, compliance costs, and 
versatility) are designed to explain violations or pollution levels.  Two (i.e., 
environmental management system and plant variability) are relevant for compliance 
and/or overcompliance. 
Additional Plant Characteristics 
Plant age is linked to environmental record.  Manufacturing plants with older 
permits tend to have more water pollution violations (Yeager, 1987) and plants that were 
in operation before 1960 are less likely to be in compliance with air pollution regulations 
(Gray and Shadbegian, 2005).  Plant age may be linked to the cost of compliance.  Steel 
plants (Gray and Deily, 1996) and pulp and paper plants (Helland, 1998) with a higher 
compliance cost are more likely to be in violation of air regulations or to have a water 
violation in any quarter.  Upgrading older plants to meet standards is likely to be more 
expensive than the cost of adding technology to newer plants.   
 
 39
Versatility of Offending 
 One study has examined whether plants in violation of one permit tend to be in 
violation of others (e.g., air and water).  Gray and Shadbegian (2005) find versatility in 
environmental offending.  Steel plants in violation of their water permits and plants in 
violation during OSHA inspections are less likely to be in compliance with air pollution 
requirements.   
Environmental Management Style 
Plants may also (over)comply because they have a strong environmental 
management system.  Thornton, Kagan, and Gunningham (2003) create a typology of 
environmental management styles based on managers’ expressed attitude toward 
environmental problems, actions taken to address stakeholder demands, and explanations 
for those actions.  In contrast to the “Environmental Laggards,” “True Believers” are 
managers driven to environmental excellence by moral commitment to the environment 
(Thornton et al., 2003).  Excellence was not contingent on the cost of investment in 
environmental performance (perceiving environmental expenditures as affordable when 
others did not), but is influenced by each strand of their proposed “license to operate” 
(legal, social, and economic license).  Environmental management style had the strongest 
relationship with environmental performance; average emissions for True Believers were 
substantially lower than emissions associated with other management styles.   
Plant Variability 
 Other studies suggest that the uncertain nature of the pollution process may 
provide the motivation for environmental performance, overcompliance in particular.  
Plant-level discharges are quite variable from month-to-month and on a daily basis 
because of seasonal changes and random large discharges.  Plants might pollute below 
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the permitted levels (overcomply) on a regular basis to compensate for this variation and 
maintain a good overall record (Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz, 2006).  Using a monthly 
compliance ratio (reported discharges/permitted level), Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz 
(2006) find that water treatment plants with higher variability (standard deviation of the 
log of the monthly compliance ratio) pollute less on average.  However, variability does 
not explain all of the POTW overcompliance.  Plants pollute only 60 percent of permitted 
levels (overcomply by 40 percent) even when accounting for the effect of variability 
(Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz, 2006).  Consistent with Kagan and colleagues’ (2003) 
qualitative interview data, plants seem to intentionally overcomply. 
Summary: Plant and Firm Behavior 
Firm and plant characteristics help us understand illegality and compliance in 
general as well as environmental crime specifically.  Financially strained firms may be 
more likely to violate the law.  In addition, larger firms and larger plants are more likely 
to violate the law.  Firm-level studies suggest that structural complexity, diversification, 
and decentralization are unrelated to environmental offending.  Yet, the plant-level 
studies are quite consistent.  Plants embedded in more complex structures violate the law 
more often and discharge more pollution.  Few studies have examined how firm or 
industry culture may influence environmental offending at the firm-level.  However, the 
plant-level studies suggest that firm culture transcends plants.  Firm and plant-level 
studies also show that extralegal concerns (shareholders and reputation) are quite relevant 
to environmental compliance.   
This review of the literature raises the issue of the unit of analysis.  Only one 
study in this review examined firm-level self-reported pollution (Dooley and Fryxell, 
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1999).  Most of the environmental studies, particularly those using self-report data, are 
conducted at the plant-level.  Some of the plant-level studies show that firm 
characteristics are not significant predictors of plant-level environmental performance 
(Gray and Shadbegian, 2005; Yeager, 1987); others find that some firm characteristics 
are independent predictors of plant-level performance (Grant and Jones, 2003; Gray and 
Deily, 1996; Helland, 1998; Kagan et al., 2003); and other studies find that firm 
characteristics interact with plant-level characteristics (Grant et al., 2002).  Thus, the 
research suggests that firm characteristics may influence plant-level outcomes, but plant 
characteristics are more consistently associated with plant environmental performance.  
In addition, other plant-level predictors (e.g., community pressure) are also relevant.  If 
there are relevant predictors at the plant-level that cannot be aggregated to the firm-level 
and the pollution process actually occurs at the plant-level, is it appropriate to aggregate 
to the firm-level?  This question is addressed in the following section. 
Unit of Analysis 
Aggregating to the firm-level means that some plant-specific factors will not be 
captured in the analysis.  For example, one cannot aggregate the community 
characteristics of facilities located in different states.18  In addition, because pollution 
actually occurs at the plant, aggregation to the firm-level may not be appropriate.  For 
example, Clinard and Yeager (1980) produce few significant findings when examining 
EPA cases at the firm-level (explaining only 9 percent of the variation in the outcome) 
leading Yeager (1993) to speculate that using firm and industry level predictors may be 
                                                 
18 This is more of a problem for some predictors than others.  Omitted variables must be correlated with 
both the outcome and the predictors of interest in order to create bias.   
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inappropriate, especially when the decisions and pressures relevant to compliance are 
made and experienced at lower levels (division, factory, etc) in the firm.19   
However, I argue that firm-level analysis is valid.  First, it has a strong theoretical 
basis in the corporate crime literature and is supported in the empirical literature.  Gray 
and Deily (1996) find that the compliance rate at other plants owned by the same firm is 
significantly related to compliance rate at the plant under study; firm culture does seem to 
transcend across plants.  Grant et al. (2002) find that large plants have significantly 
higher emissions rates when they are branch plants; the interaction effect is particularly 
strong for branches with out-of-state headquarters, which may indicate something about 
the parent company approach (locating polluting firms some distance from headquarters).  
This fact points “to the merits of an alternative way of understanding environmental 
degradation that focuses less on the dangerous chemicals used by manufacturers and 
more on the organizations that manage them” (Grant et al., 2002, p. 402). 
Despite the evidence, one cannot ignore the fact that the effects of firm 
characteristics on plant-level behavior are mixed and plant-level factors have much 
stronger effects.  However, some firm-level factors may actually condition the effect of 
plant-level factors.  For example, Gunningham et al. (2004) suggests that plant response 
to social pressure for compliance depends on the plant environmental management 
system.  Although the authors do not provide a full description of how an environmental 
management style develops and operates, they find some evidence that environmental 
management systems may be dictated by the parent company (e.g., one plant terminated 
talks with community groups based on the instructions of the head office). 
                                                 
19 He also notes that the studies are limited by incomplete data agency case data that undercounts pollution 
offenses.  This problem does not exist in the current data.   
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The failure to explore the role of citizenship is an important omission in both the 
environmental and corporate crime literatures (plant and firm-level) is.  I attempt to fill 
this gap.   
Corporate Citizenship and Compliance 
Some work has been done that supports the idea that citizenship may be related to 
firm-level outcomes.  Integrated/expanded rational choice studies established a link 
between morality and intentions to engage in street crime as well as corporate crime.  
Although business decisions are typically viewed as amoral considerations of costs and 
benefits (in the narrow sense), managers who believe that illegal acts are highly 
objectionable on moral grounds report lower intentions to offend (Simpson, 2002).  
Morality of the law has a modest effect in predicting government-rated compliance 
(Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991).  Similarly, May (2004) is able to distinguish two sets of 
motivations for compliance—“affirmative” and “negative”—among a randomly selected 
sample of homebuilders in Washington state.  He conceptualizes affirmative motivations 
as those arising from a sense of obligation to comply while negative motivations arise 
from fear of the consequences associated with violation of regulatory law.  In relative 
ranking, homebuilders report that affirmative motivations are a more important 
consideration for compliance than fear of sanctions.   
Although not defined or discussed in terms of citizenship, some firm-level studies 
contain measures that might capture citizenship to some extent.  Ethics and morality 
provide the basis for citizenship.  Ethical codes in corporations are designed to govern the 
conduct of employees.  Overall, the literature suggests that ethical codes in and of 
themselves have little impact on violations (Mathews, 1987; McKendall et al., 2002), but 
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ethical codes must be taken seriously by top management to be effective (Clinard, 1983).  
Demonstrating a consistent and sincere commitment to ethical practices is not enough.  
Top management must also find ways to convey this commitment down the ranks 
(Sonnenfeld and Lawrence, 1978).  In fact, more serious self-regulation programs (i.e., 
more than codes of conduct) significantly affect intentions to offend among MBA 
students and executives (Simpson, 2002).   
Measures that indicate more effort or a more serious commitment on the part of 
firms might better capture citizenship.  For instance, compensation criteria send a strong 
signal “down the ranks” as to what kind of behavior will be rewarded.  In the Sonnenfeld 
and Lawrence (1978) interviews, executives suggested that personnel reward practices 
contribute to price-fixing.  In many of the convicted companies, performance evaluations 
(as well as bonuses and commissions) were based primarily on profits.  Hill et al. (1992) 
examined this question with quantitative data; the authors find that companies that use 
little non-financial data to evaluate divisions have higher levels of EPA and OSHA 
violations.20  This “management by numbers” (using rate of return as the primary 
evaluation criteria) indicates that managers should do what is necessary to increase 
profits in the short-run and ignore other (social) concerns.  In fact, division reward 
practice was one of the few items that predicted EPA and OSHA citations.21   
                                                 
20 Although the authors provide a list of items used in the survey questionnaire, it is somewhat unclear 
which items specify “non-financial” considerations.  However, some do seem to be more social in nature.  
For example, Hill et al. (1992) asked managers about the extent to which industry relations were used to 
evaluate division performance.   
21 The authors also include a dichotomous measure of incentive systems.  Firms scored 1 if division 
evaluation standards are exclusively based on rate of return and 0 if it incorporates a more holistic standard.  
This measure did not significantly predict violations.  Although not highly correlated with the previous 




From the conceptual and empirical literature reviewed thus far, I expect corporate 
citizenship to be significantly related to firm environmental record.  Three research 
hypotheses are derived to test this relationship.  As previously discussed, compliance 
with environmental regulations is quite common among industrial firms.  Although some 
firms continue to violate, many do not.  Good citizens are likely to lead this trend.  Thus, 
I hypothesize that “good citizens” will be in compliance more often than “bad citizens” 
after controlling for the known predictors of corporate crime. 
However, even “good citizens” can find themselves in violation of environmental 
law due to random fluctuations in discharges and seasonal rises (Bandyopadhyay and 
Horowitz, 2006).   In addition, although decisions are conditioned by corporate culture 
and as a result are likely to be consistent across employees, there still may be employees 
who act in a manner inconsistent with corporate citizenship messages.  Yet, “good 
citizens” should have fewer violations (when they violate) because they are likely to have 
more technology in place to temper seasonal and random variations in discharges and to 
have stronger controls over individual employee behavior.  Thus, I hypothesize that when 
violations occur, “good citizens” will have fewer violations on average than “bad 
citizens” after controlling for the known predictors of corporate crime.  
In addition to the high rate of compliance in the environmental arena, firms often 
overcomply; they pollute substantially less than legally allowed.  As a result, much of the 
variation in firm record is in the degree of overcompliance.  Good citizens have a moral 
commitment to society that is broader than “mere compliance;” thus, companies in this 
state may be more likely to exceed legal requirements than those that are not.  In fact, the 
association between compliance and environmental overcompliance may stronger than 
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the relationship between compliance and the other environmental outcomes.  Thus, I 
hypothesize that “good citizens” will overcomply more than “bad citizens” after 
controlling with the known predictors of corporate crime and environmental behavior.  
Corporate citizenship may also be related to responsiveness to EPA sanctions.   
Sanctions and Recidivism 
 Although sometimes discussed in the literature as an explanation for compliance, 
sanctions have most often been examined in terms of recidivism.  I begin this review of 
the literature with the criminological firm-level studies, most of which examines the 
effect of sanctions on other kinds of corporate misconduct (antitrust, etc).  Research on 
regulation and environmental performance examines sanction effects at the plant-level.  I 
review the plant-level literature before moving into a discussion of how citizenship may 
interact with sanction effects. 
Firm-Level Literature 
Block and colleagues (1981) examine the effect of antitrust enforcement on 
collusive pricing in the white bread industry.  The authors find general and specific 
deterrent effects after controlling for the cost of bread making and production.  
Specifically, increases in antitrust enforcement budgets as well as antitrust prosecutions 
in the industry decrease overall price markups; reduce the prices of bakers in neighboring 
areas; and lower price markups for past colluders.  However, Jamieson (1994) examines 
antitrust recidivism (companies with more than one violation between 1981 and 1985) in 
a sample of 277 violating companies and finds little evidence of a deterrent effect 
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associated with either Department of Justice (DOJ) law enforcement interventions or the 
Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) more compliance-oriented interventions.22   
Simpson and Koper (1992) find only limited support for deterrence arguments 
when examining the recidivism of 38 corporations charged with one or more serious 
antitrust violations between 1928 and 1981.  Proxy measures for sanction certainty (the 
number of nonserious antitrust cases brought against a firm one year prior to the current 
year) had no effect on reoffending.  Nor did measures of sanction celerity (time between 
offense and case initiation).  The authors find some relationship between sanction 
severity and recidivism (changing crime to felony status; FTC involvement); a guilty 
finding (versus no sanction) significantly inhibited future offending.  Having a case 
brought civilly significantly increased the chances of reoffending, although criminal and 
administrative (FTC) cases did not have an impact.  The firm’s cultural and economic 
climates were far more important predictors of reoffending. 
Most perceptual deterrence studies provide little evidence of a negative 
association between formal sanctions and corporate crime.  First, corporate executives 
and managers report that formal sanctions are rarely considered when managers are faced 
with unethical situations (Simpson, 2002).  Quantitative studies contain similar evidence.  
Braithwaite and Makkai (1991) found that perceptions of the sanction elements (additive 
or multiplicative) have little influence legal compliance in Australian nursing homes.  In 
some vignette studies, informal sanctions were more salient predictors of intentions to 
offend than were formal sanctions.  Formal sanctions were no longer significant once 
                                                 
22 Compliance interventions are used to negotiate compliance and prevent corporate misconduct while 
deterrence strategies are focused on punishment after the fact.  Jamieson (1994) considers DOJ as a more 
law enforcement type intervention because it is solely responsible for criminal prosecutions.  The FTC, on 
the other hand, often uses negotiation and education to encourage conformity.   
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informal sanction threats, moral beliefs, shame, and personal benefits were entered into 
the model (Simpson, 2002).  Paternoster and Simpson (1969), however, found that 
intentions to offend were affected by formal (and informal) sanctions among those low in 
moral restraint. 
Overall, the support for deterrence theory in this literature is mixed.  However, 
much of the plant-level literature finds deterrent effects for EPA inspections. 
Plant-Level Literature 
Despite the lax regulation, the literature on enforcement of the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) in the pulp and paper industry points to a specific deterrent effect associated with 
EPA actions (see Cohen, 2000 for summary).  Most of these studies examine the effect of 
EPA inspections (monitoring) rather than enforcement actions/sanctions.  Magat and 
Viscusi (1990) find specific deterrence effects of inspections on biological oxygen 
demand (BOD) level, compliance status, and non-reporting in the United States pulp and 
paper industry.23  Laplante and Rilstone (1996) find that the expected inspection rate 
(two-stage model) decreases BOD and total suspended solids (TSS) emissions in the 
absolute and relative to allowable discharge levels in Canada.24  Liu (1995) finds that 
increased monitoring does not reduce the number of known violations.  Yet when he 
breaks inspections into “routine” and “discretionary” inspections, he finds that routine 
inspections increase the number of known violations while discretionary inspections 
(those targeted towards firms known to be out of compliance or with previous violations) 
have a deterrent effect.  Nadeau (1997) finds that enforcement actions and monitoring 
                                                 
23 BOD is a required measurement under the Clean Water Act; facilities discharging pollutants into the 
water must keep BOD below permitted levels. 
24 TSS is a required measurement for most facilities under the Clean Water Act; facilities discharging 
pollutants into the water must keep TSS below permitted levels. 
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actions (inspections and tests) both decrease the number of days a facility is in violation, 
although an increase in enforcement actions produces more of a deterrent effect than an 
increase in monitoring actions.  Significant deterrent effects are also found for EPA 
enforcement of the Clean Air Act (CAA) in the U.S. steel industry (Deily and Gray, 
1991; Gray and Deily, 1996). Deily and Gray (1991) find that enforcement and 
inspections (lagged) are significantly related to whether the steel mill is out of 
compliance in any quarter of any year. 
Although not dealing explicitly with EPA standards, studies of OSHA regulation 
also find a deterrent effect for inspections (Bartel and Thomas, 1985; Viscusi, 1986); 
however, the literature is mixed in terms of plant-level specific deterrence.  Additionally, 
as Gray and Scholz (1993) note, some studies fail to control for endogeneity between 
inspections and injury (Cooke and Gautschi, 1981; Robertson and Keeve, 1983; Scholz 
and Gray, 1990).  Those that do are less apt to find a deterrent effect for OSHA violations 
(Smith, 1979; Ruser and Smith, 1991); but the research design employed in these studies 
(i.e., a natural experiment) does not completely overcome the methodological limits of 
earlier studies (Gray and Scholz, 1993).  One study that controls for heterogeneity among 
plants, serial correlation in the dependent variable, and endogeneity between injuries and 
inspections finds that OSHA inspections with penalties do lead to a decrease in both 
frequency and severity of injury rates of the inspected plant.  In fact, the effects continue 
for up to three years after the inspection (Gray and Scholz, 1993).   
Despite the support for the deterrent effect of EPA inspections (monitoring), there 
is less evidence on the effect of EPA sanctions.  In fact, only one of the above studies 
examines sanctions.  The study finds a deterrent effect, but qualitative interviews at 14 
 
 50
pulp and paper plants suggest that the effects of regulation and sanctions are limited.  
When targeted at specific pollution problems, regulation seems to reduce pollution.  But 
overall, regulatory jurisdiction did not covary with mill environmental performance, 
particularly mill overcompliance (Kagan et al., 2003). 
Summary: Firm and Plant Deterrence 
Overall the deterrence studies are mixed.  At the firm-level, one study supports 
general and specific deterrence, one supports neither, and one has mixed findings.  The 
perceptual studies are equally mixed.  Work at the plant-level consistently finds a 
deterrent effect, primarily for regulatory inspections.  There is less evidence on the 
effectiveness of EPA sanctions and the two existing studies are mixed.  In both bodies of 
literature the work on corporate sanctions has been limited to main effects.  It has not 
examined under what conditions deterrence may be effective.  Sanction studies have not 
explored the role of corporate citizenship in sanction responsiveness.  In the current 
study, I attempt to fill some of this gap by exploring the effect of sanctions for “good” 
and “bad” corporate citizens.   
Corporate Citizenship and Deterrence 
Studies of individuals have found that deterrence does not operate in a universal 
manner; deterrent effects vary by personality characteristics, demographic characteristics, 
and moral outlooks.  In other words, deterrent effects vary by type of person.  Silberman 
(2000) notes that firm-level factors may also influence how effective deterrence strategies 
are in reducing noncompliance.  For example, small firms may “possess unique 
characteristics” that differ from larger firms and that could influence deterrence.  In fact, 
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Gray and Shadbegian (2005) find that plants owned by larger firms are less responsive to 
inspections and more responsive to other enforcement actions.   
Corporate citizenship may condition the effect of sanctions.25  There is little 
empirical evidence to support this notion, but the case can be made theoretically.  
Individual-level deterrence studies show that when respondents judge a behavior to be 
morally offensive, the effect of formal sanctions on intentions to offend is insignificant 
(Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward, 1992; Burkett and Ward, 1993).  This has been 
demonstrated among managers as well (Simpson and Paternoster, 1996; Simpson, 2002).  
Based on the rational choice literature, one can hypothesize that good citizens will be 
unaffected by sanctions.  Because they are “acute conformists,” sanctions may be 
unnecessary to produce conformity among “good citizens” (Pogarsky, 2002).  Thus, in 
these data the environmental record of good citizens may change very little following a 
sanction (although the record will still be better than “bad” citizens).   
Yet, the effects may be different in this study than in the rational choice literature.  
All of the rational choice studies examine the effect of sanction threats on intentions to 
offend.  In this study firms have already been sanctioned.  In addition, the rational choice 
studies all examine individuals; the unit of analysis in this study is the firm.  A substantial 
body of literature shows that top management sets the ethical tone for the firm.  Yet, even 
when top managers orient the tone of the firm toward good citizenship, the firm still may 
have instances of noncompliance (as I outlined above).  The sanction the firm receives 
may serve as a signal to top management that internal controls need to be strengthened.  
                                                 
25 Suggesting any links between sanctions and citizenship may seem counterintuitive given that good 
citizens are more likely to be in compliance.  However, for the reasons outlined above, good citizens will 




Thus, sanctions may actually have a stronger effect on good citizens.  Good citizens may 
improve their environmental behavior more than bad citizens after receiving sanctions.   
Furthermore, good citizen firms may be more responsive to less punitive 
sanctions.  Good citizens may respond more readily and improve their behavior more 
than bad citizens even when the sanction is mild and informal.  In fact, Bardach and 
Kagan (1982) argue that aggressive enforcement of well-intentioned businesses can lead 
to a “culture of resistance” which may undermine norms of social responsibility.  This 
culture of resistance may develop because the firm reacts in a defiant manner (Sherman, 
1993).  When a sanction is perceived as illegitimate, the sanction may actually increase 
future noncompliance.26  There is some empirical basis for these ideas.  Paternoster and 
Simpson (1996) find that managers are more likely to offend when the law in question is 
perceived as unfair; the opportunity to challenge the law significantly increases intentions 
to offend even among those high in moral restraint.  Thus, punitive sanctions may have 
less of an impact on the environmental record good citizens than bad citizens.   
 The data I will use to test these questions comes from a project supported by a 
grant from the National Institutes of Justice.  The principal investigator is Dr. Sally 
Simpson.  As the graduate research assistant, I was primarily responsible for the 
collection and interpretation of the secondary data.  However, at various points in the 
project other students worked on the secondary data as well; all references to “we” refer 
to the research team.27  We believe the data collection effort constitutes a unique 
                                                 
26 Punitive sanctions may also violate the norm of autonomy, or the notion that individuals (firms) should 
be left alone unless they have done something morally blameworthy (Vandenbergh, 2003).   
27 The research team included additional members who worked intermittently on the secondary data 
collection, although their primary contributions were to other parts of the grant data collection effort.  They 




contribution to the literature in and of itself.  First, collecting data on companies is 
extremely complex and difficult (e.g., data availability, contradictions across publicly-
available sources, etc).  Thus, we provide a framework and list of sources for others 
interested in collecting corporate data.  Second, the data add to both the corporate crime 
and the environmental crime literatures.  In the corporate crime literature, relatively few 
studies have examined environmental behavior as compared to financial crimes and the 
existing studies use court case data that capture a very narrow range of environmental 
illegalities.  Our data provides comprehensive information on water pollution (and the 
potential to link to other kinds of pollution) and contains self-reports of pollution record 
rather than relying on end-of-system cases.  Our data also adds a new (and we think 
important) perspective to the environmental crime literature.  Most environmental studies 
focus on the plant and occasionally include parent company characteristics.  Our data 
provides a comprehensive picture of environmental record at the firm-level; the sample 
was constructed at the firm-level and includes all major facilities owned by the parent 
company.   
The following chapter provides an overview of the data collection, measures, and 
analytic strategy.  The section begins with an explanation for why the pulp and paper, 
steel, and oil refining industries were selected for study.  The specific steps that were 
taken to create the database are then described: compiling a universe of firms; tracking 
firm changes over time; linking firms to environmental facilities; and tracking facility 
ownership changes over time.  Finally, some of the complexities of the data that had to be 
addressed to make effective and accurate use of the data are addressed before moving 
into the specific measures and analytic techniques used in this study. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION AND MEASURES 
The data in this study (collected for the NIJ grant) was gathered from a variety of 
secondary, publicly available sources.  Because the data collection effort (described 
below) was arduous, the first step in the process was to narrow the industry focus.  Four 
industries were selected that are similar but also distinct.  The manufacturing industries 
selected for this project are known as potential sources of water pollution.  In addition, 
there is overlap across these industries in the pollutants that result from the 
manufacturing processes.  Yet, the technology and some pollution problems in each 
industry are unique, making it possible to study industry differences.   
 After selecting the industries of interest (i.e., pulp and paper, steel, and oil 
refining), data collection began.  After gathering, verifying, and cleaning the data, we 
have a universe of all U.S. based, publicly traded companies operating primarily in one of 
four Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) (Pulp Mills; Paper Mills; Petroleum 
Refining; Steel Works, Blast Furnaces, and Rolling) in 1995 linked to facilities (the EPA 
tracks compliance at the facility level) that are regulated by the EPA.  Facilities were 
limited to those operating in the same SIC codes in order to ensure a similar culture 
between parent company and facility.  Companies were retained for the study if they 
owned at least one facility operating in the same SIC code in 1995 that is categorized as a 
major discharger in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).28  
Firms/facilities were tracked for years 1995-2000.  Therefore, any changes in either the 
                                                 
28 Major industrial facilities are distinguished from minor dischargers by the facility’s potential for 
discharging toxic wastes, the volume and type of wastewater, and whether the receiving water is used for 
drinking (Yeager, 1993).  Although minor facilities are also required to have permits and report discharges, 
national EPA does not require that states submit compliance and enforcement data on minors.  Thus, in this 




company (mergers, bankruptcy, etc) or the facility (closings, changes in ownership, etc) 
were recorded through the year 2000.   
Creating the Firm Universe 
Most researchers have examined plant-level environmental performance.  Thus, 
the samples have been constructed at the plant-level and then (sometimes) parent 
company characteristics are attached to the sample of plants.  In those studies, the 
samples may contain multiple plants owned by the same firm, but the data sets do not 
necessarily have information on all plants owned by the same firm.  In this data set, we 
are adding a new level of analysis to the environmental crime literature—the firm.  Thus, 
we began creating our sample at the company-level.29    
Using Ward’s Business Directory, Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat, and 
Mergent Online we created a list of publicly-held U.S. based companies that had their 
primary business (as defined by the source) in pulp and paper, steel, or oil.  The goal was 
to follow companies that were operating in 1995 through the year 2000 (even those that 
merged, closed, or filed bankruptcy during that time period).  Some sources of 
information (e.g., Ward’s Business Directory) were available on a yearly basis.  Thus, we 
were able to compare the 1995 company list with the 2000 company list to determine and 
track which companies experienced some sort of change.  For example, if a company that 
appeared in the 1995 Business Directory was no longer listed in 2000, we investigated 
                                                 
29 We originally intended to use the EPA data itself to construct our sample because it contains both plant 
(compliance is tracked at the plant-level) and parent company information.  However, discussions with 
EPA employees revealed that parent company/ownership is not a required field (40 percent missing in our 
data) and it is not tracked historically—when facilities change hands the current owner information is 





and coded how/why the company changed.  Because some sources of information (e.g., 
Compustat and Mergent’s Online) were available only in the current version (as of 2002), 
we had to work backward to verify that the company was operating in 1995.30  We used 
qualitative company histories (from Mergent’s Online and the Business and Company 
Resource website), company websites, and annual 10K reports to complete these checks.  
We also used these sources to investigate contradictions across data source regarding 
primary industry, company status (i.e., private, international, US public), and company 
name (e.g., multiple entries with similar names).  Final coding reflects the majority 
consensus across sources.   
Although our preference was to restrict the sample to firms that operate primarily 
in one line of business to maintain cultural similarity between the various relevant units, 
in some cases this rule was violated.  Some firms listed as parent companies in our data 
sources were actually owned by holding companies or conglomerates.  Holding 
companies are a type of parent company that exists primarily to exercise financial control 
over other firms; the control is exercised through ownership of a majority of the 
controlled firm's shares.  These cases were included in the sample because it is unlikely 
that a holding company—a financial “figurehead”—would have the same effect on firm 
culture as other structural arrangements.31  A conglomerate is made up of a number of 
different companies that operate in diversified fields rather than having a single primary 
industry.  Two companies with a conglomerate parent company were included in the 
                                                 
30 We included companies listed as currently inactive in Compustat and Mergent’s if they were operating at 
the beginning of our sample period, even if they closed during our time period.  Although our focus is on 
companies already operating in 1995, we also included companies that had not yet begun operating in 1995 
if they were spun-off of companies already in the sample in that year. 
31 Facilities sometimes had both the holding company and the operational subsidiary listed as owners in 
various sources.  In all of these cases the only economic data available was that of the holding company.  
Thus, we listed the holding company as the owner and used its’ economic data. 
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sample because we were able to obtain independent economic data on the lower-level 
companies, a fact that suggested each operated somewhat independently. 32   
In other cases we discovered that firms were actually subsidiaries (companies 
controlled by another company) of other companies operating in our industries of 
interest.  This explained many of our multiple entries with similar names.33   In these 
cases, we wanted to determine whether the ultimate parent or the subsidiary was 
responsible for environmental operations and if so, whether it was operating 
independently.  If we were able to obtain unique economic data for the subsidiary and the 
ultimate parent annual report described it an independent operation, we listed the 
subsidiary as the parent company.34  If the subsidiary did not have independent economic 
data and did not appear to operate independently according to our business sources, we 
kept the ultimate parent in the sample.  We created dummy variables to reflect whether 
the company had a holding company, a conglomerate, or another company as its ultimate 
parent to determine if there are any substantive differences in the results with and without 
these companies in the analysis. 
Changes in Compliance Over Time 
 Because we were following our companies from 1995 through 2000, it was 
necessary to track changes in the company over time (merges, bankruptcy, etc).  We 
                                                 
32 We did collect the economic data for the conglomerate parent as well and can determine whether 
substantive results change depending on which economic data is used. 
33 It would be tempting to assume that entries with similar names were the same company, yet this often is 
not the case.  For instance, in many cases our company list contained both “X Steel Company” and “X 
Company.”  Without investigation we would have assumed that these were duplicate listings for one 
company.  However, as we often found, one name actually reflected the parent company and the other a 
large subsidiary.  Although quite complex to disentangle, these distinctions became quite important in 
determining 1) which entity was responsible for environmental operations and 2) which financial data to 
use (when both were available).   
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gathered information on bankruptcies and mergers from qualitative company histories 
(Mergent’s Online and the Business and Company Resource Center) and firm annual 
(10K) reports; when possible the type of bankruptcy was noted.  Companies were 
followed through bankruptcy if the company was not dissolved.  Companies were also 
followed through mergers if the new entity continued to operate in the industry of 
interest.  Although we planned to follow the original companies separately if they 
operated as subsidiaries of the newly merged entity, this rarely occurred.  Although 
newly merged companies often retain the brand names of previously independent 
companies, the original companies generally did not continue as independent operations.  
Consistent with our U.S. based rule, companies that merged with or were acquired by 
international companies were not tracked post-merger.   
 Some companies and their facilities were tracked despite unusual ownership 
changes.  In one instance we continued to follow a company even though it was acquired 
by a company operating in a different industry because our research suggested that it did 
continue to operate as an independent entity in the industry of interest.  The original 
company had unique economic data embedded in the new parent company’s annual 
(10K) report; it was also listed on the new parent company website as an independent 
subsidiary.  Finally, some companies that reorganized facility ownership into joint 
ventures with other companies (not in the sample) were also followed.  In these cases, we 
only tracked the facilities that were originally owned by a company in our 
sample/industries and as long as we were able to obtain some independent economic data 
on the joint venture. 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 We did collect the economic data for the ultimate parent as well and can determine whether substantive 




 In fact, gathering economic data required several steps.  As a first pass, we 
utilized existing sources that had already compiled the company information (i.e., 
Compustat and FIS Online).  These databases had some limitations that required us to 
search for additional information in other places (e.g., 10K reports). 
 One small problem was differences in data item names across source.  Although 
in most cases the data items had identical names across source, we would occasionally 
find items that had slightly different names in FIS Online.  For example, “pretax income” 
is a standard measures available in Compustat; while FIS Online often did not have an 
item names “pretax income,” it did include “income from continuing operations before 
income tax.”  We entered data items with different names when we thought it was 
reasonable to do so.  When possible we identified companies for which economic data 
was available in both data sources and compared the data items with different names to 
make sure they contained identical information for that company (before using it for a 
company that was not in both sources).  When this was not possible, we verified the 
categories with business school faculty at the University of Maryland to ensure that they 
were capturing the same piece of information.  
Several additional problems occurred when tracking economic data for two 
companies that merged.  First, the sources often retrospectively applied economic data for 
one of the original companies to the newly formed merger for years before it was formed 
(e.g., Pennzoil Company economic data was assigned to Pennzoil-Quaker State for years 
prior to the 1998 merger).  We used 10K reports to determine which of the original 
companies to whom the economic data belonged.  Second, economic data was often 
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missing for the year prior to mergers.  Generally we were unable to supplement this 
information from other sources and it continues to be a source of missing data.   
Some missing data problems were resolved using firm 10K reports.  Most of the 
main sources did not contain economic data for joint ventures and subsidiaries.  In some 
cases these entities did not have separate economic data from the parent company.  
However, in other cases we were able to find unique economic data for the smaller entity 
embedded in the parent company 10K reports.  In addition, in a few cases the original 
data sources were missing certain years of parent company economic data for no apparent 
reason.  We were often able to gather the data directly from firm 10K reports. 
Finally, the original data source occasionally contained economic data for a parent 
company and a subsidiary with similar names.  We used the 10K reports to authenticate 
the appropriate entity.   
Linking Companies to Facilities 
Because pollution actually occurs at the facility-level (e.g., plant, mill, refinery, 
etc), it was necessary to identify all facilities owned by our universe of firms.  Although 
there may be variation due to the plant age and technology, the corporate crime literature 
provides compelling reasons to believe that firm structure and culture may produce 
similar environmental performance across plants.  Therefore, aggregating plant-level 
performance to the firm-level provides a new method for examining and learning about 
environmental performance.  In order to create a sample of facilities in which it is 
reasonable to aggregate to the firm-level, facilities were only included in the sample if 
they were operating in the same industry as the parent company.  Under the assumption 
that facilities operating in the same industry as the parent company would maintain a 
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culture that is more similar to the parent company than those operating in a different 
industry.35 
We used three sources to create a list of owned facilities: The Directory of 
Corporate Affiliations; Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI); and EPA’s Permit Compliance System (PCS).36  Some sources are 
published by company (e.g., the Directory of Corporate Affiliations) and others are 
compiled at the facility-level but include some ownership information.  For example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) requires 
facilities to report air, land, and water releases to the EPA if the levels are above specified 
amounts along with the parent company name. 
We began with the Directory of Corporate Affiliations because it seemed to be the 
most complete source of information by company.  For companies published in the 
directory, we created a list of all facilities owned by our sample of companies that 
operated in the same industry (as the company) as of 1995.  We next generated a list of 
all facilities in our SIC codes of interest that submitted TRI reports in 1995.  Although 
TRI reports are done by facilities, they do report ownership information.  Unfortunately, 
the ownership information was often clearly incorrect (e.g., company listed as owner 
before it existed; one facility listed twice with two different parent companies).  Thus, all 
ownership information gathered from TRI was cross-checked with other sources (annual 
10K reports, etc).  We added facilities to the master facility file if a parent company in 
                                                 
35 Future studies may find that facilities operating in different industries still maintain a culture that is 
similar to the parent company, indicating the powerful influence of firm culture.  However, if this is not the 
case, it may suggest a boundary for examining environmental performance at the firm-level.  The reach of 
the parent company may stop at industry lines. 
36 The Permit Compliance System (PCS) contains the EPA data on facilities permitted to discharge 
pollutants into U.S. waterways.  We had access to the PCS data on all facilities in our industries for 1995 
through 2000.   EPA staff was very generous with their assistance. 
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our sample was listed as the owner but the facility was not already entered from the 
Directory of Corporate Affiliations.  We did encounter companies listed as owners in TRI 
that we had not run across in our other sources; however, we often found that the 
company was privately owned, international, or not in our industries of interest.  Very 
few companies were added to the sample based solely on TRI information (without being 
listed in Mergent’s or Ward’s) and all were verified with other sources (annual 10K 
reports, company histories, etc) before doing so. 
Finally, we added facilities from our water pollution data itself—the Permit 
Compliance System (PCS).  The ownership field in PCS is not a required field; it was 
populated only 60 percent of the time.  However, we did use the information that was 
available.  Facilities were added to the master list if a company in the sample was listed 
in the ownership field.  In addition, facility names often match parent company names 
(e.g., XYZ Steel Refinery is owned by XYZ Steel Company).  Thus, we also added 
facilities to the master list if the facility name in PCS indicated a particular company.  If 
the facility name matched a parent company name we assumed it was owned by that 
company, even if ownership not explicitly listed in PCS.  Because the ownership 
information in PCS is not always updated and the historical ownership is not retained, all 
PCS ownership information was also verified with the aforementioned sources. 
Linking Facilities to the Environmental Data 
The goal of the study is to examine compliance with the Clean Water Act, thus, 
we also limited the sample of facilities to those with EPA water permits.  Facilities that 
were found in sources other than PCS then had to be matched to PCS.  For example, the 
Directory is not published in conjunction with EPA; it is an independent source of 
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information.  Thus, none of the facilities listed in this source had any EPA identifier 
linked to them.  We first attempted to match using name and address, but that approach 
on a large scale was extremely difficult.  In searching for a more efficient method, we 
learned about the EPA’s Facility Registry System (FRS).  The FRS is designed to allow 
matches across EPA data bases.  It provides a single identifier (FRS number) that is 
linked to identifiers in all media programs (e.g., PCS, TRI, etc) at the state and federal 
level (National Academy of Public Administration Report).  FRS also contains the 
facility name, address, a list of all ownership information drawn from every source, and 
all previous names of the facility.   
To reduce coding error, we wanted to use official EPA identifiers to match our list 
of facilities to the permit data whenever possible.  At the time, we had TRI number for 
some facilities, but the FRS system can only be queried with facility name or FRS 
number.  We did not have FRS number matched to our facilities and many facilities have 
similar names—sorting through them by address can be arduous.  Instead, we obtained 
and utilized the Sector Facility Indexing Project (SFIP) linkages from Abt Associates.  
SFIP targeted five industries (i.e., automobile assembly, pulp manufacturing, petroleum 
refining, iron and steel production, and the primary smelting and refining of nonferrous 
metals) and compiled data across EPA programs (i.e., Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Toxics Release Inventory, and Emergency 
Response Notification System).  Thus, this source allowed us to look up facility FRS 
numbers using the TRI numbers (for the facilities we gathered from TRI) and PCS 
numbers (for the facilities listed in PCS) that had already been documented.  The FRS 
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numbers were used to enter the FRS system.  The FRS system contained additional 
helpful ownership information (described below).  
Facilities added to our master list from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations did 
not have any EPA identifiers associated with them (either PCS or TRI).  In both of these 
cases we had to search for these facilities in the FRS system by name and address.  We 
accepted facilities as a match if the address information in each source was identical.37   
Verifying Ownership and Tracking Changes Over Time 
 
 We began creating our universe of companies and facilities with 1995 matches.  
Although we now had permit numbers, there were often ownership contradictions within 
(i.e., TRI often had the same record twice with different ownership information) and 
between sources (i.e., two sources had the same facility listed with different owners).  For 
all contradictions, we checked annual 10K reports and the Business and Company 
Resource Center company history and industry news reports to determine the correct 
owner in 1995 and over time.38   
After establishing ownership in 1995, changes in ownership were tracked over time to 
determine whether the facility was still listed with the same company in 2000.  If not, the 
                                                 
37The address match may have been pulled from the list of alternate addresses rather than the main address 
(a facility may have a PO Box and a street address or a location and a mailing address).  Within these 
address matches, we sometimes found that the facility name in FRS differed from the name in our master 
file.  In these cases, we examined the list of previous facility names in FRS to verify the match (facilities 
change hands and therefore names; some of the facility names in our 1995 PCS data were outdated).   
38 As a first pass we investigated all facilities owned by companies that merged during the sample period.  
Many of the facilities with multiple entries had one entry citing the pre-merger company as the owner and a 
second entry listing the post-merger company as the owner.  In step two all facilities with contradictory 
information within PCS (e.g., one company was listed in one of the address fields and another company 
name was embedded in the facility name) were investigated.  Finally, we examined all remaining 
contradictions.  Contradictions across sources and within TRI were often the result of sales; one entry listed 




same sources were used to determine whether the facility changed hands, what company 
purchased it, and/or if it closed.  In most instances firm annual reports were most useful 
to find this information.  The Business and Company Resource Center and Mergent 
Online company histories, industry news reports, and the FRS system were also 
utilized.39  
The FRS system contains a list of previous facility names and ownership 
information from every EPA database (for which the facility has a permit) but does not 
state when a facility was sold/purchased.  Often the list of company names and the list of 
old facility names contain the old and new names which pointed us to annual reports to 
check.40  We coded the transaction month as the first month of new owner control unless 
the source specifically said the transaction occurred at the end of the month.  Finally, we 
examined the company histories reported on Mergent’s Online to check for any 
ownership changes we may have missed. 
At the end of this coding process, the database consisted of a universe of pulp and 
paper, steel, and oil companies that were operating a major pulp and paper, steel, or oil 
facility with a water permit in 1995 followed through 2000.  The original universe of 
companies in these industries was winnowed considerably by the sample criteria.  
Therefore, it is important to understand how this “new” and more restricted sample of 
                                                 
39 During this process, we sometimes noticed facilities that seemed to have environmental permits but that 
were not uncovered in our other sources.  If additional facilities were listed in the 10K report but were not 
in our database, we checked any facility in the same city and state in PCS to see if it was a match.  If it was 
clearly the correct facility (i.e., it had part of the company name in its name, the company was listed 
somewhere in the line of data for that facility, or it had a unique name that was also listed in the 10K) then 
we added the facility to the sample. 
40 In a few cases the information was not available in the annual 10K reports of either the seller or the 
purchaser (usually we later discovered that the purchaser was international and did not have to file 10K 
reports).  In these cases The Business and Company Resource Center company histories and industry news 




firms compares to the industry as a whole.  If the sample represents only one portion of 
the industry (e.g., only large companies or only small companies) then caution should be 
used in generalizing the results to all firms in the industry.   
Information on market share indicates that the sample contains the major players.  
According to the Market Share sales rankings (compiled by compiled by Gale Research 
Inc), the sample contains the top ten pulp and paper producers; the top eight iron and 
steel; and 7 of the top 10 petroleum refining companies (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency 1995).  While our universe of companies contains some of the largest 
operators in each industry, it also includes some relatively small firms (e.g., those that 
own only one plant).  Thus, we believe that our companies represent a substantial portion 
of the market but also provide a reasonable picture of the entire industry, including 
smaller firms. 
The focus on publicly traded companies and specific industries in this study also 
narrows the number of EPA permitted facilities.  Again, it is useful to compare the 
sample for this study with EPA permitted facilities more generally to understand what 
portion of the pollution problem the sample captures.  Using the NPDES data for all 
facilities operating in the industries of interest, we can see that there were 659 unique 
permits across industries.41  These facilities had a total of 14,998 violations over the 
entire six year period.  Four hundred and eleven permits were for major facilities; our 
data consist of 214 unique major permits (52 percent of the majors).  The numbers are 
similar by industry: our sample contains 59 percent of the major pulp and paper facilities; 
55 percent of the major steel facilities; and 41 percent of the major oil facilities.  
                                                 
41 In some cases facilities have multiple permits; therefore, the actual number of facilities may be slightly 
lower than the number of permits. 
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Combined, all of the major facilities in the EPA data had 11,477 violations over the six 
year period.  Our sample has a total of 5,341 violations (47 percent of the violations for 
majors).42  The plants that are in our sample are responsible for 49 percent of the pulp and 
paper violations; 56 percent for major steel facilities; and 36 percent for major oil 
facilities.  Overall then, the sample for this study captures approximately half of the 
major facilities in each industry and half of the violations, with somewhat smaller 
numbers for the oil industry.   
After the firm and facility data was created, it was time to tackle the NPDES data 
itself.  The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharging of pollutants through point sources 
into waters of the United States without a NPDES permit. The NPDES permit program 
translates the general requirements of the Clean Water Act into specific requirements for 
each facility.  The permit contains limitations on what and how much a facility can 
discharge as well as monitoring and reporting requirements.  Facilities are required to 
take various measures of discharges into the water and submit reports (usually monthly) 
of both NPDES permitted levels and actual discharges to the EPA; these reports are 
called discharge monitoring reports (DMR).   
Water samples (taken to measure pollution levels) must be taken at various 
locations in and around the facility.  The data file is reduced by including only 
monitoring locations associated with effluent output.  For instance, upstream and 
downstream monitoring was excluded and the focus was limited to the water the facility 
was directly discharging into the waterways (effluent gross value).   
                                                 
42 These estimates have not been “cleaned” according to the rules below.  They are total counts of the 
number of violations per EPA estimations.   
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The data file is also limited to discharge monitoring reports for which the facility 
had a numeric limit on pollution.  If a facility was being monitored by the EPA but did 
not have a specific limit on pollution the case was excluded, as there is no real 
opportunity for violation.43  Federal regulations specify five different kinds of 
limits/measurements that can be placed on pollution (i.e., quantity average, quantity 
maximum, concentration minimum, concentration average, concentration maximum).44  
However, all five limit types are not required for every pollutant; the regulations specify 
certain measurements/limits for each kind of pollutant.  If every pollutant had a required 
numeric value for all five limit types, then our data file would have contained 1,982,395 
opportunities for violation.  However, the bulk of the limits required the facility to 
monitor and report pollution levels, but did not have enforceable limit values.  Across 
limit types, our data file contains 382,902 opportunities for violation.   
Of these enforceable limits, 285,480 (75%) had DMR reports of actual pollution 
levels.  The data file contained an explanation for the missing data in 98.5 percent of 
these cases (95,966 out of 97,422); thus, less than two percent (1.5) of the required 
                                                 
43 The limit fields specify a particular numeric value for the facility discharges; however, the fields may 
also specify monitoring/reporting requirements without a specific limit.  For example, the limit field might 
say “ADDMON.”  This code indicates that the permit writer added an additional monitoring requirement 
over and above what is required in the regulations.  Similarly, the limit field might say “DELMON,” 
indicating that the facility is not required to report a limit that is required by regulation.  In addition, the 
limit field might specify “OPTMON.”  In these cases, the facility monitoring is optional.  The limit field is 
also often blank.  If the limit has a unit code attached to it, the blank indicates that the facility is required to 
report its discharges (in the specified units) but it does not have to stay under or reach a particular limit.  In 
all of these cases the facility does not have the opportunity to receive an effluent violation (although it can 
receive a reporting violation if the limit field says “ADDMON” or if a blank limit has a unit code); the EPA 
is monitoring the facility discharges without limiting them.  If the limit field is blank and does not have a 
unit code, then federal regulations do not require the facility to monitor or report the limit.  Again, the 
facility has no opportunity to receive an effluent violation.  In constructing my violation data, I only use the 
DMR reports in which the facility had the opportunity to be cited for a violation.  In a few instances the 
PCS system calculated a violation for a report that was supposed to simply be monitored (no specific limit 
was set); I do not include these violations in violation counts or rates because they are system errors.  I 
discuss the number of required reports (with a particular limit) that are missing in the following section.   
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reports was missing without explanation.  The data was most often missing because there 
was no discharge (61 percent).  Additional explanations included “other” reasons (19 
percent), conditional monitoring (the report was not required for that particular 
monitoring period, 11 percent), the pollutant was below the detectable limit (5 percent), 
and production based limits (the limit did not apply during this particular production 
period, 1 percent).  Most of the remaining explanations were used less than one percent 
of the time and indicated that the facility was likely in compliance (e.g., not quantifiable, 
not tracked in PCS for this period, operations shutdown).  However, a few (used less than 
one percent of the time) were somewhat ambiguous regarding compliance status.  For 
example, in a few instances a facility reported conducting an invalid test, a lost sample, or 
that analysis was not conducted.  While this may indicate malfeasance on the part of the 
facility, it may also result from an error by the lab responsible for testing samples.   
With the remaining limit and DMR reports, a few additional problems were 
encountered.  In some cases the DMR reports contain values that are clearly incorrect.  
For example, effluent net measurements may have negative values because the measure 
represents the difference in the pollution level at two points in the production process (ex: 
intake water versus discharges).  Other end-of-pipe measures (i.e., effluent gross value) 
should never contain negative values as negative measurements are not possible, but 
facilities have reported some negative values.  In other cases the DMR reports contain 
values that seem questionable, but are not as clear-cut.  For example, one facility reports 
quantity discharges as high as 89 million kilograms per day.  These values seem unlikely, 
given that the facility is permitted to pollute 561 kilograms per day.  However, in other 
                                                                                                                                                 
44 Quantities represent total loads; the EPA also requires measurements of the concentration or percent of 
the pollutant in the water. 
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cases such high values seem possible because the plant is permitted to discharge millions 
of gallons of water each day.  Both the negative and the extremely high positive values 
make up a very small portion of the data.  For example, only three-tenths of one percent 
of the quantity average DMR reports contains negative values when they are 
inappropriate (measurement is a gross value).  Similarly, one tenth of one percent of the 
quantity maximum DMR reports has negative values when they are inappropriate.  I will 
discuss the coding of these extreme values as I discuss each specific measure of 
pollution. 
Data and Measures 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires firms to self-report monthly water pollution 
levels to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  When pollution levels are higher 
than permitted amounts, the EPA has the authority to use sanctions (e.g., warning letters, 
administrative actions, civil and criminal cases).  Facility-level data on both compliance 
and enforcement have been compiled and linked to the parent company for the years 
1995 through 2000.  Data on traditional predictors of firm misconduct such as firm size 
and finances have also been gathered from other sources.  Added to these data are two 
corporate citizenship measures that allow an examination of the effect of corporate 
citizenship on compliance and returns to compliance.  Descriptive statistics on all of these 
measures are provided in Table 1A.  A description of each measure is provided in Table 
1B. 
INSERT TABLE 1A and TABLE 1B HERE 
As Figure 2 shows, the final sample contains 67 companies as of 1995 and drops 
to 55 by 2000 (mainly due to mergers).  The majority of the companies in the sample 
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operate in the pulp and paper industry (30 in 1995 and 24 in 2000).  In 1995, 19 of the 
companies were operating in the oil industry and 18 were operating in steel; the number 
drops to 16 and 15 oil and steel companies (respectively) by the year 2000.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Figure 3 provides the number of companies in each industry over the entire 
sample period.  Again, the majority of the companies operate in pulp and paper.   
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Figure 4 shows that these companies were operating 212 major water facilities.  
Like the parent companies, the number of facilities declines over time, mainly due to 
international mergers and sales.  The majority of the facilities are pulp and paper facilities 
(124 in 1995 and 113 in 2000).  The sample contains 48 oil facilities and 40 steel 
facilities in 1995 and drops to 45 oil and 35 steel facilities by 2000. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Over the entire sample period, Figure 5 shows that 58 percent of the facilities are 
in the pulp and paper industry.   
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
Several previously used measures of compliance are calculated at the firm-level, 
including a dichotomous measure of compliance, the number of violations, and the 
compliance ratio.  Cases with inappropriate negative DMR values were dropped before 
constructing each of the measures, resulting in a small fraction of lost cases (e.g., 1.3 
percent of the quantity averages and 0.4 percent of the concentration averages).  When 
constructing the dichotomous and count measures, DMR reports of extremely high 
discharges less problematic.  Even though the large values may be greater than the actual 
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discharge, the facility is still likely to be in violation with such a large report.  These were 
retained and coded as violations.  Extreme values become more problematic for the 
compliance ratio because the exact value is used rather than a dummy code.  For these 
measures the extreme values are censored after the compliance ratio is computed.45  The 
quantity compliance ratios for BOD and conventional pollutants contained values that 
appeared to be outliers and these single values were dropped.  For the monthly average 
concentration compliance ratio, BOD, TSS, and conventional pollutants had outliers, one 
value was dropped for each of these pollutants. 
Dependent Variables 
Previous studies of environmental behavior focus on one type of water pollution: 
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD).  BOD provides information on the organic pollutant 
content of the water by measuring the amount of oxygen consumed in the biological 
processes that break down organic matter; the greater the BOD, the greater the degree of 
pollution.  In this research measures for BOD are examined as well as several other 
pollutants that are common across the industries of interest (i.e., total suspended solids, 
conventional pollutants, toxic pollutants).  Total suspended solids (TSS) is a standard 
measure of the particulate content of the water (Kagan et al., 2003).  Both BOD and TSS 
are standard measures of water quality (Kagan et al., 2003).  In addition to these specific 
pollutants, two general categories of pollutants are also examined: conventional and toxic 
pollutants.  Conventional pollutants are common pollutants, such as organic waste, acid, 
bacteria, oil and grease, or heat that are well understood by scientists.  These materials 
                                                 
45 It is difficult to determine whether the value is unreasonable based on the DMR report alone because the 




will naturally break down in the water.  Toxic pollutants are materials that cause death, 
disease, or birth defects in organisms that ingest or absorb them (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency [U.S. EPA], 2006). 
Figure 6 shows that together these pollutants constitute a significant portion of the 
violations in the sample.  Although BOD is the most commonly examined pollutant, it 
accounts for only 8 percent of the total violations each year.  TSS violations are 
somewhat more commonly, representing approximately 16 percent of the violations each 
year.  Although these numbers seem small, there are a total of 69 different conventional 
pollutants (both of these pollutants are classified as conventional pollutants) in the data 
that account for approximately 50 percent of the violations each year (see below).  Thus, 
two out of 69 pollutants (BOD and TSS) together make up twenty to thirty percent of the 
total violations each year. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
Figure 7 provides the same information for conventional and toxic pollutants.  
The two groups of pollutants, conventional in particular, account for a most of the total 
violations each year.  In 1995, 458 of the 961 total violations (48%) were conventional 
pollutant violations; 224 of the 961 (23%) were toxic pollutant violations.  These patterns 
are fairly stable over time.  Together these two groups of pollutants account for 
approximately 70 percent of the total violations each year.   
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
Thus, in this study the specific pollutants are examined to compare to the prior 
literature.  However, additional pollutant groups are added that contribute a substantial 
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portion to the total violations.  This larger group of pollutants will provide a more 
complete picture of plant and firm environmental behavior.   
As noted, the prior criminological literature on environmental crime generally 
uses court case data and factorial surveys to examine the phenomena.  Because the data 
contain the actual self-reports of pollution, the measures are drawn from the plant-level 
studies.  Researchers have constructed a variety of measures of pollution using NPDES 
data and have examined different units of time.  The dependent variable has been 
constructed as a dichotomous measure equal to one if the plant is in noncompliance 
(Helland, 1998; Magat and Viscusi, 1990); as a pollution level (Kagan et al., 2003; Magat 
and Viscusi, 1990); as the total number of violations (Yeager, 1987); and as a monthly 
compliance ratio (percent of permitted level) (Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz, 2006).  
Researchers have examined these measures on a monthly (Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz, 
2006) and quarterly basis (Helland, 1998; Magat and Viscusi, 1990).  Because the firm-
level predictors are yearly, the measures are ultimately constructed for each firm/year.  
However, quarterly measures are used to examine sanction questions because sanctions 
are delivered on a quarterly basis.   
I have constructed a dichotomous measure, a violation count, and a compliance 
ratio for the first set of research questions and use the latter two to test the sanctions 
hypotheses.46  The dichotomous and the count measures are used in the environmental 
literature and are consistent with the criminological distinction between participation in 
offending (entire population) and frequency of offending (offender population).  The 
dichotomous measure does not have the exact same meaning as the participation measure 
                                                 
46 Level of pollution is not created because it has similar flaws to the first two measures.  Instead, I chose to 
focus on the compliance ratio because it accounts for differences in permitted levels and opportunity.   
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discussed in the developmental literature.  Developmental researchers define 
“participation” as the fraction of a population that is criminally active (Blumstein, Cohen, 
Roth, and Visher, 1996).  In this case the measure is constructed for a period of several 
years (portion of years in violation).  However, the two measures are split in this research 
for a similar purpose.  Partitioning criminal activity into different components (engaging 
in crime; frequency of crime) enables research to identify different factors that affect 
different dimensions of offending (Blumstein et al., 1986).  This is particularly important 
in the corporate crime literature because there is less information (fewer studies) about 
how firm characteristics relate to these different elements of offending.   
The dichotomous measure includes the full sample of firms that have a numeric 
limit on the pollutant.  Firm/years that have no violations are coded as zero and 
firm/years with any violations are coded as one.47  Thus, the average represents the 
portion of firm/years spent in violation.  Firms have at least one violation of pollution 
standards for at least one pollutant in 91 percent of the yearly observations (see Table 1).  
The violation rate is highest for the largest group of pollutants (75 percent of the 
                                                 
47 The EPA data contain the limit, the DMR report, and a calculation of the percent the facility is out of 
compliance.  Using the limits and DMRs, I constructed a dummy measure to flag reports that were in 
violation.  I first compared whether there were any discrepancies between EPA and my calculations in 
whether or not a violation occurred.  Out of 283,173 computations, there were 214 discrepancies as to 
whether or not a violation occurred.  These discrepancies went both ways; in some instances my 
calculations contained violations not in PCS and vice-versa.  Closer examination of these discrepancies 
suggested that the limits must have been changed in the system in one point at time.  The calculations I 
produced were correct, but the PCS calculations were clearly based on a limit different from the one 
currently in the data.  There is currently a backlog in the NPDES system for permit renewal.  When permits 
are renewed after the delay, the new limits are entered retrospectively up to the point where they should 
have taken effect.  However, the violation calculations are not updated.  This is likely the source of the 
discrepancies.  If permits are updated in certain months, then systematic bias may be introduced into the 
yearly violation, compliance, or overcompliance rates by using the calculations in this study.  However, the 
permit expiration (and thus renewal) dates are spread fairly evenly over all 12 months in these data.  The 




observations for conventional pollutants are in violation).  The violation rate is 
approximately 50 percent for BOD, TSS, and toxic pollutants.   
The second count measure represents the number of violations during firm/years 
in which there is at least one violation.  When this measure is used as the dependent 
variable the analysis includes only a subset of the total sample—the violators.  During 
years in which a violation occurs, the average firm has 14 total violations.  The average 
number of violations is highest for the largest group of pollutants (conventional 
pollutants—8) and smaller for toxic pollutants (6), BOD (3), and TSS (4). 
The dichotomous and the count measures reflect compliance versus 
noncompliance and the extent of noncompliance (number of violations) when there are 
multiple levels of conformity (and degree of violations) in the data.  Firms may have 
violations that are significantly greater than permitted levels or violations that are just 
over the limit.  Similarly, firms that are in compliance may be just under the permitted 
level or they may consistently maintain pollution levels that are considerably lower than 
legally allowed (overcompliance).  The compliance ratio captures these various aspects of 
pollution.  It also makes the environmental record of firms of different size more 
comparable.   
Creating measures that account for differences in opportunity is a common 
difficulty in the corporate crime literature (Simpson, Harris, and Mattson, 1993).  Firms 
vary in size and larger firms generally are thought to have more opportunities to violate 
the law.  Environmental compliance data are all the more complicated, as compliance is 
tracked at the facility-level.  Firms own different number of facilities and thus have 
different levels of opportunity for violation to occur.  The dichotomous measure would be 
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coded as a violation if one facility or all six of a single firm’s facilities were in 
noncompliance.  Similarly, the violation count may show that a firm has more violations 
but this may simply be because it owns more facilities.  The compliance ratio sums 
together all of the monthly average pollution reports across facility for the same firm; 
thus, it provides a picture of the overall firm record in comparison to its own 
opportunities (total limits in every monthly report on pollution). 
Thus, the compliance ratio is the sum of the monthly discharges over the sum of 
the monthly limits; it represents the “ratio of reported discharges to the permitted level” 
(Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz, 2006, p. 8).  Compliance ratios that are greater than one 
indicate that the plant is in violation.  Ratios that are closer to one indicate that the firm 
pollution level is close to the permitted level; ratios closer to zero indicate that the firm is 
polluting substantially less than legally allowed.  Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) 
create this measure for concentration averages: I create it for both concentrations and 
quantities for each pollutant and pollutant group.  There is no overall summary measure 
for this outcome.  Pollutants that are neither conventional nor toxic pollutants have 
unique measurement properties that cannot be converted to a measurement unit that is 
consistent with the other types of pollution.  Color, for example, is measured in “color 
units,” which cannot be converted to pounds per day (quantity unit) or milliliters per liter 
(concentration unit). 
Although this measure includes the full sample of firms, it excludes a significant 
portion of the pollution reports for each firm.  The compliance ratio is limited to reports 
measured as monthly averages because it is unclear how one would include maximum 
and minimum pollution reports, particularly when measured daily or weekly.  Three limit 
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types (quantity maximums, concentration minimums, and concentration maximums), 
which constitute nearly 50 percent of the DMR observations, are never measured as 
averages.  Concentrated and quantity averages are always measured as averages.  These 
limit types are usually measured monthly, but not always.  The quantity average limits 
are calculated monthly in 70 percent of the (quantity average) observations.  Over 80 
percent of the concentration average limits are calculated monthly. 
This measure is drawn directly from Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006), but 
these data differ from theirs in a few ways.  The authors examine the compliance ratio for 
municipal water facilities; there is much less variation in the level of permitted discharges 
for these types of facilities.  Industrial facilities, on the other hand, all have unique 
permits that are specific to their operations; there is virtually no similarity.  In addition, 
industrial facilities are sometimes required to measure the difference in samples taken at 
two points during production.  Thus, if facilities reduce the amount of pollution in the 
water between point A and point B, the ratio can be negative (indicating even more 
overcompliance).   
As the data in Table 1 demonstrates, firms generally overcomply with both 
quantity and concentration limits.  The compliance ratio for BOD is at the high end and 
firms are still polluting only 33 percent of the legal limit.  Many of the ratios are 
substantially smaller.  For example, firms pollute only 9 percent of their toxic pollution 
limits on average.   
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Key Independent Variables 
Prior Citizenship Measures 
Researchers have used a variety of approaches to measure citizenship (usually 
called corporate social performance in this literature).  Researchers began with perceptual 
measures and have since developed content analysis, social audits, and behavioral 
measures to capture corporate citizenship. 
Perceptual Measures 
 Perceptual and reputation surveys are commonly used in the social performance 
literature.  Perceptions are frequently drawn from populations that have little or no 
contact with the companies in question (MBA students; academics), although some 
researchers have surveyed executives about their own company (Aupperle, Hatfield, and 
Carroll, 1983; Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield, 1985).  One commonly used measure—
Fortune magazine’s annual corporate reputation index—surveys executives from firms 
within the same industry.  Researchers have acknowledged the major problems associated 
with these kinds of reputation measures including a lack of specific criteria and 
questionable expertise of the raters (Wokutch and McKinney, 1991).     
Content Analysis 
 Content analysis of company annual reports has also been used to capture CSP.  
This method involves coding (counting) the quantity and measuring the quality of a 
firm’s self-reported disclosures of socially responsible activities.  The level of 
sophistication in these measures varies across studies (Wolfe, 1991).  This approach has 
been criticized because firms may over- or under- report socially responsible behavior 
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and there is no way for researchers to determine the accuracy of the reports (Carroll, 
1991; Wokutch and McKinney, 1991).   
Social Audits 
 “Social audits” were proposed as a more systematic approach to CSP assessment.  
Advocates imagined something like a balance sheet that would summarize both the 
positive and negative impacts of the corporation.  However, the social audits suffer from 
a lack of accepted methods (no standardized methodologies for collecting the information 
or measuring devices for quantifying the information), difficulty in gathering the 
information (executives are often wary of divulging information), and excessive cost 
(Wokutch and McKinney, 1991). 
 Behavioral Measures 
 Behavioral measures were designed to overcome the subjectivity of perceptual 
measures, as they examine the firms actual performance rather than its reputation.  
Examples of behavioral measures used in the research literature include corporate 
philanthropic donations (e.g., Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991; Wang and Coffey, 1992), the 
commission of specific kinds of illegal acts (Wokutch and Spencer, 1987), and pollution 
control (e.g., Bowman and Haire, 1975; Chen and Metcalf, 1980).  Using behavioral 
measures can also reduce, or at least make clear, the value-laden judgments that must be 
made in determining what programs are socially beneficial or how to prioritize multiple 
dimensions of social performance (Wokutch and McKinney, 1991).   
Improving Measurement   
Clearly there is no consensus regarding the appropriate measurement of firm 
citizenship.  To some degree, this may be tied to the lack of consensus regarding what 
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citizenship means.  In fact, few of the measures from prior literature are based on the 
conceptual models; the collection of conceptually based data has proven extremely 
difficult.  Studies using survey (perceptual) measures based on the three part social 
performance models have suffered from extremely low response rates (Aupperle et al., 
1983, 1985; Maignan and Ferrell, 2000).  Other attempts to collect behavioral measures 
consistent with the social performance models have had little success distinguishing 
between the components and collecting data that was consistent with each (Clarkson, 
1995).    
Despite the limitations in attempting to measure citizenship, small improvements 
can still be made.  First, measurement can be improved by separating potential outcomes 
from measures of CSP themselves.  Many research questions require the creation of some 
demarcation between “good” and “bad” performance.  Some researchers have used the 
presence or absence of crime to make this distinction.  Although the literature provides 
little theoretical guidance on how to differentiate groups on the continuum of social 
performance, it is still unclear why a firm meeting its basic legal requirements would be 
considered a “good” social performer.  Throughout the history of CSP research, some 
have included economic and legal considerations in the definition of social responsibility 
while others have not.  But, regardless of whether definitions include legal and economic 
dimensions, all CSP definitions include something beyond these basic criteria, even 
within the legal domain.  How that “something more” is defined varies greatly (appeasing 
other stakeholders besides shareholders versus acting on ethics), but the spirit of the 
original and current CSP definitions involves something above and beyond the call of 
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duty (see Carroll, 1999 for summary).  Mere compliance with the law is not a sufficient 
indicator of “good” citizenship.   
Second, measurement can also be improved by using multiple measures.  A 
triangulation of data sources provides a better idea of the firms overall citizenship.  As 
Bowie (1991) states:  
“The difficulty with most analyses of the moral obligations of the firm is that they 
focus only on one of the relationships—the obligations of managers to stockholders 
or the obligations of managers and employees to customers.  A complete account of 
the firm as a moral community would need to consider the total set of stakeholder 
relationships” (p. 171).   
 
Thus, in this study I will make small improvements in the measurement of 
citizenship by using behavioral measures that separate potential outcomes (crime) from 
the concept itself.  In addition, I will rely on multiple measures of corporate citizenship.  I 
will propose a new measure of citizenship (overcompliance programs) and I will use a set  
of measures commonly used in the business and society literature.48  Specifically, 
citizenship is measured by actions taken by the firm that signal firm orientation toward 
citizenship.  I acknowledge that firms may engage in some of these actions (i.e., 
voluntary overcompliance programs) to improve/maintain a good reputation (as “window 
dressing”) without being truly committed to the ideals of citizenship.  Therefore, I will 
discuss this limitation below. 
 
                                                 
48 Although not improving measurement itself, using measures consistent with prior research (however 
flawed) can help to build knowledge regarding firm citizenship.  Inconsistent measurement strategies in the 
business and society field have prevented any synthesis and conclusion regarding the relationship between 




Current Citizenship Measures 
Corporate Citizenship--Overcompliance Programs 
In this study, I use firm participation in voluntary overcompliance programs as 
one measure of citizenship.  Participation in voluntary programs is theoretically 
consistent with the citizenship/social performance concept, as firms are volunteering to 
go above and beyond legal requirements.  As Clarkson (1995) notes, companies are free 
to decide the extent to which they will “acknowledge, recognize, or pursue obligations 
and responsibilities to their stakeholders” (p. 105).  While there are legal requirements for 
obligations to some stakeholders (health and safety of employees), companies do not 
have legal obligations for some behaviors (employee career development).  Any evidence 
of acknowledging some (non-legally obligated) stakeholders or evidence of going above 
and beyond the requirements for legally binding activities may be suggestive of a good 
citizen.  The concept of citizenship is measured by firm participation in two voluntary 
programs: the EPA’s TRI 33/50 Program and the Wastewise Program. 
The EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is an information disclosure program 
created in 1988.  Although the pollutants reported in the program can be legally emitted 
(and thus, there are no sanctions associated with the emissions), the EPA requires toxic 
waste producers with more than 10 employees to file annual reports of emissions for 
approximately 300 toxins to the EPA.  Reports are only required if the facility 
manufactures, processes, or otherwise uses listed chemicals in excess of the reporting 
thresholds over the course of a year (U.S. EPA, 1999).49 
                                                 
49 From the list of toxins, “manufactured or processed” toxic chemicals in quantities exceeding 25,000 
pounds must be reported.  In addition, toxins from the list “otherwise used” must be reported if they exceed 
10,000 pounds in the calendar year.   
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As a result of the information disclosed, the EPA developed a program called TRI 
33/50.  The 33/50 program targeted 17 chemicals to be reduced by 33 percent by 1992 
and 50 percent by 1995.  Although the recruiting effort occurred in stages, the EPA 
invited all companies that previously reported discharging the targeted chemicals to 
participate in the 33/50 program.  All companies in this sample meet the criteria and,  
thus, would have been invited. 50  The EPA reports that 13 percent of the companies 
contacted committed to the 33/50 Program.  The program met is overall goal (50 percent 
reduction in pollution transfers) by 1994, one year early (U.S. EPA, 1999).  
Approximately 50 percent of the companies in the current sample participated in the 
33/50 program.   
The second program used as a measure of citizenship is Wastewise.  Wastewise is 
a voluntary partnership program which strives to reduce solid waste through waste 
prevention (i.e., using fewer materials to do the job) and recycling.  It began with 281 
partners and by 2004 had 1500 members (U.S. EPA, 2004).  The EPA launched its 
Wastewise program in 1994 but companies could join anytime thereafter.  Although a list 
of member companies is available, the year of membership is not; thus, Wastewise 
participation is also a static measure of CSP.  Approximately 20 percent of the companies 
in the current sample participated in Wastewise at some time during the six year window 
that companies are followed. 
                                                 
50 The EPA engaged in a heavy recruiting effort, beginning in 1991, to encourage firms to join the TRI 
33/50 program.  The EPA invited firms to participate in three stages with a total of approximately 8,000 
invitations.  Although the EPA has not retained a list of invitees, all companies in our sample were invited 
to participate.  Two sources were used to verify the invitation.  First, firms that discharged any one of the 
seventeen chemicals of interest were invited.  Thus, TRI facility reports from 1988 and 1992 were used as 
verification.  Second, Vidovic and Khanna (2005) provided their EPA database which contained facility 





These measures of citizenship are not ideal; they are not measuring firm culture, 
but rather actions or signals that seem to indicate good citizenship.  I accept these 
measures at face value, which may be problematic.  If, for example, firms volunteer for 
overcompliance programs because they have poor records and want to appear “green”, 
then participation in these programs is not really capturing citizenship.  On the other 
hand, there is no apriori reason not to accept these measures as reasonable proxies for 
citizenship.   
First, the only benefits for participation in the TRI 33/50 program are public 
recognition and special awards from the EPA.  Firms do not receive reductions in the 
enforcement of other EPA requirements.51  Second, the literature on emissions and TRI 
33/50 participation does not suggest that firms merely use the program for appearances.52  
Firms with higher releases of 33/50 chemicals tend to participate (Arora and Cason, 
1995) and firms with higher releases of non-33/50 toxic chemicals (Arora and Cason, 
1996) are more likely to join.  Overall it seems that firms with higher levels of emissions 
may have been more likely to participate.  Arora and Cason interpret this association in 
terms of negative motivation; firms want to want to reduce emissions and the associated 
stigma.  However, it may also mean that firms recognized a problem for the first time 
(new mandatory reporting requirements) and took an opportunity to make a change.  
                                                 
51 It is unlikely that firms received enforcement reductions in one regulated area for voluntary reductions in 
another.  First, the EPA structure keeps program offices relatively separate.  Instead of integrating new 
legislative requirements into an agency wide strategy, the EPA creates new, separate program offices when 
additional regulations are passed.  EPA enforcement has only recently become more centralized.  In 
addition, much of the enforcement takes place at the state-level and the TRI 33/50 program is a federal 
program (Arora and Cason, 1995).  Finally, Arora and Cason (1995) reviewed enforcement decisions and 
penalties under the Toxic Substances Control Act (a program separate from the TRI program) and find little 
evidence of enforcement reductions for participants.  Thirty-five percent of the companies fined were 33/50 
participants.  The largest fine was also imposed on a 33/50 participant.   
52 Although there is a growing body of literature examining the antecedents and effectiveness of the TRI 
33/50 program, a similar body of literature has not developed on the Wastewise program. 
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Third, the evidence does not support the “free rider” argument.  Firms that were already 
reducing emissions prior to the program inception were no more likely to participate 
(Arora and Cason, 1995, 1996).  However, these firms were still eligible to participate.53  
Finally, the TRI 33/50 chemicals are legal pollutants; if firms that joined the program had 
poor records in discharging illegal chemicals it might still suggest that they entered the 
program for appearances.  However, Arora and Cason (1996) do not find an association 
between a firm’s TRI 33/50 participation and air violations.  
These problems are less of an issue with the second set of measures—the KLD 
social ratings data.  These measures are more objective; the firms are actually engaging in 
the socially responsible activities, not merely signing up for them.  However, the social 
ratings data do not ensure that firms take the socially responsible actions out of moral or 
altruistic concerns.   
Corporate Citizenship--Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini & Co. Index54   
In addition to the above citizenship indicators, I also use measures common in the 
corporate social performance literature.   Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini & Co., Inc (KLD) 
compiles and provides investors with information on corporate social activities derived 
from annual surveys, annual reports, proxy statements, quarterly reports, and articles in 
the general business press.  Although the specific categories and the method of presenting 
the data have changed over time, KLD has assessed companies on a total of thirteen 
dimensions.  KLD divides the dimensions into two sets (qualitative screens and 
exclusionary screens), each with different rating methods.  The qualitative screens are a 
                                                 
53 In fact, the TRI reports from 1988 are used as the program baseline to avoid excluding any decreases in 
emissions made by firms prior to the program inception in 1991 (Arora and Cason, 1996). 
54 The descriptive statistics for the KLD measure are presented in Table 5, which contains the sample 
averages for the subsample of firms in the KLD ratings.   
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set of dimensions (community; employee; environment; product; treatment of women and 
minorities; human rights; and corporate governance) that contain sub-categories on which 
the company might be rated a “strength” or a “concern.”  For example, under 
“Community” KLD rates companies on the following strengths: generous giving, 
innovative giving, non-U.S. charitable giving, support for housing, support for education, 
and other strengths.  Companies that reach the criteria for “strength” are coded as a one 
and those that do not are coded zero.  The “Community” dimension also contains a list of 
concerns on which companies may be rated a zero or one, including investment 
controversies, negative economic impacts, and other concerns.55  The collected data are 
largely objective; for example, only companies that consistently give over 1.5% of 
trailing three-year net earnings before taxes to charity are rated as “generous givers” 
under the philanthropy sub-category.  However, KLD must set sometimes subjective “cut 
points” to rate the sub-topics as a strength or a weakness.  For instance, KLD determines 
whether a company is a “prominent participant” in partnerships that support housing 
(rather than simply using participation).  Again, these data provide information on firm 
activities that signal corporate citizenship rather than directly measuring firm culture.  
However, these measures rate firms on a variety of activities across different domains.  
Thus, they provide a more comprehensive view of firm performance than just 
environmental activities.  In addition, these measures are compiled on a yearly basis and 
allow for the examination of changes in citizenship and compliance over time.  
                                                 
55 KLD originally provided a single score for each of these dimensions.  The score ranged from major 
concern (-2) to major strength (+2); the sub-categories were listed as the reasons for the rating.  Thus, 
companies that had three or more reasons for concern were given the same score on the dimension as 
companies with only two concerns (-2).  Some researchers used this truncated score and others coded each 
reason code (assigning each a zero or one) and summed them to capture the full variation across company.  




These measures have been used extensively in the prior literature on citizenship.  
Some researchers have organized these dimensions to reflect stakeholder groups.  
Hillman and Keim (2001) combine the subcategories to reflect employee, customer, 
community, and supplier stakeholders.  Dawkins (2002) collapses the stakeholder groups 
into “people” and “product” dimensions.  Within each stakeholder group, strengths are 
subtracted from concerns arrive at a “net concerns” measure.  Although combining them 
in different ways, each of these studies has used only five of the available categories of 
data: employees; women and minorities; products; community; and environment. 
The KLD data contains an additional set of items called “exclusionary screens.” 
These items are assigned a score only if the item is a concern for the company; these 
currently include whether the company derives substantial revenues from alcohol, 
gambling, weapons contracting, nuclear power, or production of tobacco products.  In 
addition to the stakeholder group measures, one study used some of these additional 
categories (alcohol, military, nuclear contracting, non-US concerns over investment) as a 
“social issues” dimension (Dawkins, 2002).56   
Although some advocate examining each dimension of CSP separately as some 
researchers have done (Johnson and Greening, 1999), the literature appears to suggest 
that firms can be assigned a single CSP score.57  This approach was adopted by other 
scholars.  Griffin and Mahon (1997) assigned both the qualitative items and the 
exclusionary screens equal weight and created a global CSP measure of all strengths 
                                                 
56 KLD has also reorganized the data over time.  For instance, South Africa involvement was previously 
included in the exclusionary screens (rated only if a concern).  However, KLD have created a new category 
in the qualitative screens to reflect human rights.  Positive South Africa involvement was then rated as a 
strength while South African controversies (and Northern Ireland, Burma, Mexico controversies) are rated 
as concerns.      
57 There is little guidance in the literature as to how one might aggregate these dimensions into a single 
CSP rating.  Thus, a variety of approaches are used even with this single data source.   
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minus all concerns.  Scharfman (1996) cites two conference papers that use researcher-
developed weights to allow some items more importance in the global (weighted) 
measure of all strengths minus all concerns (Graves and Waddock, 1993; Ruf, 
Muralidhar, and Paul, 1993).  This study is the first to examine the implications of 
citizenship for corporate crime; thus, it is logical to begin with the global concept of 
social performance.   
Although the previous literature is followed as much as possible, the current 
social performance measure differs in several ways: the exclusionary screens, the product 
dimension, and the sub-categories that reflect criminal activity in all dimensions are 
excluded.  Like previous studies the global measure includes the community, diversity, 
employee, environment, and corporate governance dimensions and does not include the 
human rights dimension.58  None of the previous studies contained the human rights 
dimension in its current form (although some did indicate whether the company had 
significant involvement in South Africa; see footnote 56).  Even in its current form, most 
of the sub-categories in the dimension were not collected during the time period of the 
current study (1995-2000).  Most were assessed up to or only in 1994 or 1995 and others 
were added in 2000 or 2002.  Sub-categories in the dimensions to be used (community, 
diversity, employee, environment, corporate governance) were all collected throughout 
the time period of interest; thus, the measure will be consistent over time. 
Although previous global measures have included the exclusionary screen 
concerns (company derives substantial revenues from alcohol, gambling, weapons 
                                                 
58 It is actually unclear whether studies using a single global CSP measure included the corporate 
governance dimension.  Several studies mention the category (previously named “other”) but do not discuss 




contracting, nuclear power, or production of tobacco products), there is less of a 
consensus these items; they are consistently rated as less important; and they are 
irrelevant for the industries in this study.  Although there is little agreement on the 
meaning and appropriate measurement of social performance, there is more consensus 
that some of the dimensions reflect social (ir) responsibility more than others.  For 
example, although individuals may not agree that firms have an obligation to provide 
retirement benefits and stock options to employees (employee relations dimension), they 
would not see it as irresponsible to do so.  Some items in the exclusionary screens, 
however, are not as straightforward.  For instance, societal views on mala prohibita kinds 
of behaviors (alcohol and gambling) have changed over time.  Thus, while some may 
view alcohol or gambling revenue as reflecting irresponsibility, others would not.  In fact, 
Scharfman (1996) finds that the global KLD score has a higher correlation with other 
social performance measures when the nuclear power, military contracting, and South 
African involvement are excluded.  In addition, the exclusionary screens are rated as less 
important by independent assessors and socially responsible investors.  In constructing 
weights for the KLD dimensions, both Waddock and Graves (1993) and Ruf  et al. (1993) 
find that military contracting, nuclear power, and South African involvement are rated as 
less important than community relations, employee relations, product, and diversity by 
different sets of assessors (as cited by Scharfman, 1996).  In addition, socially responsible 
investors report being mainly concerned with environment and labor relations.  Although 
fewer in number, the investors were also concerned with individual rights (hiring women 
and minorities).  Although mentioned the least, the respondents also reported concerns 
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with socially useful products and military contracts, particularly contracts that involved 
nuclear weapons (Rosen, Sandler, and Shani, 1991).   
Finally, these items are virtually irrelevant for the industries examined in this 
study.  No company had a concern rating for deriving revenue from alcohol, gambling, or 
production of tobacco products or for involvement with nuclear power.  Only one item 
appeared as a concern for any company in the sample—receiving more than $50 million 
for fuel or other supplies related to weapons from the Department of Defense.  However, 
this item is not included in the global measure.  First, while other dimensions are 
applicable to all of the industries under study, this measure is only relevant for the oil 
industry.  In addition, although investors reported a concern with military contracts that 
involved nuclear weapons, they did not report such a concern with selling oil.  Finally, I 
would argue that this item is still subjective; many may see it as the patriotic duty of a 
corporation to assist the military rather than a social concern.   
Although previous studies have used the product dimension, it is excluded from 
the global measure because almost every “concern” within the product dimension is 
related to crime (e.g., paying fines or penalties for regulatory actions relating to product 
safety).  As discussed below, any crime related sub-categories is excluded from every 
dimension under study.  In addition, the “strength” sub-categories do not seem to 
distinguish among the companies in these industries.  Only one company is rated as a 
strength in the product dimensions at any time during the sample period.  While this may 
suggest something about these industries (the industry products do not go directly into 
consumers hands) or the companies (they are not product leaders), it does nothing to 
distinguish among the companies.   
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Finally, the present measure differs from previous studies in that any crime 
related sub-category is excluded from the total concerns for each dimension.  As stated, 
criminologists would conceive of crime as an outcome of corporate citizenship rather 
than a measure of it.  Thus, any items related to fines or civil penalties are excluded 
whether they refer to discrimination, pollution, antitrust, or product safety issues.   
With these modifications, I have followed the approach of previous studies and 
created a single score to represent social performance/citizenship by subtracting total 
concerns from total strengths.  In some cases substitutions have been made when data are 
unavailable for subsidiaries and joint ventures in the sample (i.e., parent company social 
ratings are used for the subsidiary; both parent company social ratings are used for the 
joint venture).  These substitutions were made for 18 company/years.  With these 
substitutions, the data range from -3 to positive 8, with a mean of 1 and a standard 
deviation of 2.  Without these substitutions, the descriptive statistics are virtually 
identical.  The analyses are run both with and without the replacements.   
Sanctions 
The EPA also conducts enforcement activities at the facility-level, although the 
parent company may be a defendant in court cases.  These official EPA reactions are also 
aggregated to firm-level counts of enforcement actions.  For this study, I will examine the 
enforcement actions that resulted from a pollution violation (i.e., excluding enforcement 
actions for reporting violations, etc).  However, the data does not contain links between 
enforcement actions and specific violations.  Thus, although the outcome of interest may 
be limited to a specific type of pollutant (e.g., BOD), the enforcement action may have 
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been given for any type of pollution (e.g., combining violations for BOD, TSS, and 
nitrogen).   
Two sources of information are used to construct measures of sanctions; one is 
the PCS system itself.  The EPA data contains information on actions taken by EPA 
(national and state).  EPA enforcement actions in this study have been categorized using 
a severity scale created by Hunter and Waterman (1996).  The scale ranges from 0 to 7, 
with more informal actions falling at the bottom of the scale.  Table 2 provides the 
distribution of sanctions across the 7 severity categories; the distribution is cut at 2 
(categories 0, 1, and 2 are considered informal). 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 3 provides the distribution for informal and formal sanctions.  Level three 
contains administrative action items, moving into the realm of a formal response.  
Although in their study Hunter and Waterman (1996) find that the bulk of enforcement 
actions fall into the informal categories, the distribution of formal and informal 
enforcement actions in these data is more balanced.  Shifts in EPA and political 
administration over time may account for this difference.  In addition, Hunter and 
Waterman (1996) combine enforcement actions administered for different kind of 
violations (some more serious than others) and to different kinds of violators 
(municipalities and industry).  The data presented here measure enforcement actions for 
industrial polluters (a more serious violation).  Thus, the equal use of formal and informal 
actions may represent a more punitive stance toward the more serious violations.59  As 
                                                 
59 This difference may also be due to one category of sanctions that is excluded—other.  The “other” 
category is not included in the Hunter and Waterman (1996) scale (nor is it mentioned as a problem).  It is 




shown in Table 1, on average firms receive very few sanctions each year.  Although some 
firms received as many as 41, on average each firm/year contains only 2 sanctions: one 
formal and one informal. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
The EPA has several options for pursuing violators through the court system.  The 
EPA may handle the case administratively (internally); these are administrative (civil) 
cases.  The EPA may also refer cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for external 
civil (“civil judicial”) or criminal prosecution.  These sources provide an additional 
indicator of sanctions in this study.  However, there are several issues that require caution 
when the using these data.  First, it is likely that information on administrative cases in 
this source (EPA Docket) overlaps with information on administrative orders and 
penalties in the PCS data, but it is impossible to determine the degree of overlap.  
Second, the administrative, civil, and criminal cases coded as the more formal actions in 
the scale currently reflect all cases brought against these companies under the Clean 
Water Act; thus, the cases may have been brought as a result of other kinds of violations 
(reporting or compliance schedule violations rather than pollution violations).  However, 
because the EPA targets the most serious violators and the most serious violations (i.e., 
pollution) for formal enforcement actions it is likely that most of the cases were brought 
for either repeated pollution violations or repeated violations of many types (e.g., 
pollution, compliance schedule, and single event violations).   
As Table 4 demonstrates, when formal cases are brought the EPA most often files 
the least serious type of case—administrative.  Administrative cases constitute 72 percent 
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of the total cases and civil cases make up 25 percent; thus, criminal cases are extremely 
infrequent (3 percent).   
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Control Variables 
Firm Financial Performance 
Profitability 
A common measure of profitability (total firm profit) is total stockholders equity 
(TSE) (Simpson, 1986; Jamieson, 1994).  TSE is the common and preferred 
shareholders’ interest in the company; essentially it is total assets minus total liabilities 
and represents the amount stockholders might obtain if a corporation were liquidated.  
The mean TSE is approximately 3 billion with a standard deviation of 8 billion.  Higher 
values indicate that the firm is more profitable. 
Return on Assets 
Return on assets (ROA) is a common measure of firm financial performance.  
ROA is commonly calculated as net income divided by total assets and captures how 
effectively managers utilize firm assets (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Deephouse and 
Carter, 2005; Kieso and Weygandt, 1974).  Profitability in relation to assets or investment 
reflects how efficiently the firm utilizes its resources (Keane, 1993).  The mean is 0.03 
with a standard deviation of 0.06.  Higher values indicate that the firm is more efficient.   
Return on Sales 
 Return on Sales (ROS), measured as total sales divided by total assets, is also 
used to measure of firm performance (Altman, 1968).  ROS indicates the sales generating 
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ability of firm assets (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).  Altman (1968) refers to it as a measure 
of management’s capability in dealing with competitive conditions.  The mean for this 
variable is 1.20 with a standard deviation of 0.66.  Higher values indicate that the firm is 
more efficient.   
Liquidity 
Liquidity is defined the difference between a firm’s current assets and current 
liabilities divided by the total corporate assets.  It is meant to capture a firm’s working 
capital (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).  The mean for this measure is 0.09 with a standard 




 In this study, firm complexity is measured as the number of facilities owned by 
the firm that are operating in the same industry.  This provides a proxy for complexity in 
that it captures the degree of horizontal spread in the company’s structure.  The mean 
number of facilities owned is 3 with a standard deviation of 3.   
Firm Size 
 Size is measured as the number of employees.  The mean number of employees is 
approximately 15,000 and the standard deviation is 20,000. 
Additional Controls 
Industry 
Corporate wrongdoing may be a reflection of the culture or structure of the 
industry in which the firm operates (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).  Thus, it is important to 
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control for industry effects, particularly because studies have found them to be more 
powerful predictors of compliance than firm-level constructs (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; 
Simpson, 1986; Simpson, 2002).  In the descriptive section differences in environmental 
record across industry are explored.  Dummy controls for the primary industry of each 
company (steel; pulp and paper; and oil refining) are also included when the questions of 
interest are explored.  Controlling for industry effects in this manner is consistent with 
previous studies (Simpson and Koper, 1992).   
Variability 
As stated, plants often have variability in discharges from seasonal changes, 
random fluctuations, differences in intake water content, and plant maintenance.  
Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) find that variability significantly predicts the 
degree of overcompliance: water treatment plants with higher variability were more 
likely to overcomply to maintain an overall low pollution level.  Water/sewage treatment 
plants (publicly owned treatment works) are also required to obtain NPDES water 
permits to discharge water into waterways.  These entities are different from industrial 
discharges: they are publicly owned and therefore have no corporate structure.  Most 
importantly, many manufacturing plants send some water discharge to sewage treatment 
plants and the sewage treatment plant is ultimately responsible for treating and 
discharging wastewater.  Because the water treatment plants have less control over the 
receiving water, they likely experience more problems with variability.  However, 
variability is still likely to be a problem for industrial plants as well.  Thus, the same 
measure used by the authors (the firm-specific standard deviation of the logged monthly 
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compliance ratio) is created and used here when the compliance ratio is the dependent 
variable. 
Data and Sample Issues 
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics for the subset of firms that are ranked in 
the KLD social ratings data.  The KLD firms have better financial performance and are 
larger on average; thus, the firms that are less profitable and smaller tend to be excluded 
from these rankings.  For example, the average stockholders equity is approximately 3 
billion in the full sample and 5.5 billion in the KLD sample; this is due to the loss of 
firms on the lower end of financial performance.  Although the average levels are much 
more similar for return on assets, return on sales, and liquidity, the firms at the bottom of 
the distribution are again excluded from the KLD ratings and the KLD firms have slightly 
higher returns and liquidity.  Similarly, the companies contained in the KLD data are 
larger.  They own 1.4 more facilities and have approximately 12,000 more employees 
than the average firm in the full sample.   
The KLD sample also differs in terms of sanctions and compliance record, but the 
differences are minimal.  The KLD sub-sample received slightly more sanctions on 
average each year and has a slightly higher average number of administrative cases.  
However, the largest difference in means is still small: the full sample received 1.75 
sanctions (of any kind) on average each year and the KLD sample received 2.09 per year.   
On average the KLD firms were in violation during a slightly higher percent of 
the yearly observations for nearly all of the pollution types, although the mean difference 
ranges from only 0.03 to 0.08.  The KLD subsample was in compliance with toxic 
pollution standards slightly more often.  The KLD subsample also has slightly more 
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violations on average than the full sample (with the exception of violations for TSS and 
for toxic pollution), but the differences are again small.  The biggest difference is in total 
violations.  Among the violators in the full sample, the firms had 13.55 violations on 
average per year while the KLD violators had 14.10 yearly violations on average.  The 
difference between the two samples in the compliance ratio (portion of limit that is 
discharged) varies by the measure; however, the median compliance ratios are quite 
similar across the two samples.  Table 6 provides this information for the KLD sample 
without the substitutions.  The means and medians change very little from the KLD 
sample with replacements. 
INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE 
Regardless of the sample, the data are challenging to use.  Ideally, panel models 
with fixed effects would used to test both sets of hypotheses.  Controlling for unobserved 
differences in firms that might explain citizenship, sanctions, and environmental behavior 
would strengthen any associations that are uncovered.  However, this type of analysis is 
not feasible for several reasons.   
Two issues emerge from examining these descriptive statistic tables.  First, the 
data are clearly skewed; in fact, the standard deviations are often larger than the means.  
In addition, the medians are often quite different from the means.  The second related 
problem is low variability.  For example, the range of violations each year is large but the 
median for each type of pollutant is between two and four for each pollutant group and 
only eight for overall pollution.   
Several other difficulties emerge due to the complexity of the data.  First, the 
variables of interest are measured in different time units.  Although pollution levels are 
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usually reported monthly, sanctions are distributed quarterly and firm characteristics (size 
and financial performance) are only available yearly.  Thus, the data must be aggregated 
to firm/year to examine the effect of citizenship on environmental behavior.  If a monthly 
or quarterly analysis was conducted the coefficient would still be based on any yearly 
changes in citizenship.  In addition to a small sample size (73 firms total), this reduces the 
number of observations over time.  When the sanctions questions are examined the 
models are run quarterly and the firm characteristics for each year are applied to every 
quarter in the year.   
To further complicate matters, some measures are available for a limited number 
of firms.  As noted, the KLD social ratings are available for only half of the sample.  In 
addition, the compliance ratios can only be calculated for monthly averages, but pollution 
levels are not always measured and submitted in this unit.   
Finally, many of the independent variables of interest are correlated (see Table 7).  
For example, consistent with previous studies (Arora and Cason, 1995, 1996; Decanio 
and Watkins, 1998), larger firms are more likely to participate in voluntary programs.  
Firms with more employees also score higher on the KLD rankings.  Correlations among 
the independent variables make it more difficult to sort out competing explanations.  
However, diagnostic tests of the regression models indicate that the correlations do not 
create substantial multicollinearity (discussed in the results section).   
These problems make these data difficult to analyze, but not impossible.  A 
variety of methods are used to understand the association between environmental 
behavior and citizenship.  When the outcome is continuous mean differences and/or 
correlations are presented for the full sample.  Because these tests do not correct for the 
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dependence of multiple observations of the same firms, pooled regression models that 
correct the standard errors (using the STATA cluster command) are used to determine 
statistical significance.  However, STATA documentation urges caution in using the 
cluster command with binary dependent variables.  In addition, it is unclear whether it is 
appropriate to use the cluster command with binary independent variables.  In these 
cases, all of the data for each firm is combined into one observation (circumventing the 
problem of dependent observations over time) and then mean differences and correlations 
are calculated.  The bivariate tests do contain some statistically significant results.60  
When the outcome is continuous, multivariate pooled regression (with a correction for 
clustering) is conducted to test citizenship against competing explanations of firm 
behavior.  When the cluster command is inappropriate, partial correlations are used to 
examine whether citizenship remains significant when covariates are included. 
The sanction hypotheses are especially tricky to test with these data.  Again, 
survival or panel analysis with fixed effects would be ideal to sort out the impact of 
sanctions on compliance.  However, in addition to the outcome, the data also lack 
variability in sanctions.  The median number of sanctions received each year is zero and 
75 percent or more of the firm/quarters have zero sanctions.  Although survival analysis 
might be useful to identify the effect of sanctions even when rare, fixed effects cannot be 
included in the survival models to ensure the effect of sanctions on recidivism is captured 
rather than the reverse (poor environmental behavior results in sanctions) because of low 
                                                 
60 Because of the data limitations, statistical power in this study is low.  There is an increased chance of 
making a Type I error (failure to detect true significant differences).  Thus, a lower significance criteria 
(p=0.10) is used. 
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variability in the outcome.61  In addition, time to failure models would not capture the 
effect of sanctions on the frequency of violation or overcompliance.  Despite these 
problems, I am still able to address the sanctions questions in an exploratory manner.  
Using the violation count and overcompliance measures, I examine the effect of sanctions 
on future behavior within each citizenship group while including the firm characteristics 
that are related to environmental performance in the model.  I also include prior 
violations/overcompliance in the model as a proxy for “sanction risk.”  In a limited way, 
the lagged dependent variable “controls for” the fact that chronic offenders receive more 
sanctions.  
Given that the concept of citizenship and data on the actual pollution levels at the 
firm-level are new additions to the corporate and environmental crime literature, it is 
reasonable to begin addressing these research questions with this more descriptive 
approach.  In addition, compiling this type of data at the firm-level is a new approach and 
it is necessary to first understand some of the broader patterns in the data.  Thus, I begin 
the results section with a description of the production of water pollution in each of the 
industries of interest before describing the patterns of environmental behavior (with each 
of the measures) for each industry over time.  Next, the environmental record of the 
plants and firms in the sample are described overall and within each industry.  This 
section provides some sense of how the picture of pollution changes as one moves to a 
higher unit of analysis.  Finally, descriptive analysis of the relationship between 
sanctions, citizenship, and environmental record are presented at the firm-level. 
                                                 
61 In preliminary analysis I found that fixed effects explained 75 to 90 percent of the variation in firm 
violation rate.   
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CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Industry Descriptions62 
Pulp and Paper 
The pulp and paper industries are intertwined to produce paper.  The pulping 
process involves breaking down raw wood into wood fiber that will be used to make 
paper (papermaking).  Specifically, pulp mills break down and separate the fibers of 
wood from one another and from other impurities (e.g., rags, straw, etc) using chemical, 
semi-chemical, or mechanical (grinders) methods.  Wood is the most common pulping 
material.  In this pulping process, chemicals are used to break down the bonds that bind 
wood fibers together.  Once the wood fibers are separated they are usually bleached, 
combined with other additives, and mixed with water to create “slurry.”  Paper mills 
“dewater” the mixture, leaving the fibers spread on a wire conveyor that presses and 
heats the mixture into the final paper product.  Integrated mills engage in both pulping 
and papermaking; other paper mills purchase pulp or recycle wastepaper to make paper.   
Both the pulp and the paper production processes use water; in fact, the pulp and 
paper industry is the largest industrial process water user in the U.S.  The resulting 
wastewater can reduce water quality and/or (depending on the process) introduce toxic 
pollutants into the waterway.  The pulping process has a greater pollution potential than 
papermaking, mainly in the pulping and the bleaching stages (U.S EPA, 2002). 
                                                 
62 The EPA produced industry sector reports in 1995 and updated them in 2002.  The sector reports for pulp 
and paper, steel, and oil and gas are used to describe the production of pollution in each of the industries of 




Steel production contains several steps that vary by the type of technology used in 
the mill.  When the basic oxygen furnace (BOF) is used, cokemaking and ironmaking 
precede steelmaking.  Coal is converted into “coke” in large oven batteries; the coke is 
burned to reduce iron; and the molten iron is melted and refined into steel in the BOF.  
When the electric arc furnace (EAF) is used, the primary input material is scrap steel and 
the coking process is not necessary.  The scrap metal is melted and refined.  The later 
parts of the process are similar regardless of the technology initially used.  The molten 
steel from either furnace type is formed into slabs that are rolled into finished products.  
During the rolling process, the steel may be reheated, cleaned, and/or coated.  Fully-
integrated mills (i.e., those using BOF) create coke, produce steel, and roll and finish it.  
Non-integrated mills do not have the necessary equipment to produce steel from coal, 
iron ore, or scrap metal; these mills purchase raw materials in processed form.  The 
current sample contains both types of mills. 
The type of environmental threat varies according to the type of mill.  Water is 
used in both the coking process and the steel finishing process, but the largest pollution 
threat is associated with the coking process.  This wastewater is most likely to contain 
contaminants (U.S. EPA, 1995a). 
Oil 
 Petroleum refining refers to the physical, thermal, and chemical separation of 
crude oil into distillation fractions which are then further processed into finished 
petroleum products.  Petroleum refineries contain multiple complex operating systems.  
The specific operations depend on the properties of the crude oil to be refined (the 
composition of crude oil can vary significantly by source) and the desired products; thus, 
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no two refineries are identical.  Large volumes of water are used in the refining process 
and four types of wastewater are produced: surface water runoff, cooling water, process 
water, and sanitary wastewater.  Water used for cooling and water used in processing 
operations account for significant portions of the total wastewater.  Process water often 
comes into direct contact with oil and is usually highly contaminated; cooling water 
typically does not come into direct contact with oil and contains fewer contaminants.  
Surface water runoff can contain pollutants from spills to the surface, leaks in equipment, 
or any materials that may have collected in drains.  After primary treatment, the 
wastewater can be discharged to a publicly owned treatment works or undergo secondary 
treatment before being discharged directly to surface waters.  The wastewater discharged 
directly to surface water is regulated under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (U.S. EPA, 1995b). 
With this background information about the industries of interest, the yearly 
trends in the environmental record of the pulp and paper, steel, and oil plants in these data 
are discussed.  Other environmental research has shown a growth in compliance over 
time (e.g., Thornton et al., 2003).  The trend toward more compliance is even visible in 
this study with only six years of data.  Overall in 1995 thirty-five percent of the plants 
reported zero violations; by the year 2000 this number increased to 46 percent.  Although 
not always perfectly linear, as Figure 8 shows compliance increases in both the pulp and 
paper and the oil industry over time.  Although the steel industry also increases in 
compliance between point A (1995) and point B (2000), its course is much more 
sporadic.  In fact, the steel industry declines in compliance between 1998 and 2000.   
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE 
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Figure 9 contains the yearly compliance rate for each pollutant.  Although 
somewhat more stable for toxic pollution, the upward trend exists for all of the pollutant 
types. 
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE 
A similar pattern is revealed in the violation data.  There are 4,608 violations over 
the six year period.  As figure 10 shows, the number of total violations declines each 
year, from nearly 1000 violations in 1995 to 600 in 2000.  This decline occurs in each 
industry and for every pollutant type (Figure 11). 
INSERT FIGURES 10 & 11 HERE 
Unable to create a summary measure of total compliance ratio, instead the 
industry patterns are presented over time for both conventional and toxic pollutants.  As 
shown in Figure 12, all three industries show a decrease in the portion of the conventional 
pollutant quantity permit that is discharged (increases in overcompliance).   However, the 
path is not as smooth for the steel industry.  In fact, the portion of the conventional 
pollutant quantity limit discharged increases for several years before declining.  As 
Figure 13 shows, the pattern is the same for toxic pollution quantities with the exception 
of the steel industry.  The steel industry increases the portion of the quantity permitted 
level that is discharged over time.  In other words, the steel industry overcomplies less 
over time.  When summed across industry, the fraction of limits discharged decreases 
(overcompliance increases) across all pollutant types over time (Figure 14). 
INSERT FIGURES 12, 13, AND 14 HERE 
Turning to concentration measures, the pattern is somewhat different for 
conventional pollutant concentrations (Figure 15).  The steel industry pollutes less of its 
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legal concentration limits over time but is fairly stable.  Both the pulp and paper and the 
oil industries pollute more of their legal limits over time.  The increase is much more 
dramatic for the pulp and paper industry. Although the oil industry has a spike in 1998, 
overcompliance with toxic pollution concentration limits generally increases or remains 
fairly stable over time across industry (Figure 16).  When summed across industry, the 
fraction of limits discharged increases (overcompliance decreases) over time or is stable 
over time.  However, the level of overcompliance does consistently increase over time for 
toxic pollution concentrations (Figure 17). 
INSERT FIGURES 15, 16, AND 17 HERE 
Overall, all of the measures of environmental behavior show continued 
improvement over time.  The firms are in compliance more often, violate less, and 
overcomply more over time.  Although the findings are more varied for the compliance 
ratios, it is important to note that the increases in the portion of the legal limit being 
discharged were small.  The median monthly compliance ratios still reflect a substantial 
degree of overcompliance, even with the increases.   
Given that the level of compliance was already high in 1995, the demonstrated 
improvements through the year 2000 are very noteworthy.  The increases in compliance 
are consistent with previous work (Vandenbergh, 2004) and clearly suggest that firms 
have some commitment to improved environmental performance.  However, the trend 
toward compliance is not as smooth among firms in the steel industry.  The context of the 
steel industry may account for this difference.  Declining prices, inefficient mills, and the 
influx of foreign steel forced a string of bankruptcies in the U.S. steel industry in the mid-
1990s.  The older, less efficient mills (with worse environmental records) may have 
 
 108
closed during this period.  As the industry became dominated by newer mini-mills, the 
environmental performance of the industry as a whole likely improved. 
Moving on from the changes over time, in the following section the data are 
pooled to present the plant-level record overall and by industry.   
Plant-Level Environmental Record 
I begin by describing the general patterns of environmental behavior in the data 
using the simpler measures from the prior literature (i.e., dichotomous, counts).  In order 
to compare to this prior work, these patterns are examined at the plant/month and 
plant/quarter.  The data are also aggregated to the plant/year because the analysis for this 
paper will ultimately be conducted on a yearly basis.  Finally, plant behavior is described 
using the monthly compliance ratio, which controls for differences in the permitted 
levels. 
Full Sample: Dichotomous Violation Measure 
Most of the existing studies of water pollution examine BOD and TSS outcomes.  
Using data from the mid-1980s, Magat and Viscusi (1990) find that pulp and paper mills 
in the southeastern states were in compliance with BOD limits during 75 percent of the 
quarters over a three year period.  Using data from the late 1990s, Kagan et al. (2003) 
find even higher compliance with BOD and TSS monthly standards; the sample of 14 
pulp and paper mills in Australia, New Zealand, British Columbia, and the states of 
Washington and Georgia in the United States were almost always in compliance.  Table 8 
shows similar high levels of compliance for BOD and TSS in these data.  Plants were in 
violation of BOD limits only 7 percent of the quarters and 3 percent of the months.  
Similarly, plants were in violation of TSS limits only 9 percent of the quarters and 4 
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percent of the months.  When aggregating to the year the compliance rates are somewhat 
lower for BOD and TSS (81 and 80 percent respectively), but still show high levels of 
compliance.  In addition, the number of violations for those plant/years that are out of 
compliance is often quite small (e.g., one or two for the entire year). 
Although still exhibiting a high degree of compliance, the percent of observations 
in compliance is somewhat smaller when examining groups of pollutants.  At the monthly 
level, plants are in compliance with conventional pollutant standards 91 percent of the 
time; at the quarterly level this drops to 81 percent.  Similarly, the percent of observations 
in compliance is lower for the group of toxic pollutants: 92 percent of the monthly 
observations and 85 percent quarterly observations are in compliance.  The plants were in 
compliance during 61 percent and 71 percent (respectively) of the yearly observations of 
conventional and toxic pollutants.   
Compliance levels are the lowest when examining the plants’ overall pollution 
record.  For all pollutants, plants were in compliance in 83 percent of the monthly 
observations; 68 percent of the quarterly observations; and 41 percent of the yearly 
observations.  While still reflecting a substantial degree of compliance, these numbers are 
substantially lower than the compliance rates that are often presented in studies of single 
pollutants.   
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 Prior research has primarily examined water pollution in the pulp and paper 
industry.  In this study pulp and paper is included as well as steel and oil and there are 
differences in the level of compliance across industry.  As Table 9 shows, the pulp and 
paper industries level of compliance closely resembles the findings in other work.  As 
 
 110
Kagan et al. (2003) find, the industry is nearly always in compliance with BOD and TSS 
standards (98 percent for each at the monthly level).  In fact, pulp and paper has the 
highest rate of compliance of all the industries for each pollutant and pollutant group.  
Although the percent of observations in compliance decreases as the number of time 
periods increases (i.e., moving from monthly to quarterly), the industry has fairly high 
compliance rates (e.g., 89 and 92 percent for conventional and toxic pollutants at the 
quarterly level; 73 and 83 percent at the yearly level).  In fact, the rate of compliance for 
pulp and paper is actually higher than the sample average even at the quarterly and yearly 
level of analysis.  The steel and oil industries, however, are not quite as conforming. 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
As Table 10 demonstrates, the steel industries’ BOD and TSS monthly 
compliance levels are comparable to the sample average.  Ninety-four percent of the 
BOD observations and 93 percent of the TSS observations reflect compliance in the steel 
industry, compared to 97 and 96 percent respectively in the entire sample.  However, it is 
important to note that although the compliance levels are similar, very few plants in the 
steel industry are required to report BOD levels (especially compared to pulp and paper).  
Unlike BOD and TSS, the industries’ overall compliance and compliance with 
conventional and toxic pollutant standards is lower than the sample average at the 
monthly level.  A similar picture emerges when the data is aggregated to the quarter.  In 
the steel industry 71 percent of the quarterly observations for conventional pollutants; 73 
percent of the observations for toxic pollutants; and 55 percent of the total observations 
show compliance.  The quarterly compliance percentages for the sample as a whole are 
approximately 12 percent higher than steel for each group of pollutants.  The compliance 
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levels in the steel industry are lower than the sample average for all pollutants and 
pollutant groups when the time unit increases to the yearly level, although the difference 
is largest (approximately 20 percent lower) for conventional and toxic pollutants.    
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
 Like the steel industry, Table 11 shows that the oil industries’ BOD and TSS 
monthly compliance levels are comparable to the sample average (95 and 93 percent 
respectively).  The oil industry also has lower than average monthly compliance levels 
for conventional pollutants and overall pollution.  However, unlike the steel industry the 
oil industry differs very little from the monthly sample average for toxic pollutants (95 
and 92 percent respectively).  At the quarterly unit of analysis the oil industry exhibits 
less compliance than the sample for all pollutants and pollutant groups with the notable 
exception of toxic pollutants, which is actually three percentage points higher than the 
average.  Like steel, the differences are smaller for BOD and TSS than for conventional 
and overall pollution (oil is approximately 5 percentage points lower).  In the oil industry 
the percent of quarters in compliance is 57 percent overall and 69 percent for 
conventional pollutants; the sample average is approximately 11 points higher for each.  
This trend continues when the data are aggregated to the year.  The oil industries’ yearly 
compliance rate is comparable to the sample average for BOD and TSS and is actually a 
few percentage points higher for toxic pollutants, but compliance is approximately 20 
percent points lower than average for conventional pollutants and total pollution.   
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
 Overall, the steel and oil industries have smaller percentages of compliant 
observations than the pulp and paper industry.  The industries differ most in terms of the 
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pollutant groups (conventional, toxic, and total) rather than the specific pollutants (BOD 
and TSS).  These differences are depicted graphically in Figure 18.  While the 
observations for most pollutants and time units reflect compliance the majority of the 
time in all industries, reports of nearly 100 percent compliance rates in the pulp and paper 
industry do not apply to steel and oil; plants in these two industries are in violation more 
often.  In addition, the steel industry has the lowest compliance rate for the worst type of 
pollution: toxic discharges.  This toxic pollution problem has not been captured in studies 
that look exclusively at BOD pollution in the pulp and paper industry. 
INSERT FIGURE 18 HERE 
Violators: Number of Violations 
 Moving to the number of violations outcome, Tables 12 through 14 show similar 
industry patterns among the violators.  Among the violators, those in the pulp and paper 
industry tend to have fewer violations on average, less than the sample average.  
Violating firms in the steel and oil industries tend to have more violations than the 
sample as a whole.  The steel industry violators are actually the “worst” violators.  On a 
yearly basis the plants in the steel industry have the highest number of violations on 
average.  For example, the average violator has 3.39 total violations per year in the pulp 
and paper industry; 11.37 violations per year in the steel industry; and 6.72 violations in 
the oil industry.   
INSERT TABLES 12 – 14 HERE 
In terms of total violations over the six year period, the steel industry again often 
leads the way (as shown in Figure 19).  The steel industry is responsible for the highest 
percent (41 percent) of total pollution and the majority of toxic pollution violations (63 
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percent).  The oil industry accounts for 32 percent and pulp and paper accounts 27 
percent of the total violations.  The distribution for TSS and conventional pollutants is 
more evenly split between oil and steel (each between 35 to 40 percent) with pulp and 
paper following.  The one exception to this pattern of high violations in the steel industry 
is for BOD.  The pulp and paper industry is responsible for 45 percent of the BOD 
violations and the oil industry is responsible for 49 percent.  However, most of the steel 
plants were not required to maintain specific limits on BOD. 
INSERT FIGURE 19 HERE 
 In addition to industry level differences, differences in environmental record also 
exist across plants.  For example, Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) find that a small 
group of water treatment plants have continually poor compliance records over time.  
Similarly, Magat and Viscusi (1990) find that four of the fifty-six pulp and paper mills in 
their sample were responsible for most of the cases of significant noncompliance.  
Although not as dramatic, there are similar patterns in these data shown in Table 15.   
 With a total of 434 violations of BOD standards in the 6 year period, the average 
number of BOD violations (among the violators) is only 2.42 per year.  However, some 
plants violated BOD standards as many as 8 times in a quarter and 26 times in a year.  
Over the entire sample period, one plant was cited 56 times for polluting above the 
permitted BOD levels.  Three facilities were more than two standard deviations above the 
sample mean for the six years; these three facilities accounted for 24 percent of the total 
BOD violations.  In fact, these same three facilities were responsible for 30 percent of the 
significant violations (more than 40 percent over permitted levels) of BOD regulations. 
 
 114
 Over the six sample years there are 746 violations of TSS standards.  Although 
the average number of violations (among the violators) is only 2.27 violations per year, 
some facilities have as many as 20 violations in a quarter and 33 in a year.  One facility 
accumulated 119 TSS violations (16 percent of the total) as well as 17 percent (71 of the 
411) of the significant violations over the six years.  Two facilities were more than two 
standard deviations above the sample mean, accounting for approximately 21 percent of 
the total and significant TSS violations. 
 Over the sample period, plants received the most violations for conventional 
pollutant discharges.  On average the violating plants received 4.81 violations per year; 
however, some facilities have as many as 40 violations in a single quarter and 73 in a 
year.  One facility accumulated 264 conventional pollutant violations (11 percent of the 
total) and 10 percent of the significant violations.  Four facilities were more than two 
standard deviations above the sample mean, accounting for approximately 26 percent of 
the conventional pollutant violations and 27 percent of the significant violations. 
 Among the violators, the average number of toxic pollutant violations is 4.53 per 
year.  Yet, some facilities receive as many as 20 violations in a quarter and 48 in a year.  
One facility was responsible for 17 percent of the toxic pollutant and significant toxic 
pollutant violations over the six year period.  Three facilities were more than two 
standard deviations above the sample mean, accounting for approximately 32 percent of 
both the total and significant toxic violations. 
INSERT TABLE 15 HERE 
  The two pieces of information examined thus far (the number of violations and 
the percent of observations in compliance) provide consistent pictures of the 
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environmental record across industry for conventional and toxic pollutants.  Both 
measures suggest that the steel industry is the leading polluter of toxic chemicals.  The 
percent of compliant observations in the steel industry is 15 to 19 percentage points lower 
than oil and pulp and paper quarterly and 24 to 33 percent lower yearly.  In addition, the 
steel industry is responsible for 64 percent of the toxic pollution violations and the 
average violator has more violations per year.     
Both pieces of information also show that the steel and oil industries are 
responsible for the bulk of the conventional pollution problem.  The two industries are in 
compliance for 18 to 20 percent fewer of the quarterly observations and 28 to 34 percent 
fewer of the year observations than the pulp and paper industry.  Similarly, the two 
industries are responsible for approximately 40 percent of the conventional pollutant 
violations over the sample period and on average have a higher number of violations.  
Both measures suggest that the steel and oil industries are also problematic in terms of 
TSS.  These two industries account for 40 and 35 percent of the total violations 
respectively and are in compliance for a smaller portion of the observations.  Steel and oil 
are in compliance for 10 percent fewer observations quarterly and approximately 18 
percent fewer yearly than pulp and paper. 
Both measures also suggest that the pulp and paper industry overall accounts for 
the smallest percent of the total violations (27 percent) and the plants are in compliance 
more often than the other two industries at both the quarterly and yearly unit of analysis.  
Together the steel and oil industries account for the majority of the total violations (73 
percent), are in compliance less often, and have more violations on average than the pulp 
and paper industry. 
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The distribution by industry differs between the two measures only for BOD.  
Pulp and paper and oil are responsible for the bulk of the BOD violations (50 and 45 
percent) across the six year period, while steel is responsible for only 6 percent.  
However, the pulp and paper and plants are actually in compliance during a slightly 
higher portion of the observations than the steel or oil industries; pulp and paper is in 
compliance for 5 to 7 percent more quarterly observations and 12 to 14 percent more 
yearly observations.  In addition, the pulp and paper industry violators have slightly 
fewer violations on average than steel or oil.  The difference seems to be an issue of 
sample size.  There are 680 observations for the pulp and paper plants and only 28 for the 
steel plants.  While the pulp and paper industry is more often in compliance and has 
fewer violations on average, the additional observations make it look as though it is more 
problematic then steel.   
These data show some industries to be more problematic for specific kinds of 
pollution.  However, although not as high as prior studies of BOD in the pulp and paper 
industry would suggest, the percent of observations in compliance is still rather high for 
each pollutant and each unit of analysis even when examining the plants’ overall record.  
In fact, only when examining total pollution compliance rates at the yearly level does the 
percent of observations in compliance fall below 50 percent and even in these cases the 
number of violations is rather small.  However, this is not to suggest that plants never 
pollute over the permitted levels.  In fact, some plants have high numbers of violations.  
Consistent with the prior literature, these outliers are quite different from the sample 




Full Sample: Compliance Ratio 
The results for the median compliance ratio are comparable to the prior literature.  
Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) look specifically at monthly average BOD 
concentrations and find them to be far below permitted levels.  Across plants, the median 
monthly compliance ratio for BOD concentrations is 0.32.  The data in this study contain 
even higher levels of overcompliance, as shown in Table 16.  For monthly average 
concentrations, the median sample compliance ratio is 0.23 for BOD; 0.20 for TSS; 0.22 
for conventional pollutants; and 0.10 for toxic pollutants.  Thus, the water treatment 
plants in the Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) sample polluted only 32 percent of 
their permit while the industrial plants in the current sample pollute only 23 percent of 
their BOD legal levels.  The estimates for the pulp and paper industry are even closer to 
those of Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006); on average the pulp and paper plants 
pollute just 27 percent of BOD concentration limits and 29 percent of BOD quantity 
limits (see below for industry comparison).  For monthly average quantities, the median 
compliance ratio is 0.27 for BOD; 0.20 for TSS; 0.22 for conventional pollutants; and 
0.08 for toxic pollutants.  While all of these compliance ratios show a substantial amount 
of overcompliance, plants overcomply the most (pollute the smallest portion of their legal 
limit) with toxic pollution requirements. 
Based on the previous descriptions, one might expect plants in the pulp and paper 
industry to lead in overcompliance.  However, this is not the case.  With the exception of 
toxic pollutants, steel and oil actually overcomply more (to some degree) than pulp and 
paper for all pollution types.  The industry that pollutes the least of its permitted levels 
(on average) varies with pollutant and measure (quantity versus concentration), but the 
general pattern is the same for all pollutants except toxic pollutants.  Thus, while the steel 
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and oil industries are generally in compliance less often and have more violations on 
average, they also overcomply more than the pulp and paper industry in most cases.  
These industry differences are consistent with the variability argument (Bandopadhyay 
and Horowitz, 2006).  Firms in the steel and oil industries have higher variability and 
firms in the pulp and paper industries have lower variability.  Firms with higher 
variability are likely to have more total violations because the violation count includes 
violations of daily pollution measurements that are more subject to random fluctuations 
than monthly averages.  But, firms with higher variability will also overcomply more in 
order to maintain a good overall record.  Conversely, firms with lower variability (pulp 
and paper) may have fewer violations but overcomply on a smaller scale. 
However, there is one exception to the overall patterns.  The steel industry 
overcomplies the least with toxic pollution requirements.  In this case, variability does 
not differ by industry.  Thus, some other factor unique to the steel industry must account 
for this difference.  The production process in the steel industry may simply create more 
toxic pollution.   
As these differences in overcompliance are described, it is important to note that 
they are actually very small.  Across industry the firms are engaging in substantial 
overcompliance.  The differences in environmental behavior across industry are 
summarized in Figures 20 and 21.   
INSERT FIGURES 20 AND 21 HERE 
Firm-Level Environmental Record 
The firm-level patterns are described in the following section, beginning with the 
dichotomous violation measure.  After illustrating the firm patterns in the additional 
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outcome measures (counts, compliance ratio), a summary of every outcome is presented.  
Comparisons to the plant-level results are made throughout the discussion.   
Full Sample: Dichotomous Violation Measure 
At the firm-level the dichotomous measure shows that overall the firms are in 
violation of EPA standards during a larger portion of the yearly observations than at the 
plant-level.  This is not surprising given the change in the unit of analysis.  When the data 
are aggregated, if any plant is in noncompliance then the entire firm is coded as 
noncompliant.  Although most of the industry differences remain the same at the firm-
level, the magnitude of the differences is much smaller.   
Table 17A provides a summary of the dichotomous measure of compliance across 
industry at the firm-level.  In the plant-level description, steel and oil were in compliance 
less often than pulp and paper.  The differences at the plant level were quite large: the 
pulp and paper industry was in compliance in 52 percent of the total observations 
compared to 29 percent in the steel industry and 23 percent in the oil industry.  At the 
firm/year, the oil industry continues to be in compliance during the smallest portion of 
observations (4 percent).  However, the difference between pulp and paper and steel is 
very small and steel is actually in compliance for a higher portion of observations (15 
percent versus 10 percent).  Aggregation to the firm-level likely explains this shift.  For 
all of the dichotomous measures of pollution, there is more variability between firms than 
within firms: facilities owned by the same firm tend to have similar records (Table 17B).  
However, this does not mean that all facilities owned by a firm will be in compliance or 
vice-versa.  Even though plant records tend to be similar within firm, there is some 
variation.  When the data are aggregated, if any plant is in noncompliance then the entire 
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firm is coded as noncompliant.  The firms in the pulp and paper industry own more plants 
on average and have a higher chance of at least one of those plants having a violation.   
Patterns of compliance with BOD standards also shift when the data are 
aggregated to the firm-level.  Rather than pulp and paper, at the firm-level the steel 
industry is compliant most often (65 percent of the observations).  There are very few 
BOD observations for the steel plants and firms.  When the data are aggregated, the 
denominator for used to create the mean changes very little for the steel industry.  
However, it drops drastically for the pulp and paper industry.  The pulp and paper 
industry is compliant for 52 percent of the observations and the oil industry during 43 
percent. 
 The patterns for the remaining pollutants remain consistent with the plant-level 
description.  The oil industry is in compliance with TSS standards during the smallest 
portion of observations (46 percent) followed by steel (52 percent) and pulp and paper 
(55 percent).  However, the difference between the average for steel and pulp and paper 
is not very large at the firm-level (only 3 percentage points).  Once again, the oil and steel 
industries are in compliance with conventional pollutant standards less often than pulp 
and paper (15, 27, and 31 percent respectively).  And finally, the steel industry has the 
lowest percent of toxic pollutant observations in compliance (35 percent) followed by oil 
(46 percent) and pulp and paper (64 percent).  Figure 22 summarizes these industry 
differences.  The patterns are similar in the smaller sample of violators. 
INSERT TABLE 17A, TABLE 17B, AND FIGURE 22 
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Violators: Number of Violations 
As Table 18A shows, among the violators those in the pulp and paper industry 
once again tend to have fewer violations on average, less than the sample average.  
Violating firms in the steel and oil industries tend to have more violations than the 
sample as a whole.  The steel industry violators are actually the “worst” violators; on a 
yearly basis the plants in the steel industry have the highest number of violations on 
average.  For example, the average violator has 8.28 total violations per year in the pulp 
and paper industry; 21.82 violations per year in the steel industry; and 14.32 violations in 
the oil industry.  Although these averages are quite low, like the plants some firms have 
many violations each year.  For example, some firms have as many as 106 total 
violations; 27 BOD violations; 33 TSS violations; 73 conventional pollutant violations 
and 48 toxic pollutant violations in a single year.  Once again, a one-way ANOVA shows 
more variability between firms than within firm: plants owned by the same firm tend to 
have a similar average number of violations when they violate (Table 18B). 
INSERT TABLES 18A AND 18B HERE 
 In fact, there are a few firms that are responsible for a disproportionate percent of 
the violations.63  Nine companies (13 percent) are more than one standard deviation 
above the sample average and are responsible for 45 percent of the total violations during 
the sample period.  Similarly, five companies (seven percent) are responsible for 40 
percent of the BOD violations.  With TSS, eight companies (11 percent) are responsible 
for 54 percent of the violations.  Similar patterns emerge with conventional and toxic 
                                                 
63 Although in any year there are fewer companies in the sample, 73 different entities are observed during 
the six year period.  Although some of these are mergers from two original sample companies, I count them 
as separate entities in calculating the percent of the sample.  I also combine the two parent companies 
violation data with the violation data of their joint ventures (and reduce the denominator accordingly).  The 
numbers are very similar when I do not combine the joint ventures. 
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pollutants.  Nine companies (13 percent) are responsible for 53 percent of the 
conventional pollutant violations and six companies (eight percent) are responsible for 56 
percent of the toxic pollution violations.  In fact, three companies fall into these high 
violation groups for total violations, conventional pollutant violations, and toxic pollutant 
violations.  Six other companies fall into two groups: either total and toxic or total and 
conventional pollutants.  However, the companies are not all observed for the same 
length of time for various reasons (e.g., mergers, closings, etc).  Thus, it is possible that 
certain companies make up a disproportionate amount of the violations simply because 
they are observed for a longer period of time.  Yet, on a fairly consistent yearly basis, the 
same companies have significantly higher than average numbers of violations.  The 
company with the highest number of violations is higher than average every year.  Other 
companies also consistently rank highly in violation counts for 3 to 4 of the sample years; 
while others are less consistent (1 to 2 years).   
 This study is the first to demonstrate that a few companies are responsible for a 
disproportionate number of the total violations.  This concentration of violations among 
certain companies is quite relevant to the larger field of criminology because it is 
consistent with the patterns of offending for street offenders (Wolfgang, Figlio, and 
Sellin, 1972) and white-collar offenders (Weisburd et al., 2001).  Yet, the data also 
contain a substantial degree of overcompliance.  Returning to the full sample, overall the 
patterns for the median compliance ratio at the firm-level are nearly identical to those at 
the plant-level.  
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Full Sample: Compliance Ratio 
 As shown in Table 19A, the sample median of the concentration compliance ratio 
is 0.25 for BOD; 0.25 for TSS; 0.25 for conventional pollutants; and 0.11 for toxic 
pollutants.  For pulp and paper specifically, the median concentration level is 0.27.  For 
monthly average quantities, the median compliance ratio is 0.32 for BOD; 0.23 for TSS; 
0.26 for conventional pollutants; and 0.09 for toxic pollutants.   
Thus, the firm-level averages also demonstrate a substantial degree of 
overcompliance with legal limits.  Overall, the steel and oil industries pollute less of their 
permitted levels than pulp and paper: the industry that overcomplies the most depends on 
the pollutant and on the measurement (quantity versus concentration).  For example, the 
oil industry overcomplies the most with BOD quantity standards, but the steel industry 
overcomplies the most with BOD concentration standards.  Toxic pollutants are one 
exception to this pattern.  The steel industry overcomplies the least with toxic pollution 
quantity and concentration standards.  Again, for the most part these differences by 
industry are small. 
INSERT TABLE 19A HERE 
Tables 19B and 19C provide the ANOVA test for the compliance ratios.  
Consistent with the other outcomes, plants owned by the same firm tend to have similar 
average compliance ratios. 
INSERT TABLES 19B AND 19C HERE 
Overall the data show that the firm-level approach is relevant.  For each outcome 
measure the ANOVA tests indicate that there is more variability between firms than 
within firm (i.e., multiple plants owned by the same firm).  In addition, moving to the 
firm-level does not distort the overall and industry specific patterns found at the plant-
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level.  The changes that do occur are expected because the unit of analysis is larger (e.g., 
the firms are in violation more often than the plants).  The remainder of the analysis is 
conducted at the firm-level. 
In the following section, the association between firm citizenship and 
environmental record is examined beginning with the bivariate association between 
citizenship and each measure of environmental behavior.  When the citizenship measure 
is binary, the average time spent in violation, number of violations, or compliance ratio is 
presented for the “good” and “bad” citizen.  When the citizenship measure is continuous, 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient is provided.  The mean difference and correlation tables 
are presented, but regression models are used to determine significance levels after 
adjusting the standard errors for the dependence of observations over time using the 
STATA clustering command.  An overview of the bivariate relationship between 
environmental behavior and the other variables of interest is provided before moving into 
multivariate analysis.64   
Citizenship and Environmental Behavior: Bivariate Analysis 
Full Sample: Dichotomous Violation Measure 
The bivariate relationship between citizenship and environmental performance is 
first examined using a dichotomous measure of violation.  Violation is coded as one; 
thus, a higher value indicates that a higher portion of firm/years in violation.  Table 20 
provides the firm-level (one observation for each firm) means for each group (“bad” and 
“good” citizens) by pollutant type with a two-tailed test for significance.  Because using 
                                                 
64 With the exception of the program participation measures, firm characteristics are lagged by one year in 
all of these models.  Models were also run without lags on citizenship and one only result substantively 
changed.  This difference is discussed in the text.   
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the STATA clustering command with a dichotomous outcome is a potential problem, I 
provide firm-level findings (aggregating the data to one observation per firm) in addition 
to the regression results.  Aggregating multiple observations (over time) to a single firm 
observation eliminates the need to adjust the standard errors because each observation is 
independent.  Because of the reduction in sample size, the firm-level analysis is a more 
conservative estimate of significance levels.   
Counter to the research hypotheses, when significant the mean differences in 
Table 20 and the regression results in Table 21 actually show that program participants 
are in violation of pollution standards more often than non-participants.65  TRI 33/50 
participants tend to be in violation of BOD, TSS, and conventional pollutant standards for 
a higher proportion of years than non-participants.  For example, the program participants 
are in violation of TSS standards during 55 percent of the firm/years on average; the 
nonparticipants are in violation during 37 percent of the firm/years.  Since BOD and TSS 
are conventional pollutants, it seems that in general TRI participants have a problem with 
violating conventional pollutant standards.   
The pattern is similar for Wastewise participants who tend to be in violation of 
some pollution standard (the overall measure) more frequently than non-participants (96 
versus 90 percent of the years, respectively).  These results are consistent in both the 
mean difference and regression findings in Tables 20 and 21. 
                                                 
65 Although the findings are in the same direction for both the firm-level mean differences and the 
regression results, the two pieces of information differ in terms of significance.  In the firm-level mean 
difference tests, the TRI 33/50 program participants do not differ significantly from the non-participants in 
the proportion of years in violation of BOD or conventional pollutant standards.  However, the regression 
models show small significant differences (p=0.10) between the two groups for these two pollutants.  The 
firm-level analysis provides the most conservative test of the hypothesis; in reality the correct standard 
errors are probably somewhere between these two approaches.  Thus, while there may be a small difference 
in the proportion of years in violation for BOD and conventional pollutants, the differences between the 
two groups is clearly more robust for TSS. 
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INSERT TABLE 20 AND 21 HERE 
 The KLD citizenship measures, however, are not significantly related to the 
portion of firm/years in violation in the correlations or regression results (Tables 22 and 
23).66  Good and bad citizens differ somewhat in the amount of time they are in violation 
of toxic pollution standards.  When KLD citizenship is converted to a dichotomous 
variable, KLD good citizens are in violation during 42 percent of the firm/years while the 
“bad citizens” are in violation during 52 percent of the firm/years.  Similarly, the 
correlation analysis shows that increases in citizenship are associated with a decrease in 
the fraction of time spent in violation of toxic pollution standards.  However, these 
differences are not statistically significant.   
INSERT TABLE 22 AND 23 HERE 
Thus far, there is little support for the hypothesis that citizenship will decrease the 
amount of time spent in violation.  If anything, firms that participate in voluntary 
compliance programs are in violation more frequently.  However, results may differ when 
a different measure of violation is utilized. 
Violators: Number of Violations 
 As shown in Table 24, the bivariate relationship between citizenship and the 
average number of violations is generally counter to hypotheses, but findings again vary 
by pollution type and the citizenship measure.   
Table 24 contains the average number of violations for program participants and 
non-participants using the full sample (multiple observations for each firm).  Because the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
66 Recall that in some cases substitutions have been made.  If the data were data unavailable for subsidiaries 
and joint ventures in the sample then parent company social ratings are used.  The results are presented 
with the replacement data and without. 
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standard deviations are not corrected for the dependence of observations, regression 
results in Table 25 are used to determine the statistical significance.67  In addition to 
spending fewer years in compliance, Table 24 shows that TRI 33/50 participants have a 
significantly higher number of total, BOD, and toxic pollution violations on average.  For 
example, the participants on average have approximately 6 more total violations and 5 
more toxic violations than the non-participants.  Although TRI 33/50 participants are in 
violation of toxic standards the same amount of time as than non-participants, when the 
participants violate toxic pollution standards they have more violations on average.  The 
findings are similar for Wastewise volunteers.  When Wastewise participants violate 
pollution standards they tend to have more violations on average across pollutant type 
(except BOD).  For example, Wastewise violators have approximately 16 violations on 
average each year compared to 13 among non-participants.  However, these differences 
are small and are not statistically significant.   
INSERT TABLES 24 AND 25 HERE 
The findings for the KLD social ratings measures vary by pollutant type.  Table 
26 shows that although not significant, higher levels of citizenship (as ranked in the KLD 
data) are associated with more BOD and TSS violations.  However, KLD citizenship is 
negatively associated with toxic pollutant violations: those ranked higher in the KLD data 
tend to have fewer toxic pollution violations on average.  As shown in the bivariate 
regression model in Table 27, the negative association between citizenship and toxic 
pollutants is significant at the 0.10 level.   
INSERT TABLES 26 AND 27 HERE 
                                                 
67 Although OLS is technically inappropriate when the dependent variable is a count, I use it for ease of 
presentation and interpretation.  All results were confirmed with a Poisson model as well.   
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Next, the total number of violations across the six year period is examined by 
citizenship.  Table 28 confirms the positive relationship between TRI 33/50 participation 
and violations.  TRI 33/50 participants are responsible for 66 to 79 percent of the 
violations across pollutant type.  Wastewise participants are actually responsible for a 
smaller percent of the violations—only 20 to 30 percent for each category of pollutants.  
While this result may seem counter to earlier findings that Wastewise participants have 
more violations on average, it is an issue of sample size.  Data on Wastewise participants 
is limited to 77 company/year compared to 308 for the nonparticipants.  Thus, the 
Wastewise participants tend to be in violation more often and to have more violations on 
average, but are responsible for fewer total violations because there are fewer 
observations. 
INSERT TABLE 28 HERE 
As shown in Table 29, the KLD good citizens are responsible for forty percent of 
the violations or less in all pollution categories with the exception of BOD.  Overall, the 
firm/years with higher KLD ratings are responsible for a smaller percent of the total, 
TSS, conventional, and toxic pollution violations.  Consistent with the previous results, 
the difference is most noticeable for the most worrisome measure—toxic pollutants.  
When using the number of violations attributable to firms ranked in the KLD data as the 
denominator, the bad citizens account for almost 80 percent of toxic violations (data not 
shown).  When examining the percent of violations for the good and bad KLD citizens 
using the total sample violations as the denominator, the differences in toxic pollution 
between the groups are much smaller but still notable.  KLD bad citizens (with and 
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without replacement data) account for approximately 30 percent of the toxic pollution 
violations compared to only 9 percent for the good citizens.   
INSERT TABLE 29 HERE 
Turning back to the full sample, the relationship between citizenship and 
overcompliance is again opposite of hypothesis when the program participation measures 
are used.  However, the relationships differ when using the KLD citizenship measures.   
Full Sample: Compliance Ratio 
 The final environmental measure that examined is the compliance ratio—the 
amount of the permit that is discharged.  Ratios that are closer to one indicate that the 
firms pollution levels are close to the permitted level; ratios closer to zero indicate that 
the firm is polluting substantially less than legally allowed.  Because the compliance ratio 
is logged prior to taking the median, the actual numbers are difficult to interpret.  Larger 
negative values indicate a higher level of overcompliance.68  Thus, while the other 
measures focused on compliance versus noncompliance, this measure includes the entire 
range of conformity and violation. 
Consistent with earlier results the findings differ by citizenship measure.  They 
also vary by limit type (quantity versus concentration).  Table 30 contains the median 
compliance ratio by program participation for the full sample.  Because the standard 
errors are not corrected in this table of means, significance is discussed using the 
regression results that control for clustering (Table 31).  None of the comparisons are 
significantly different (statistically) from one another.  Yet, there is a substantive pattern 
                                                 
68 Previous literature finds that pollution levels are quire variable and the error does not follow the normal 
distribution.  Per the Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) approach, the compliance ratios were logged 




in the direction of findings; the results are generally counter to hypotheses.  Although any 
observed differences are small, program participants overcomply with quantity limits less 
than nonparticipants.  Tables 30 and 31 show that TRI participants on average discharge 
a larger portion of permitted BOD, TSS, conventional, and toxic pollution quantities as 
well as toxic pollution concentrations (Tables 32 and 33).  However, TRI 33/50 
participants do overcomply with BOD, TSS, and conventional pollutant concentration 
standards more than nonparticipants (Tables 32 and 33).  Again, although some 
differences are more substantial than others, none reach statistical significance.   
Wastewise participants also overcomply with quantity standards less than 
nonparticipants.  With the exception of toxic pollution, Wastewise participants discharge 
a higher portion of the permitted quantity on average.  Based on the regression results 
(with corrected standard errors), this difference is only significant for BOD (p=0.07).  
The differences in the average compliance ratio for concentration measures show a 
similar pattern.  The difference between groups is largest for BOD and toxic pollution: 
Wastewise participants overcomply less with BOD and toxic pollution concentration 
standards.  However, these differences are not statistically significant.    
INSERT TABLES 30-33 
 Once again, research results are more consistent with hypotheses when citizenship 
is measured using the KLD social ratings.  KLD citizenship is associated with higher 
levels of overcompliance with BOD, TSS, conventional pollutant and toxic pollutant 
quantity limits; good citizens tend to pollute less of their permitted limits (see Table 34).  
The pattern is generally consistent for concentration limits as well.  Good citizenship is 
associated with overcompliance with BOD, conventional, and toxic pollution standards 
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(see Table 36).  However, the majority of the associations are not significant (Tables 35 
and 37).  Two associations remain marginally significant in the regression models, but 
depend on the specification of citizenship.  The association between good citizenship and 
overcompliance with conventional pollutant quantity standards is significant only with 
the KLD measures without substitutions.  In addition, good citizens overcomply with 
toxic pollution quantity standards significantly more than “bad citizens,” but only when 
parent company data is substituted for subsidiary data.  This association is only 
significant when citizenship is measured contemporaneously (see footnote 64).   
Summary: Citizenship and Environmental Behavior Bivariate Results 
 Overall the results indicate that TRI 33/50 and/or Wastewise participants tend to 
have environmental records that are either indistinguishable or worse than 
nonparticipants.  The findings for TRI 33/50 participation are fairly consistent across 
different measures of the outcome, although the significance of the findings varies by 
pollutant type.  TRI 33/50 participants are more likely to be in violation; have more 
violations on average; have more total violations over the sample period; and are less 
likely to overcomply with quantity and concentration standards.   
 The differences in environmental behavior between Wastewise participants and 
non-participants are also fairly consistent across different measures of environmental 
behavior, but are only sporadically significant.  Wastewise participants tend to be in 
violation of a pollution standard more often (the differences are insignificant); have more 
violations on average than nonparticipants (no significant differences); and overcomply 
with quantity and concentration standards less than non-participants (only one of these 
comparisons is statistically significant).   
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The association between citizenship and environmental behavior does vary by 
outcome type using the KLD social ratings data.  Good citizens do not differ in the 
amount of time spent in violation or in the number of violation, but the direction of the 
correlation between (and regression coefficients for) citizenship and violation counts is 
mixed according to pollution type.  KLD good citizens have slightly more conventional 
pollutant violations on average (including BOD and TSS specifically), but fewer total and 
toxic pollution violations.  The correlation between citizenship and the number of toxic 
pollution violations is larger than the correlation with the other pollutants even though 
none of the associations are statistically significant.  The relationship between KLD 
citizenship and overcompliance is more consistent across pollutant type and is in the 
hypothesized direction, but only two are statistically significant.  Firms higher in KLD 
citizenship overcomply with conventional and toxic quantity standards significantly more 
than firms low in citizenship.  These two findings are important, especially when coupled 
with the consistent association between citizenship and overcompliance in the other 
pollution measures (even though not significant).  Out of all the pollution measures, one 
would expect the relationship between citizenship and overcompliance to be the 
strongest.   
In sum, these results are generally counter to research hypotheses, especially 
those that measure citizenship using TRI and Wastewise participation.  Firms that are 
distinguished as “good citizens” have equivalent or worse environmental records than 
those distinguished as “bad citizens.”  The next step is to determine whether the findings 
are spurious.  Based on the corporate crime literature, one would expect that other firm 
characteristics will be associated with environmental behavior.   
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Firm Characteristics and Environmental Behavior: Bivariate Results 
 
Analyses reported in Tables 38-41 show that other firm characteristics are 
correlated with the various environmental outcomes and the citizenship measures.  
Beginning with the full sample dichotomous measure, firms with higher liquidity spend 
significantly fewer years in violation of total, BOD, TSS, and conventional pollutant 
standards.  However, the effect is opposite for toxic pollution.  Firms with higher 
liquidity spend more years in violation of toxic pollution standards.  Other economic 
indicators have no effect.  Both the number of employees and the number of facilities 
owned are positively (and usually significantly) related to spending a higher fraction of 
time in violation, but once again, the findings are different for toxic pollution.  Firm size 
is in the opposite direction, but unrelated to the portion of time that firms violate toxic 
pollution standards.  Firm characteristics are also relevant among the violator sample. 
INSERT TABLE 38 HERE 
Moving next to the relationship between economic standing and average number 
of violations (among violators), we see that companies with a higher return on sales have 
significantly more BOD, TSS, and conventional pollutant violations on average.  Once 
again, the effect is different for toxic pollution.  Firms with a higher return on sales have 
significantly fewer toxic pollution violations (on average) when they violate.  The 
association between firm size and average violations, while generally in the negative 
direction, is rarely significant.   
INSERT TABLE 39 HERE 
Returning to the full sample, the association between firm economic standing and 
overcompliance is highly variable.  Companies with a higher return on sales pollute 
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significantly less of their BOD and toxic quantity permits.  Firms with more employees 
or more facilities pollute significantly more of their permitted quantity levels, but 
company size is unrelated to toxic pollution overcompliance.  None of the firm 
characteristics are significantly associated with overcompliance with concentration limits. 
INSERT TABLES 40 AND 41 HERE 
Thus, the existing literature and the current results indicate that firm 
characteristics are relevant to each of the dependent variables.  Plant variability is also 
important to examine because prior literature indicates that higher variability is linked to 
overcompliance.  Using the standard deviation of the log of the monthly compliance 
ratios as a measure of discharge variability, Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz (2006) find 
that variability in discharges explains some variation in overcompliance.  Using the same 
measure, the correlation matrix in Tables 40 and 41 shows that discharge variability is 
significantly (negatively) correlated with median compliance levels.  Firms with more 
variability in pollution discharges pollute significantly less of their permitted quantity 
values for all pollution types (although the effect is only marginally significant for toxic 
pollution).  In fact, variability is the only measure significantly associated with the 
concentration compliance ratio.  Firms with more variability in pollution discharges 
pollute significantly less of their permitted quantity values for BOD, TSS, and 
conventional pollutants.  Variability is also significantly associated with toxic pollution, 
but in the opposite direction.  Firms with higher variability pollute significantly more of 
their legal levels for toxic concentration. 
Given these other firm-level associations, it is possible that the relationship 
between citizenship and overcompliance is spurious.  In the next set of analyses, the 
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relationship between citizenship and environmental behavior is examined using a fully 
specified model including a measure of firm financial performance, firm size, and 
industry controls.   
Citizenship, Firm Characteristics, and Environmental Behavior: Multivariate Results 
It is important to test the citizenship results against the other relevant covariates.  
However, each of the independent variables is correlated.  Therefore, the 
tolerance/variance inflation factor for the independent variables in each of the models is 
examined to determine whether multicollinearity is a significant problem.  The tolerance 
for each independent variable is never lower than 0.35.  Generally the tolerance is at least 
0.4 or 0.5, but usually greater.  Thus, multicollinearity does not seem to be a significant 
problem in these models.  The presentation of results begins with the full sample 
dichotomous measure.  
Full Sample: Dichotomous Violation Measure 
 Mean differences tests are more appropriate than correlations when both the 
independent variable and the outcome are dichotomous.  However, because these data are 
aggregated to the firm-level (one observation per firm), the sample size is too small to 
present two-by-two tables of the average time spent in violation by citizenship and other 
relevant firm characteristics.  Thus, partial correlations are presented in Tables 42 and 43.   
INSERT TABLES 42 AND 43 HERE 
 Although still positively correlated, TRI 33/50 participation is no longer 
significantly associated with being in violation once firm characteristics are controlled.  
Similarly, Wastewise participation is no longer significantly associated with being in 
violation of any pollutant once firm characteristics are included.   
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Turning to the violators in the sample, the bivariate analysis revealed that 
participation in TRI 33/50 was associated with more total, BOD, and toxic violations on 
average.  However, most of these results also become insignificant as well. 
Violators: Number of Violations 
 As shown in Table 44, the effects for total and BOD violations are no longer 
significant in the fully specified model.  Only the effect for toxic pollution remains, 
controlling for firm return on sales, number of employees, and industry.  TRI participants 
who violate pollution standards have significantly more toxic violations on average than 
non-participants.  Recall that in the bivariate analysis, KLD citizenship significantly 
(p<0.10) decreased the average number of toxic violations.  However, this effect too is 
eliminated in the full model shown in Table 45.  A few of the results are also rendered 
insignificant in the full sample compliance ratio models.   
INSERT TABLES 44 and 45 HERE 
Full Sample: Compliance Ratio 
 Bivariate results showed Wastewise participants were less likely to overcompy 
with BOD quantity standards.  Once again, this effect disappears in the full model (Table 
46) once controls for firm profits, size, and industry are added.  
INSERT TABLE 46 HERE 
KLD citizenship, on the other hand, remains marginally significant in the 
conventional pollutant model.  Results in Table 47 indicate that good citizens pollute 
slightly less of their conventional pollutant quantity limits than bad citizens; yet other 
firm characteristics (size, industry) have a stronger association with the compliance ratio.  
In fact, once the other firm characteristics are included, variability is no longer 
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significant.   However, the previously observed relationship between KLD citizenship 
and overcompliance with toxic pollution standards no longer holds when the other 
covariates are added.  In fact, none of the firm or citizenship measures are significantly 
related to toxic pollution.   
INSERT TABLE 47 HERE 
Given the small sample size and low variability, there is potential for instability in 
the regression coefficients.  As one last check, the full model was run for all of the 
citizenship/environmental behavior combinations to determine whether results changed.  
In nearly every model citizenship remained insignificant (consistent with the bivariate 
models).  The substantive results changed in only one case.  Although it was not 
significant in the bivariate model, in the multivariate model KLD citizenship became a 
significant predictor of the toxic concentration compliance ratio.  Firms higher in the 
citizenship rankings appear to overcomply more than firms that rank lower. 
Summary: Multivariate Results 
Very few of the citizenship/environmental behavior associations remain  
significant after controlling for the theoretically relevant variables.69  In fact, only two 
remain significant.  TRI33/50 participants have more violations for toxic pollution.  KLD 
good citizens overcomply significantly more with conventional pollutant quantity 
standards.  Thus, out of 72 comparisons (each measure of citizenship, each independent 
variable) only 2 comparisons remain statistically significant.  One would expect 3.5 by 
                                                 
69 I have approached the two research hypotheses as separate questions, in part because the data are at 
different levels of analysis.  However, sanction threats can also influence compliance.  As a proxy for 
sanction threats, I included the number of sanctions received the previous year in these models.   The two 
significant associations remain after controlling for prior sanctions and the tolerances are still at a 
reasonable level (generally 0.4 or greater; none below 0.34).  In addition, I include the relevant firm 
characteristics in the sanctions models. 
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chance alone (p=0.05).  Thus, these analyses leave little evidence that citizenship has any 
influence on environmental behavior in these data with these measures.   
Firm Citizenship, Sanctions, and Environmental Behavior 
It is difficult to disentangle the association between sanctions and environmental 
behavior because the worst violators are targeted for sanctions.  Sanctions may appear to 
impact environmental behavior when in fact the association is in the opposite direction.  
In these data (Table 48) the number of total, informal, and formal sanctions is positively 
associated with violations.  The association holds when total sanctions are lagged by one 
or two quarters (data not shown).  In all likelihood the positive relationship is capturing 
the sanctioning practices of the EPA rather than any deviance amplification effect.  
Although panel or survival analysis with fixed effects would be ideal to control for 
unobserved differences in firms that create high violations and high sanctions, neither are 
possible with these data.  
Instead, the interaction between citizenship and sanction effects is examined using 
a pooled regression model with a control for clustering and control for prior 
environmental behavior (a proxy for the “risk” of sanction).  While not ideal, this method 
still provides useful information about the association between citizenship, sanctions, and 
recidivism.70 
Violators: Number of Violations 
After controlling for prior behavior and the relevant covariates (firm profits, size, 
and industry), total sanctions have no effect on future violations for the full sample of 
companies.  However, some differences emerge by citizenship subgroup and once again 
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the findings differ by citizenship measure.  As shown in Table 49, among TRI 33/50 and 
Wastewise program participants, total sanctions are associated with an increase in 
violations during the following quarter.  Among the non-participants sanctions have no 
effect.  The sanction coefficient is significantly different for TRI participants and 
nonparticipants.71  Although labeling and defiance theory suggest that under certain 
conditions sanctions may increase future crime, in these data the positive coefficient 
probably reflects a continuation of an earlier pollution problem.  For the converse 
argument, i.e., a firm chooses to increase pollution (and therefore violations) to be true, a 
firm would have to deliberately reduce equipment maintenance and undermine safety 
controls with full knowledge of pollution reporting requirements.  This seems unlikely.   
In addition, barring a deliberate bypass of the pollution control systems, any changes 
(positive or negative) are likely to occur over a longer period of time.  To explore this 
issue further, the same analysis was conducted with total sanctions lagged by two 
quarters and sanctions no longer had a significant effect on violations in any of these 
models.  Therefore, it seems that the TRI participants take longer to correct whatever 
problem lead to high violations in the first place.  Once again these findings are 
inconsistent with hypotheses.  Sanctions are not irrelevant to the TRI participants and the 
extreme volunteers are not more responsive to sanctions.  Instead, using the TRI 
participation as the measure of citizenship, “good citizens” are somewhat less responsive 
to sanctions 
INSERT TABLE 49 HERE 
                                                                                                                                                 
70 The dichotomous violation measure is not used because it is problematic to use the cluster command with 
a dichotomous outcome. 
71 I use the formula provided by Paternoster and colleagues (1998) to test the difference in coefficients. 
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The findings are different when citizenship is measured with the KLD social 
ratings data.  Regardless of the specification of the KLD rank, Table 50 shows that as 
total sanctions increase firms categorized as “bad citizens” have more violations in the 
following quarter.  Sanctions have no effect on the “good” citizens’ environmental 
performance.  Once again, the sanction measures are insignificant when lagged by two 
quarters.  Even though the direction of the effect is consistent with hypotheses (i.e., 
sanctions are irrelevant to good citizens), the sanction coefficients for good and bad 
citizens are not significantly different from one another.   
INSERT TABLE 50 HERE 
Table 52 presents the relationship between informal sanctions, KLD citizenship, 
and recidivism.  It is similar to the total sanctions results.  Among the “bad” citizens, 
informal sanctions are associated with an increase in violations the following quarter but 
sanctions have no effect on violations for good citizens.  The sanctions coefficient for the 
bad corporate citizens is no longer significant when informal sanctions are lagged by two 
quarters.  Again, the bad citizens take a longer period of time to deal with high violations.  
However, the coefficient for informal sanctions is not significantly different for good and 
bad citizens in the original model with a one quarter lag.  Informal sanctions are unrelated 
to subsequent violations among the TRI and Wastewise participants and nonparticipants 
(Table 51).   
INSERT TABLES 51 AND 52 HERE 
Finally, the patterns are similar for formal sanctions.  As Tables 53 and 54 show, 
formal sanctions are followed by an increase in violations among TRI participants, 
Wastewise participants, and KLD “bad” citizens.  Formal sanctions have no significant 
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impact on future violations for firms categorized as “good citizens” by KLD or firms that 
did not participate in the voluntary programs.  The difference between the coefficients is 
only significant for the TRI participants versus nonparticipants.  All of these effects are 
rendered insignificant when formal sanctions are lagged by two quarters.  Again, this 
suggests that the “bad” citizens (KLD bad citizens) and the program participants 
(supposed “good” citizens) take longer to reduce violations. 
INSERT TABLES 53 AND 54 HERE 
The tolerance for each of the variables in these models is generally above 0.4.  
However, in some models (mainly those where the sample is split by voluntary program 
participation) the tolerance for the industry dummy variables is below 0.3 (0.27 
specifically).  The models were reexamined excluding the industry dummy variables and 
the sanction results were generally replicated.  In the total and formal sanction models, 
the difference in the sanction coefficients (when lagged one quarter) for “good” and 
“bad” KLD citizens became statistically significant at the p=0.10 level.   
Full Sample: Compliance Ratio 
 The effect of sanctions on overcompliance was examined for conventional and 
toxic pollutant quantity and concentration ratios.  Some significant differences were 
found that are similar to those reported in the previous section.  However, the tolerance 
and variance inflation factors indicate that multicollinearity is more of an issue in these 
models.  In particular, the industry dummy variables have a low tolerance.  In some 
models the tolerance is as low as 0.08.  When the industry dummies are excluded, the 
results change and sanctions are no longer significant.  However, multicollinearity is only 
a problem when citizenship is measured by program participation.  Using the KLD 
 
 142
citizenship measures, the coefficient for sanctions is significant for one group—sanctions 
are followed by less overcompliance among the bad citizens.   However, the difference in 
the sanction effect for the good and bad citizens is never close to statistical significance.   
Summary: Firm Citizenship, Sanctions, and Environmental Behavior 
Sanctions were expected to have a smaller impact on “good citizens” because the 
sanction is not needed to achieve conformity.  On the other hand, good citizens might be 
more responsive to sanctions because these firms are more apt to recognize that a change 
needs to be made.  Results vary according to the citizenship measure.  An increase in 
sanctions is followed by an increase in violations among the program participants.  An 
increase in sanctions is also followed by an increase in violations among the KLD “bad 
citizens.”  In some cases the difference in the effect between groups is significant and in 
others it is not.  One could interpret these findings to say that sanctions actually increase 
violations among certain firms, but this interpretation is illogical given the nature of the 
pollution process.  Instead, more total sanctions are given to those firms with the most 
violations.  Among some groups, the firms have a higher number of violations for a 
slightly longer period of time (one quarter).  Sanctions have little effect. 
Consistent with some of the earlier substantive differences, the results differ by 
citizenship measure.  It is the program participants—firms theoretically designated as 
“good citizens”—that take longer to reduce the number of violations.  But, the KLD “bad 
citizens” have higher violations for a longer period of time.   
In the following section results are summarized across each of the research 
questions.  The results are followed by a discussion of the meaning and implications of 
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the study.  The section concludes with an overview of study limitations and directions for 
future research.     
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Traditionally the corporate crime literature has not measured environmental crime 
with self-reports and has ignored theoretical explanations of compliance and 
overcompliance.  The environmental crime literature, on the other hand, has failed to 
fully explore the relevance of the parent company.  This investigation sought to address 
this intersection by studying firm-level environmental performance.  In particular, it 
added corporate citizenship as a new explanation for environmental behavior with a 
specific focus on explaining compliance. 
The data show some small substantive differences between good and bad citizens.  
Even so, the utility of corporate citizenship for explaining environmental performance is 
quite limited.  Few differences are significant either statistically or with regard to 
magnitude.  In addition, the association between citizenship and other variables of 
interest suggests that with additional data the small substantive differences may 
disappear.  In these data with these measures, citizenship adds little to our theoretical 
understanding of environmental performance. 
Still, it is worth revisiting the results.  Consistent with hypotheses, the 
environmental record of KLD good citizens appears to be substantively better than less 
socially responsible companies.  In particular, “better” KLD citizens are in compliance 
more often, have fewer total and toxic violations on average and in the total sample 
period, and overcomply more.  In contrast, KLD “bad” citizens tend to have poorer 
environmental records.  Total, informal, and formal sanctions have no impact on “good” 
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KLD citizens.  Sanctions are unnecessary to produce the better record among good 
citizens.  In fact, bad citizens continue to have a higher number of violations in the 
quarter following total and formal sanctions.   
Moving into the next citizenship measure, logically the program volunteers 
should also have better records.  The TRI 33/50 program was designed to reduce (legal) 
environmental emissions.  At the very least one might expect that the program 
participants would have a better environmental record because of some spillover effects.  
Instead, participants are actually in violation more often, have more violations on 
average, and have high violations in the quarter following sanctions.  Moreover, TRI 
33/50 participants also account for most of the total sample violations (compared to non-
participants) and generally overcomply less.   
The difference in results requires explanation.  The contradictory findings for the 
two types of measures are likely due to measurement error.  As discussed in the 
measurement section, the KLD measures are objectively stronger than the voluntary 
program measures.  Firms can participate in voluntary programs fairly easily, particularly 
Wastewise, without a real commitment to the program goals.  It is possible that firms 
enroll in these programs only to create an image as a “green” company.  In these cases, 
program participation is mere “window dressing” designed to improve firm reputation 
and attract customers.  Voluntary programs may not reflect a commitment to social 
responsibility.   
Although not enforced, the TRI 33/50 program did require real changes.  In fact, 
the program met its overall pollution reduction goals but the reductions in discharges 
represent an average treatment effect.  The success of the program does not necessarily 
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indicate that all firms had equivalent discharge reductions.  Some firms may still use the 
program for reputation purposes without reducing toxic discharges.  However, these 
findings have other explanations as well and do not necessarily indicate that firms were 
using the program participation as “window dressing.”  For instance, the literature 
indicates that many firms that participated in the TRI program had worse compliance 
records prior to the program inception.  Thus, while they may have improved their TRI 
emissions (and this improvement may have had some spill over to water pollution), the 
firms may still have poorer records than others. 
Some may argue that the null findings are a result of data limitations rather than 
reality.  For example, is it possible that the small sample size is driving the null findings?  
This is unlikely for a few reasons.  First, a lower criterion for statistical significance is 
used (p=0.10).  Second, although a larger sample size might result in more statistical 
significance (because of the reduced error) there is no apriori reason to believe that the 
size of the coefficients would change even if the sample size was larger.  Assume for a 
moment that KLD rankings do capture something about firm culture and the direction of 
the differences would be the same if the data were available for additional firms in the 
sample.  With this larger sample size the findings might become significant, but the 
differences between good and bad citizens would likely still be small.  Thus, even if the 
lack of significant findings is attributable to sample size, with additional data citizenship 
would still have only a small effect on compliance.   
 Additional evidence suggests that the small existing findings may not hold up 
under scrutiny.  KLD citizenship rank is positively associated with variability.  Good 
citizens have higher variability.  Thus, they may overcomply in order to achieve overall 
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(monthly) compliance despite the daily and seasonal fluctuation (Bandyopadhyay and 
Horowitz, 2006).  To the extent that variability is uncontrollable and random (i.e., due to 
weather and random events), it is unclear why variability would be positively correlated 
with any firm characteristic other than size.  However, to the extent that variability is 
controllable (i.e., due to plant maintenance, etc) it seems that truly good citizens would 
target the origin of the fluctuation for technological advancements in order to reduce all 
pollution, not just the overall record.  Conversely, program participation is negatively 
correlated with variability.  Thus, program participants may overcomply less simply 
because they can do so and still maintain a good record overall.  These findings could 
mean that firms overcomply for instrumental reasons.  But, they may also suggest that 
there are limits to citizenship.  When measured appropriately, good citizens with high 
variability will take steps to overcomply but will not take the additional step of improving 
technology to reduce the root cause of the variability. 
Theoretical and Policy Implications: Citizenship Results 
Despite the null findings, it is important to take a step back and assess the policy 
and theoretical implications of this work.  Based on these data and measures, information 
about citizenship provides little guidance for regulators to target monitoring and 
determine effective punishments.  Even if the effects were statistically significant, the 
environmental records of good and bad citizens are more similar than they are different.  
In addition, the firms vary little in their responsiveness to sanctions.   
The citizenship results do have a theoretical impact.  It is possible that the 
theoretical basis for citizenship is flawed.  Moral and altruistic motives may be less 
relevant to company decisions than theorized.  Although the business and society 
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literature suggests that firms vary in social performance, the important difference may be 
in firm outcomes.  Perhaps citizenship should not be conceptualized as an independent 
variable.  Instead, firms may be distinguished as good or bad citizens because of their 
record of misconduct.  In fact, the descriptive findings show that the firms do vary in 
record: most firm/years reflect overcompliance but a few firms continue to be laggards 
with chronic violations.  In this work, firms were not categorized according to their 
overall record.  But building on the patterns found here, future work should explore 
whether companies can be categorized based on their overall record (i.e., outcomes) into 
the citizenship types discussed by Carroll (1979) in the business and society literature 
(proactive, reactive, etc).   
The differences in environmental record in these data are clearly the result of 
something other than citizenship as measured here.  If the theoretical motivation 
underlying the concept of citizenship is irrelevant to this type of crime, one must think 
about other theoretical frameworks that might explain this firm behavior.  It is possible 
that command and control strategies in earlier decades were successful in reducing 
pollution and violations.  Some of the other explanations for overcompliance and low 
violations may also be more relevant (curry favor with regulators; establish good 
reputation, etc).  Environmental behavior may be better explained by a deterrence or pure 
rational choice framework.   
While the tests of corporate citizenship, sanctions, and environmental behavior 




Theoretical and Policy Implications: Other Results 
In this study environmental performance is examined with a new unit of 
analysis—the firm.  Several pieces of evidence support the firm-level approach.  First, as 
the analysis of variance demonstrates, there is more similarity in the environmental 
record within firm (i.e., firms owned by the same plant) than between firm (i.e., plants 
owned by different firms).  Second, moving to the firm-level does not distort the patterns 
of environmental performance found at the plant-level.  In fact, the overall record of 
environmental violations and overcompliance and the distribution by industry is similar 
when each unit of analysis is used.  The patterns that change do so in logical ways (e.g., 
firms are in violation more than plants because unit of analysis is larger).  In addition, 
variability of pollution is related to firm-level overcompliance in the same manner as it 
relates to plant-level overcompliance.  Although this is a plant-level phenomenon, the 
association is not distorted by moving to the firm-level.  Finally, firm characteristics 
matter.  Although explored primarily in bivariate analyses (because the multivariate 
models are only presented when citizenship is significant), firm characteristics are 
significantly related to firm-level environmental performance measured with self-reports.  
Not only do they matter, the associations make sense either in conjunction with the 
existing environmental and/or corporate crime literature.  For example, firms with a 
higher return on sales (more efficient use of assets to produce sales) have more 
violations, but they also overcomply more.  Firms with a higher return on sales have 
more variability.  Companies that focus on generating more sales from their assets may 
be less wiling to spend money to target underlying problems that create variability in the 
first place.  They overcomply to compensate, but do not upgrade technology.   
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 Other associations are not associated with other environmental explanations, but 
are understood within the context of the corporate crime literature.  For example, larger 
firms are in violation more often.  One would expect this based on the corporate crime 
literature because the dichotomous measure does not account for differences in size, 
larger firms are in violation more often because they have more opportunity.   
Clearly some tie connects firms and plants, even when the plants are located in 
different states.  The corporate crime and organizational literature would point to firm 
structure (e.g., organizational form) and firm culture to explain the similarity in behavior 
and in the predictors of behavior across unit.  Regardless of the specific form (refer back 
to Figures 1A and 1B), multiple levels of management are built into the corporate 
organizational form.  Managers at each ancillary unit implement policies from the parent 
company that are designed to create this similarity in behavior.   
Research findings from the environmental literature might also help explain these 
patterns.  The generally public cares about environmental performance.  In some cases, 
companies have been informally “punished” with decreases in stock prices following 
reports of high legal emissions (Hamilton, 1995).  In striving to maintain a reputation as a 
“green” company and avoid such penalties, firms might be particularly vigilant in using 
their structure to convey environmental policies down the ranks.   
The descriptive section also provides some results that are relevant to the larger 
field of criminology.  For example, in most years the plants and firms have few violations 
and overcomply substantially.  But, some plants and particularly some firms have a very 
high number of violations and are responsible for a disproportionate amount of 
violations.  These patterns are consistent with those found for street criminals (Wolfgang 
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et al 1972), white-collar offenders (Weisburd et al., 2001), hotspots (Weisburd, Maher, 
and Sherman, 1992), and micro places (Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, and Yang, 2004). 
Although citizenship provides little guidance to regulators, the broader study 
findings do inform policy.  First, sanctions have little impact on environmental behavior.  
Perhaps the null findings reflect that EPA sanctions are too lenient to create changes in 
behavior.  Or the null findings may occur because most firms are complying and 
overcomplying already.  Earlier command and control policies may have successfully 
reduced the level of pollution and violations so that point sources are no longer a major 
source of pollution (Vandenbergh, 2004).   
Second, this research finds that plants owned by the same firm tend to have 
similar records.  Accordingly, knowledge about plant ownership may help regulators 
target monitoring.  If one facility has chronic violations, it is likely that other plants 
owned by the firm will be problematic as well.  Knowledge about the parent company 
might also help regulators target sanctions more effectively.  Currently the EPA sanctions 
each plant individually.  Regulators might consider moving up the command chain to 
deal with the parent company itself.  Perhaps addressing sanctions in this level would 
result in greater effectiveness.  In the end this is an empirical question.   
Limitations 
 Like any empirical investigation, this study also has limitations.  First, the data are 
somewhat limited.  Variability is low, the sample size is small, and the stronger 
citizenship measures (KLD ratings) are available for only half of the sample.  Aside from 
these data issues, the study has several other limitations.  Although the KLD social 
ratings are objectively stronger than the voluntary program measures, they are far from 
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perfect measures of citizenship.  Behavioral measures (e.g., the KLD ratings) are 
preferred because they demonstrate real actions on the part of the firm instead of mere 
“lip service” paid to social responsibility.  The KLD social ratings data provide 
information on charitable donations and employee benefits programs, but ideal 
citizenship measures would directly reflect the balance a firm strikes between profits and 
social concerns.   
In addition, the models could not sustain additional covariates and the data do not 
contain of these covariates (e.g., public pressure, etc).  Including these measures would 
produce a better specified model.   
As with any agency data, there are also issues with the EPA data quality.  The 
data issues are similar to problems with the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) when state 
data are transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  In the EPA data, there 
are some differences between headquarters and the states that result in data discrepancies.  
For instance, states are not required to report “informal” enforcement actions to 
headquarters.  Thus, there is missing information on some sanctions.  However, states 
have incentives to report the information because, absent reporting, the facility will show 
up in the data as noncompliant.  In addition, if informal enforcement actions are not 
entered from state records it would appear that the state did nothing to fix the problem.    
Finally, EPA self-report data are subject to the same set of problems as traditional 
self-report data.  Firms may have an incentive to misrepresent pollution levels.  However, 
firms do report (sometimes quite significant) violations.  In addition, the EPA does 
conduct site inspections, interview those who do the reports, and in some instances 
inspectors take samples to test the accuracy of the reports.  Therefore, inspections—while 
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rare—are a constant threat that challenge false self-reports.  Despite its limitations, this 
study produces many questions for future research.   
Directions for Future Research 
In this study, the measures of citizenship have little association with 
environmental performance.  However, these results do not necessarily indicate that the 
concept of citizenship is completely irrelevant to firm behavior.  More research is 
necessary before the question is closed.   
First, citizenship may have more of an impact with other kinds of corporate 
misconduct.  Other factors may have reduced violations and rendered citizenship 
irrelevant to environmental behavior, but good citizens may have fewer financial crimes, 
OSHA violations, or discrimination cases.  These questions can actually be addressed in 
the future using these data.  The KLD social ratings data contain some information about 
non-environmental cases and settlements against the firms.  Although limited, the 
association between citizenship and these crimes can be examined with these data.  
In addition, researchers can explore whether citizenship matters more for 
particular kinds of organizations.  The sample in this study is limited to publicly-traded 
companies.  Among these types of firms, other explanations for compliance and 
overcompliance may be more relevant.  Firms that produce consumer products may be 
particularly vulnerable to public pressure for environmental friendly products or for 
“green” companies.  In addition, the goal of publicly-traded firms is to increase 
shareholder profits.  Firms that maintain a good environmental record and/or market 
environmentally friendly products may have a competitive advantage.  But, citizenship 
may be relevant for other organizations, even other types of businesses.  Privately owned 
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businesses, where profit concerns do not weigh quite as heavy, may be more conducive to 
balancing social and economic concerns. 
The sample is also limited to companies based in the United States.  To the extent 
that firms engage in socially responsible activities and/or comply because of social 
pressure, the association between citizenship and environmental behavior may vary 
internationally.  In some European countries the ideas of social responsibility and 
environmental preservation took hold much earlier than in the United States.  Thus, firms 
based in these countries may have equivalent or better records than firms based in the 
U.S.  However, in other parts of the world environmental protection is not a prominent 
social concern.  Firms based in these countries (or U.S. owned facilities and subsidiaries 
that are located in these countries) may have less impressive environmental records than 
found in these data.  Thus, expanding beyond U.S. based companies may provide 
additional insight in to the causes of compliance and other socially responsible activities.   
The association between firm characteristics and environmental performance also 
warrants further exploration.  Future studies (with a larger sample of firms) should 
include these and measures of additional competing explanations.  However, to engage in 
this sort of research, scholars need data.  This study highlights an important obstacle for 
those who study corporate crime—data.   
First, there are few existing firm-level databases.  Most of the existing ones have 
been compiled by researchers.  There is no Uniform Crime Report, National 
Victimization Survey, or stockpile of self-report data on corporate crime.  In order to 
study firm-level environmental data, we had to compile the data ourselves.   
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Aside from data on crime and/or conformity, any attempt to compile corporate 
crime data is difficult because very little company information of any kind is publicly 
available.  Essentially researchers are left with 10K reports and sources that draw 
information from the 10K reports (e.g., Industrial Compustat and Mergent’s Online).  We 
were left combing through industry news listings and company websites to find missing 
information.  In addition, corporate crime researchers can only construct a limited 
number of variables from this information.  In fact, the citizenship measures used in this 
study are virtually the only ones that are publicly available.   
In addition to the data availability problems described above, the environmental 
database created problems.  On the plus side, the PCS data provided self-reported 
pollution amounts.  Unfortunately, the facility pollution data were not already linked to 
the parent company.  These links had to be made with the existing (limited) sources.  
Information we received at an EPA workshop helps to put this task in perspective.  After 
the Exxon-Valdez oil spill it took the EPA six months to link Exxon’s facilities and 
discuss the company’s overall record.  In fact, the only source that provides 
company/facility linkages in database form (Dunn and Bradstreet) is prohibitively 
expensive.  Further, the EPA does not do quality control on the Dunn and Bradstreet 
identification numbers in its system and they are highly inaccurate (Grant et al 2002). 
Thus, although this study and these data provide many starting points for 
additional research, data improvements would help achieve future research goals.  The 
EPA has several existing databases, but the firm-level links are not easily accessible and 
the data quality could be improved.  In addition, researchers need access to additional 
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data sources.  Mandatory reporting and more open access to corporations will ultimately 























































































































Table 1A:  Full Sample - Descriptive Statistics Pooled Across Six Waves (nT=378) 






     All 
 
 
378 0 – 1  0.91 (0.29) 
1.00 
     BOD 
 
 
274 0 – 1 0.50 (0.50) 
0.50 
     TSS 
 
 
355 0 – 1 0.48 (0.50) 
0.00 
     Con Poll 
 
 
364 0 – 1 0.74 (0.44) 
1.00 
     Tox Poll 
 
 
332 0 – 1 0.50 (0.50) 
0.50 
 
NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS 
 
  
     All 
 
 
374 1 – 106  13.55 (16.47) 
8.00 
     BOD 
 
 
274 1 – 27 3.16 (3.28) 
2.00 
     TSS 
 
 
355 1 – 33 4.34 (5.02) 
3.00 
     Con Poll 
 
 
364 1 – 73 8.44 (10.88) 
4.00 
     Tox Poll 
 
 










Table 1A (cont) 
Variables nT Range Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Median 
 
COMPLIANCE RATIO—QUANTITY  
  
 
     BOD 
 
 
210 0.03 – 24.32 0.46 (1.66) 
0.33 
     TSS 
 
 
300 -8.16 – 39.40 0.28 (2.41) 
0.23 
     Con Poll 
 
 
323 -3.18 – 34.50 0.35 (1.93) 
0.26 
     Tox Poll 
 
 
205 -15.19 – 2.54 -0.15 (1.88) 
0.09 
 
COMPLIANCE RATIO—CONCENTRATION  
 
 
     BOD 
 
 
119 0.00 – 1.56 0.29 (0.20) 
0.25 
     TSS 
 
 
211 -7.38 – 0.96 0.11 (1.10) 
0.25 
     Con Poll 
 
 
258 -3.25 – 32.16 0.35 (2.04) 
0.25 
     Tox Poll 
 
 

















Table 1A (cont) 





   
     TRI 33/50  
 
N/A 0 – 1 0.66 (0.48) 
1.00 
 
     Wastewise 
 






   
     Total Sanctions 
 
 
378 0 – 41  1.75 (3.84) 
0.00 
     Informal Sanctions 
 
 
378 0 – 15 0.93 (2.14) 
0.00 
     Formal Sanctions 
 
 






   
     Administrative 
 
 
378 0 – 4 0.23 (0.56) 
0.00 
     Civil 
 
 
378 0 – 3 0.08 (0.34) 
0.00 
     Criminal 
 
 














Table 1A (cont) 



















352 -0.32 – 0.18 0.03 (0.06) 
0.03 
      ROS 
 
 
339 0.30 – 5.02 1.20 (0.66) 
1.03 
      Liquidity 
 
 






     # of Facilities Owned 378 1 – 23 3.43 (2.96) 
2.00 
 
     # of Employees 
 






























=1 if in violation 
 
      Number of Violations Number of Violations (among violators) 
 
     Compliance Ratio Portion of permitted limit that is discharged.  Numbers closer to zero 
indicate more overcompliance.  Numbers closer to one indicate less 
overcompliance.  Numbers over one indicate violation. 
 




A measure of the amount of oxygen consumed in the biological processes 
that break down organic matter in water. The greater the BOD, the greater 
the degree of pollution. 
 
     Total Suspended Solids 
(TSS) 
A measure of the suspended solids in wastewater, effluent, or water bodies, 
determined by tests for "total suspended non-filterable solids." 
 
     Conventional Pollutants Pollutants that will break down.  Statutorily listed pollutants understood 
well by scientists. These may be in the form of organic waste, sediment, 
acid, bacteria, viruses, nutrients, oil and grease, or heat.  
 
     Toxic Pollutants Materials that cause death, disease, or birth defects in organisms that ingest 
or absorb them. The quantities and exposures necessary to cause these 




























     Total Sanctions Yearly count of total number of sanctions received 
 
     Informal Sanctions Yearly count of number of informal sanctions received (e.g., phone calls 
and warning letters) 
 
     Formal Sanctions Yearly count of number of formal sanctions received (e.g., civil and 
administrative actions and cases) 
 
KLD Social Ratings Data Sum of Total Strengths minus Total Concerns 
 
     Community (Strengths)  
      Generous Giving. The company has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing 
three-year net earnings before taxes (NEBT) to charity, or has otherwise 
been notably generous in its giving. 
 
 Innovative Giving. The company has a notably innovative giving program 
that supports nonprofit organizations, particularly those promoting self-
sufficiency among the economically disadvantaged. Companies that permit 
nontraditional federated charitable giving drives in the workplace are often 
noted in this section as well. 
 
 Non-US Charitable Giving. The company has made a substantial effort to 
make charitable contributions abroad, as well as in the U.S. To qualify, a 
company must make at least 20% of its giving, or have taken notably 
innovative initiatives in its giving program, outside the U.S. 
 
 Support for Housing. The company is a prominent participant in 
public/private partnerships that support housing initiatives for the 
economically disadvantaged, e.g., the National Equity Fund or the 
Enterprise Foundation. 
 
 Support for Education. The company has either been notably innovative in 
its support for primary or secondary school education, particularly for those 
programs that benefit the economically disadvantaged, or the company has 
prominently supported youth job-training programs. 
 
 Volunteer Programs. The company has an exceptionally strong volunteer 
program. 
 
 Other Strength. The company has an exceptionally strong giving program or 











Table 1B (cont) 
     Community (Concerns)  
 Investment Controversies. The company is a financial institution whose 
lending or investment practices have led to controversies, particularly ones 
related to the Community Reinvestment Act. 
 
 Negative Economic Impact. The company's actions have resulted in major 
controversies concerning its economic impact on the community. These 
controversies can include issues related to environmental contamination, 
water rights disputes, plant closings, "put or pay" contracts with trash 
incinerators, or other company actions that adversely affect the quality of 
life, tax base, or property values in the community. 
 
 Other Concern. The company is involved with a controversy that has 
mobilized community opposition, or is engaged in other noteworthy 
community controversies. 
 
     Corporate Governance              
(Strengths) 
 
 Limited Compensation. The company has recently awarded notably low 
levels of compensation to its top management or its board members. The 
limit for a rating is total compensation of less than $500,000 per year for a 
CEO or $30,000 per year for outside directors.  
 
 Ownership Strength. The company owns between 20% and 50% of another 
company KLD has cited as having an area of social strength, or is more than 
20% owned by a firm that KLD has rated as having social strengths. When 
a company owns more than 50% of another firm, it has a controlling 
interest, and KLD treats the second firm as if it is a division of the first. 
 
 Other Strength. The company has an innovative compensation plan for its 
board or executives, a unique and positive corporate culture, or some other 
initiative not covered by other KLD ratings. 
 
 Corporate Governance 
(Concern) 
 
      High Compensation. The company has recently awarded notably high levels 
of compensation to its top management or its board members. The limit is 
total compensation of more than $10 million per year for a CEO or 
$100,000 per year for outside directors. 
 
 Ownership Concern. The company owns between 20% and 50% of a 
company KLD has cited as having an area of social concern, or is more than 
20% owned by a firm KLD has rated as having areas of concern. When a 
company owns more than 50% of another firm, it has a controlling interest, 










Table 1B (cont) 
 Other Concern. The company restated its earnings over an accounting 
controversy, has other accounting problems, or is involved with some other 
controversy not covered by other KLD ratings. 
 
 Tax Disputes. The company has recently been involved in major tax 
disputes involving more than $100 million with the Federal, state, or local 
authorities. 
 
     Diversity(Strength)  
 CEO. The company's chief executive officer is a woman or a member of a 
minority group. 
 
 Promotion. The company has made notable progress in the promotion of 
women and minorities, particularly to line positions with profit-and-loss 
responsibilities in the corporation. 
 
 Board of Directors. Women, minorities, and/or the disabled hold four seats 
or more (with no double counting) on the board of directors, or one-third or 
more of the board seats if the board numbers less than 12. 
 
 Work/Life Benefits. The company has outstanding employee benefits or 
other programs addressing work/life concerns, e.g., childcare, elder care, or 
flextime. 
 
 Women & Minority Contracting. The company does at least 5% of its 
subcontracting, or otherwise has a demonstrably strong record on 
purchasing or contracting, with women- and/or minority-owned businesses. 
 
 Employment of the Disabled. The company has implemented innovative 
hiring programs, other innovative human resource programs for the 
disabled, or otherwise has a superior reputation as an employer of the 
disabled.  
 
 Gay & Lesbian Policies. The company has implemented notably 
progressive policies toward its gay and lesbian employees. In particular, it 
provides benefits to the domestic partners.  
 
 Other Strength. The company has made a notable commitment to diversity 
that is not covered by other KLD ratings. 
 
     Diversity (Concern)  
 Non-Representation. The company has no women on its board of directors 
or among its senior line managers. 
 














 Union Relations. The company has a history of notably strong union 
relations. 
 
 Cash Profit Sharing. The company has a cash profit-sharing program 
through which it has recently made distributions to a majority of its 
workforce. 
 
 Employee Involvement. The company strongly encourages worker 
involvement and/or ownership through stock options available to a majority 
of its employees, gain sharing, stock ownership, sharing of financial 
information, or participation in management decision-making. 
 
 Retirement Benefits. The company has a notably strong retirement benefits 
program. 
 
 Other Strength. The company is noted by the US Occupational Health and 
Safety Administration for its safety programs, or has other strong employee 
relations initiatives not covered by other KLD ratings. 
 
     Employee Relations 
(Concern) 
 
 Union Relations. The company has a history of notably poor union 
relations. 
 
 Workforce Reductions. The company has reduced its workforce by 15% in 
the most recent year or by 25% during the past two years, or it has 
announced plans for such reductions. 
 
 Retirement Benefits Concern. The company has either a substantially 
underfunded defined benefit pension plan, or an inadequate retirement 
benefits program. 
 
 Other Concern. The company is involved in an employee relations 
controversy that is not covered by other KLD ratings. 
 
     Environment (Strength)  
 Beneficial Products and Services. The company derives substantial 
revenues from innovative remediation products, environmental services, or 
products that promote the efficient use of energy, or it has developed 
innovative products with environmental benefits. 
 
 Pollution Prevention. The company has notably strong pollution prevention 










Table 1B (cont) 
 Recycling. The company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as 
raw materials in its manufacturing processes, or a major factor in the 
recycling industry. 
 
 Alternative Fuels. The company derives substantial revenues from 
alternative fuels. The term "alternative fuels" includes natural gas, wind 
power, and solar energy. The company has demonstrated an exceptional 
commitment to energy efficiency programs or the promotion of energy 
efficiency.  
 
 Other Strength. The company has demonstrated a superior commitment to 
management systems, voluntary programs, or other environmentally 
proactive activities. 
 
     Environment (Concern)  
 Ozone Depleting Chemicals. The company is among the top manufacturers 
of ozone depleting chemicals such as HCFCs, methyl chloroform, 
methylene chloride, or bromines. 
 
 Substantial Emissions. The company's legal emissions of toxic chemicals 
(as defined by and reported to the EPA) from individual plants into the air 
and water are among the highest of the companies followed by KLD. 
 
 Agricultural Chemicals. The company is a substantial producer of 
agricultural chemicals, i.e., pesticides or chemical fertilizers. 
 
 Other Concern. The company has been involved in an environmental 
controversy that is not covered by other KLD ratings. 
 
Voluntary Program Participation  
     TRI 33/50 =1 if participated in TRI 33/50 program 
 




















Table 1B (continued): Control Variables 
Variable Definition 
 
Financial Performance  
Total Company Profit  Total Stockholders Equity: The common and preferred shareholders’ 
interest in the company.  It is the amount stockholders might obtain if a 
corporation is liquidated. 
 
     Return on Assets Net Income/Total Assets: Profitability in relation to assets or investment 
reflects how efficiently the firm utilizes its resources.  Measure of 
management effectiveness. 
     Return on Sales Total Sales/Total Assets: This standard measure indicates the sales 
generating ability of firm assets. 
     Liquidity (Total Current Assets – Total Current Liabilities)/Total Assets: Captures a 
firm’s working capital. 
Corporate Structure  
     Complexity 
 Number of facilities owned 




     Oil =1 if SIC is 2911 
     Steel =1 if SIC is 3211 
Pulp and Paper             
(omitted) 








































































30 29 30 28 26 24
18 18 18 18 16 15















































































































Facility Sample Size by Year
212 211 209 204 200 197
124 123 121 119 116 113
40 40 40 40 39 39






























































































































Number/Percent of Violations for BOD and TSS by Year
99 109 91 54 42 39
170 168 110 95 102 101





































































Number/Percent of Violations for Conventional and Toxic Pollutants 
by Year

































Table 2: Sanction Severity Scale 
Action Frequency Percent 
(0) 













Final Order of the Board, Letter of Violation-Effluent, 
Section 308 Letter, Warning Letter, Notice of 
Violation (multiple versions—letter), Notice of 






Administrative Action Planned, Administrative  
Action Pending, Under Review by State Agency, 













AO Stipulated Penalty, Amended Administrative 
Order, 308 Administrative Order, Administrative 
Order, Administrative Consent Order, Jud Action 
Planned, Referred to Higher Level Review,  







Jud Action Pending, Consent Decree, Stipulation 
Court Order, Stipulation Court Order, Stipulation 







NPDES Penalty AO Category I, NPDES Penalty AO 


























































































































Table 5: Sample Descriptives.  Firms with KLD Data (with Replacements), Pooled 
Across Six Waves (nT=174) 





   
     KLD Social Ratings 
(with substitutions) 
 





   
     Total Sanctions 
 
 
174 0 – 23  2.09 (3.88) 
0.00 
     Informal Sanctions 
 
 
174 0 – 12 1.14 (2.43) 
0.00 
     Formal Sanctions 
 
 





   
     Administrative 
 
 
174 0 – 4 0.30 (0.64) 
0.00 
     Civil 
 
 
174 0 – 2 0.09 (0.36) 
0.00 
     Criminal 
 
 
















Table 5 (cont) 


















160 -0.08 – 0.18 0.04 (0.04) 
0.04 
      ROS 
 
156 0.56 – 5.02 1.11 (0.50) 
1.01 
 
     Liquidity 
 







     # of Facilities Owned 
 
 
174 1.00 – 23.00 4.78 (3.63) 
3.00 
     # of Employees 
 
 























Table 5 (cont) 






     All 
 
173 0 – 1  0.94 (0.24) 
1.00 
 
     BOD 
 
144 0 – 1 0.56 (0.50) 
1.00 
 
     TSS 
 
173 0 – 1 0.56 (0.50) 
1.00 
 
     Con Poll 
 
173 0 – 1 0.79 (0.41) 
1.00 
 
     Tox Poll 
 




NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS 
 
  
     All 
 
 
173 0 – 87 14.10 (14.85) 
10.00 
     BOD 
 
 
144 0 – 15 3.40 (2.54) 
3.00 
     TSS 
 
 
173 0 – 21 3.86 (3.83) 
3.00 
     Con Poll 
 
 
173 0 – 48 8.58 (9.26) 
5.50 
     Tox Poll 
 
 










Table 5 (cont) 






     BOD 
 
 
114 0.03 – 0.92 0.34 (0.16) 
0.33 
     TSS 
 
 
142 -3.68 – 0.73 0.21 (0.53) 
0.27 
     Con Poll 
 
 
154 -0.36 – 0.84 0.28 (0.16) 
0.28 
     Tox Poll 
 
 






     BOD 
 
 
67 0.05 – 0.73 0.25 (0.15) 
0.22 
     TSS 
 
 
108 0.00 – 0.83 0.26 (0.16) 
0.24 
     Con Poll 
 
 
138 0.00 – 32.16 0.50 (2.72) 
0.24 
     Tox Poll 
 
 

















Table 6: Sample Descriptives.  Firms with KLD Data (No Replacements), Pooled Across 
Six Waves (nT=156) 





   
     KLD Social Ratings 
(no substitutions) 
 





   
     Total Sanctions 
 
 
156 0 – 23  2.08 (3.88) 
0.00 
     Informal Sanctions 
 
 
156 0 – 11  1.06 (2.31) 
0.00 
     Formal Sanctions 
 
 





   
     Administrative 
 
 
156 0 – 4 0.31 (0.65) 
0.00 
     Civil 
 
 
156 0 – 2 0.09 (0.37) 
0.00 
     Criminal 
 
 
















Table 6 (cont) 


















145 -0.07 – 0.18 0.04 (0.04) 
0.03 
      ROS 
 
 
141 0.56 – 2.73 1.05 (0.35) 
1.01 
     Liquidity 
 
 






     # of Facilities Owned 
 
 
156 1.00 – 23.00 4.94 (3.75) 
3.00 
     # of Employees 
 
 























Table 6 (cont) 






     All 
 
155 0 – 1  0.93 (0.26) 
1.00 
 
     BOD 
 
126 0 – 1 0.56 (0.50) 
1.00 
 
     TSS 
 
155 0 – 1 0.57 (0.50) 
1.00 
 
     Con Poll 
 
155 0 – 1 0.77 (0.42) 
1.00 
 
     Tox Poll 
 




NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS 
 
  
     All 
 
 
155 0 – 87 14.42 (14.93) 
10.00 
     BOD 
 
 
126 0 – 15 3.48 (2.59) 
3.00 
     TSS 
 
 
155 0 – 21 3.78 (3.90) 
2.00 
     Con Poll 
 
 
155 0 – 43 8.48 (8.81) 
5.50 
     Tox Poll 
 
 










Table 6 (cont) 






     BOD 
 
 
103 0.03 – 0.92 0.35 (0.15) 
0.33 
     TSS 
 
 
130 -3.68 – 0.73 0.20 (0.56) 
0.26 
     Con Poll 
 
 
143 -0.36 – 0.84 0.28 (0.16) 
0.28 
     Tox Poll 
 
 






     BOD 
 
 
59 0.06 – 0.73 0.26 (0.14) 
0.23 
     TSS 
 
 
101 0.00 – 0.83 0.26 (0.16) 
0.24 
     Con Poll 
 
 
126 0.00 – 32.16 0.52 (2.85) 
0.24 
     Tox Poll 
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Table 8: Average Time Spent in Violation 
All Facilities, Pooled Data 
  


















Plant / Month  
     
     mean (std dev) 
 

































Plant / Quarter 
      
     mean (std dev) 
 





































Plant / Year 
 
     mean (std dev) 
 




















































Table 9: Average Time Spent in Violation 
Pulp and Paper Facilities, Pooled Data 
  


















Plant / Month  
     
     mean (std dev) 
 

































Plant / Quarter 
      
     mean (std dev) 
 
     % in compliance 
      




































Plant / Year 
 
     mean (std dev) 
 




















































Table 10: Average Time Spent in Violation 
Steel Facilities, Pooled Data 
  





















Plant / Month  
     
     mean (std dev) 
 

































Plant / Quarter 
      
     mean (std dev) 
 
     % in compliance 
      

































Plant / Year 
 
     mean (std dev) 
 



















































Table 11: Average Time Spent in Violation 
Oil Facilities, Pooled Data 
  





















Plant / Month  
     
     mean (std dev) 
 



































Plant / Quarter 
      
     mean (std dev) 
 
     % in compliance 
      
































Plant / Year 
 
     mean (std dev) 
 









































































































Percent of Plant Yearly Observations in Compliance by 
Industry
Pulp and Paper 52 85 87 73 83
Steel 29 71 69 44 51
Oil 23 73 68 39 74




Table 12: Average Number of Violations (Among Violators) 
 Pulp and Paper Facilities, Pooled Data 
  
Number of Violations 
 
 





















































































































Table 13: Average Number of Violations (Among Violators) 
Steel Facilities, Pooled Data 
  
Number of Violations 
 
 


























































































































Table 14: Average Number of Violations (Among Violators) 
Oil Facilities, Pooled Data 
  
Number of Violations 
 
 








































































































































































































Table 15: Range of Violations, All Facilities 
  
Range of Violations 
 
 

















































1 – 11 
 
 


































1 – 20 
 
 































































Table 16: Median of the Monthly Compliance Ratios 
Full and Industry Specific, Pooled Data 
  















    
     Conc 
 
0.23 0.20 0.22 0.10 
     Quantity 
 
0.27 0.20 0.22 0.08 
Pulp & Paper     
     Conc 
 
0.27 0.24 0.27 0.04 
     Quantity 
 
0.29 0.22 0.26 0.09 
Steel     
     Conc 
 
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.15 
     Quantity 
 
0.21 0.10 0.14 0.10 
Oil     
     Conc 
 
0.20 0.16 0.16 0.12 
     Quantity 
 





























































































































































Table 17A: Firm Average Time Spent in Violation 
Total and Industry Specific, Pooled Data 
  


















Firm / Year 
 
     mean (std dev) 
 














































Pulp & Paper 
Industry: Firm/Year 
 
      mean (std dev) 
 









































     mean (std dev) 
 








































     mean (std dev) 
 















































Table 17B: Firm One Way Analysis of Variance 
Dichotomous Violation Measure 
  




































































































































































Percent of Firm Yearly Observations in Compliance by Industry
Pulp and Paper 10 52 55 31 64
Steel 15 65 52 27 35
Oil 4 43 46 15 46




Table 18A: Firm Average Number of Violations (Among Violators) 
Total and Industry Specific, Pooled Data 
  












































1 – 48 
 
Pulp & Paper 





































































































Table 18B: Firm One Way Analysis of Variance 
Number of Violations 
  















































































































Table 19A: Firm Median of the Monthly Compliance Ratios 
Total and Industry Samples 
  




BOD TSS Con Poll Tox Poll 
Total Sample 
 
    
     Conc 
 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.11 
     Quantity 
 
0.32 0.23 0.26 0.09 
Pulp & Paper     
     Conc 
 
0.27 0.26 0.25 0.05 
     Quantity 
 
0.39 0.27 0.31 0.10 
Steel     
     Conc 
 
0.19 0.28 0.27 0.19 
     Quantity 
 
0.30 0.14 0.20 0.18 
Oil     
     Conc 
 
0.24 0.18 0.22 0.09 
     Quantity 
 






















Table 19B: Firm One Way Analysis of Variance 
Median Quantity Compliance Ratio 
  


































































































Table 19C: Firm One Way Analysis of Variance 
Median Concentration Compliance Ratio 
  
































































































Table 20: Firm-Level (One Observation per Firm) Mean Differences, Program 
Participation and Dichotomous Violation Measure 
  















     













    





























     













     


















































Table 21: Full Sample (Pooled) Bivariate Probit Regression, Program Participation and  
Dichotomous Violation Measure# 
  
Dichotomous Violation Measure 
 

















































































#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 





























Table 22: Firm-Level (One Observation per Firm) Pearson’s Correlation, KLD 
Citizenship and Dichotomous Violation Measure 
  


























KLD Rank  



















































Table 23: Full Sample (Pooled) Bivariate Pooled Probit Regression, KLD Citizenship and 
Dichotomous Violation Measure# 
  





























































     KLD Rank  
















#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 



























Table 24: Full Sample (Pooled) Mean Differences, Program Participation and Number of 
Violations (Among Violators) 
  















     













     



















 p=0.06 p=0.06 p=0.78 p=0.68 p=0.01 
 
Wastewise 
     













           










































Table 25: Full Sample (Pooled) Bivariate OLS Pooled Regression, Program Participation 
and Number of Violations (Among Violators)# 
  




















































































#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 




























Table 26: Full Sample (Pooled) Pearson’s Correlation, KLD Citizenship and Number of 
Violations (Among Violators) 
  











































































Table 27: Full Sample (Pooled) Bivariate OLS Pooled Regression, KLD Citizenship and 










































































   KLD Rank  
















#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 





























Table 28: Program Participation and the Number and Percent of Violations Over Study 
Period# 
 





# of violations % of violations 
 
 
“Bad” Citizen “Good” Citizen “Bad” Citizen “Good” Citizen 
     All  
 
1022 3242 22% 70% 
     BOD 
 
86 313 20% 72% 
     TSS 
 
193 515 26% 69% 
     Con Poll 
 
620 1521 27% 66% 
     Tox Poll 
 




   
 
 
# of violations % of violations 
 
 
“Bad” Citizen “Good” Citizen “Bad” Citizen “Good” Citizen 
     All  
 
3310 1160 72% 25% 
     BOD 
 
352 72 81% 17% 
     TSS 
 
517 208 69% 28% 
     Con Poll 
 
1650 546 72% 24% 
     Tox Poll 
 
689 295 69% 29% 
#These percentages do not sum to 100 percent because they are calculated based on the total violations.  













Table 29: KLD Social Ratings Data and the Number and Percent of Violations Over 
Study Period# 
 





# of violations % of violations 
 
 
“Bad” Citizen “Good” Citizen “Bad” Citizen “Good” Citizen 
     All  
 
1470 817 32% 18% 
     BOD 
 
140 132 32% 30% 
     TSS 
 
227 148 30% 20% 
     Con Poll 
 
744 425 32% 18% 
     Tox Poll 
 
313 94 31% 9% 
 





# of violations % of violations 
 
 
“Bad” Citizen “Good” Citizen “Bad” Citizen “Good” Citizen 
     All  
 
1293 787 28% 17% 
     BOD 
 
123 124 28% 29% 
     TSS 
 
196 141 26% 19% 
     Con Poll 
 
619 400 27% 17% 
     Tox Poll 
 
287 93 29% 9% 
#The percentages do not sum to 100 percent because they are calculated based on the total violations.  













Table 30: Full Sample (Pooled) Mean Differences, Program Participation and Quantity 
Compliance Ratio 
  











TRI 33_50     









          














 p=0.24 p=0.91 p=0.96 p=0.17 
Wastewise     









          







































Table 31: Full Sample (Pooled) Bivariate OLS Pooled Regression, Program Participation 
and Quantity Compliance Ratio# 
  







































































#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 





























Table 32: Full Sample (Pooled) Mean Differences, Program Participation and 
Concentration Compliance Ratio 
  













    









       














 p=0.16 p=0.83 p=0.65 p=0.41 
 
Wastewise 
    









         




































Table 33: Full Sample (Pooled) Bivariate OLS Pooled Regression, Program Participation 
and Concentration Compliance Ratio#  
  




























































#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 





























Table 34: Full Sample (Pooled) Pearson’s Correlation, KLD Citizenship and Quantity 
Compliance Ratio 
  















































































Table 35: Full Sample (Pooled) Bivariate OLS Pooled Regression, KLD Citizenship and 
Quantity Compliance Ratio# 
  



























































     KLD Rank  
















#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 
observations over time.  The association between the first KLD measure and toxic pollution is significant 



























Table 36: Full Sample (Pooled) Pearson’s Correlations, KLD Citizenship and 
Concentration Compliance Ratio 
  














































































Table 37: Full Sample (Pooled) Bivariate OLS Pooled Regression, KLD Citizenship and 
Concentration Compliance Ratio# 
  






















































     KLD Rank  

















#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 




























Table 38: Firm-Level (One Observation per Firm) Pearson’s Correlations, Firm 
Characteristics and Dichotomous Violation Measure 
  



















































































































Table 39: Full Sample (Pooled) Pearson’s Correlations, Firm Characteristics and Number 
of Violations# 
  























































































































#This table presents correlation coefficients.  However, the significance levels are taken from bivariate 
regression models in which the STATA cluster command was used to adjust the standard errors for the 






















Table 40: Full Sample (Pooled) Pearson’s Correlations, Firm Characteristics and 
Quantity Compliance Ratio# 
  






















































































































#This table presents correlation coefficients.  However, the significance levels are taken from bivariate 
regression models in which the STATA cluster command was used to adjust the standard errors for the 



















Table 41: Full Sample (Pooled) Pearson’s Correlations, Firm Characteristics and 
Concentration Compliance Ratio# 
  























































































































#This table presents correlation coefficients.  However, the significance levels are taken from bivariate 
regression models in which the STATA cluster command was used to adjust the standard errors for the 



















Table 42: Firm-Level (Pooled) Partial Correlations, TRI33/50 Participation and 
Dichotomous Violation Measure 
  






















































Table 43: Firm-Level Partial Correlation, Wastewise Participation and Dichotomous 
Violation Measure 
  














































Table 44: Full Sample (Pooled) Multivariate OLS Regression, Program Participation and 
Number of Violations# 
  



























Return on sales 
 
1.28 (1.92) 2.04 (0.67)** 0.73 (0.77) 
# of employees 
 
0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)* -0.00 (0.00) 
Pulp and paper 
company 
 
-4.80 (2.99) -0.12 (0.77) 1.36 (1.32) 
Steel company 
 
9.75 (5.27)+ 0.18 (0.95) 5.44 (2.23)* 
#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 





























Table 45: Full Sample (Pooled) Multivariate OLS Regression, KLD Citizenship and 
Number of Violations# 
  















Return on sales 
 
-0.83 (2.18) 
# of employees 
 
0.00 (0.00) 






#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 




























Table 46: Full Sample (Pooled) Multivariate OLS Regression, Program Participation and 
Quantity Compliance Ratio# 
  










































#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 





















Table 47: Full Sample (Pooled) Multivariate OLS Regression, KLD Citizenship and 
Quantity Compliance Ratio#  
  
























Return on sales 
 
 
-0.17 (0.22) -0.79 (0.69) 






5.32 e-06  
(7.29 e-06) 
Pulp & Paper 
 
 








-0.51 (0.14)** -0.61 (0.42) 
#The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the dependence of 

































Con Poll  
 
Tox Poll  
 
Con Poll  
 






















































#This table presents correlation coefficients.  However, the significance levels are taken from bivariate 
regression models in which the STATA cluster command was used to adjust the standard errors for the 





























Table 49: Multivariate OLS Pooled Regression, Sanctions and Number of Violations by 
Program Participation# 
  































#These models include the firm characteristics that were relevant in previous models as well as a control for 
prior violations.  The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the 
































Table 50: Multivariate OLS Pooled Regression, Total Sanctions and Number of 
Violations by KLD Citizenship# 
  






KLD Citizenship  
(no replacement) 










Total Sanctions 0.49 (0.09)** 
 
0.13 (0.22) 0.46 (0.09)** 0.13 (0.22) 
#These models include the firm characteristics that were relevant in previous models as well as a control for 
prior violations.  The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the 


































Table 51: Multivariate OLS Pooled Regression, Informal Sanctions and Number of 
Violations by Program Participation# 
  
























0.24 (0.20) -0.01 (0.21) 0.99 (0.86) 
#These models include the firm characteristics that were relevant in previous models as well as a control for 
prior violations.  The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the 
































Table 52: Multivariate OLS Pooled Regression, Informal Sanctions and Number of 
Violations by KLD Citizenship# 
  






KLD Citizenship  
(no replacement) 















0.52 (0.16)** 0.04 (0.56) 0.47 (0.17)** 0.04 (0.56) 
 
#These models include the firm characteristics that were relevant in previous models as well as a control for 
prior violations.  The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the 

































Table 53: Multivariate OLS Pooled Regression, Formal Sanctions and Number of 
Violations by Program Participation# 
  




















Formal Sanctions 0.03 (0.10) 0.43 (0.16)** 0.14 (0.15) 0.69 (0.37)+ 
 
#These models include the firm characteristics that were relevant in previous models as well as a control for 
prior violations.  The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the 

































Table 54: Multivariate OLS Pooled Regression, Formal Sanctions and Number of 
Violations by KLD Citizenship# 
  






KLD Citizenship  
(no replacement) 













Formal Sanctions 0.64 (0.11)** 0.21 (0.24) 
 
0.61 (0.12)** 0.21 (0.24) 
#These models include the firm characteristics that were relevant in previous models as well as a control for 
prior violations.  The STATA cluster command has been used to adjust the standard errors for the 


































Ackerman, R.W. & Bauer, R.A. (1976).  Corporate social responsiveness. Reston,  
Virginia: Reston Publishing. 
 
Alexander, C.R. & Cohen, M.A. (1996). New evidence on the origins of corporate crime.   
Managerial and Decision Economics, 17:421-435. 
 
Altman, E.I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of  
corporate bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 23(4):589-609. 
 
Arora, S. & Cason, T.N. (1995). An experiment in voluntary environmental regulation:  
Participation in EPA’s 33/50 program.  Resources, 116(Summer):6-10. 
 
Arora, S. & Cason, T.N. (1996).  Why do firms volunteer to exceed environmental  
regulations?  Understanding participation in EPA’s 33/50 program.  Land 
Economics, 72(4):413-432. 
 
Asch, P. & Seneca, J.J. (1976). Is collusion profitable? Review of Economics and  
Statistics, 58(1):1-12. 
 
Aupperle, K.E., Hatfield, J.D. & Carroll, A.B. (1983). Instrument development and  
application in corporate social responsibility.  Academy of Management 
Proceedings, 369-373. 
 
Aupperle, K.E., Carroll, A.B. & Hatfield, J.D. (1985). An empirical examination of the  
relationship between corporate social responsibility and profitability. Academy of 
Management Journal, 28(2):446-464. 
 
Bachman, R., Paternoster, R. & Ward, S. (1992). The rationality of sexual offending:  
Testing a deterrence/rational choice conception of sexual assault. Law and Society 
Review, 26:343-372. 
 
Bandyopadhyay, S. & Horowitz, J. (2006). Do plants overcomply with water pollution  
regulations? The role of discharge variability. Topics in Economic Analysis and 
Policy, 6(1):1-32. 
 
Bardach, E. & Kagan, R.A. (1982). Going by the book: The problem of regulatory  
unreasonableness.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Barnett, H.C. (1986). Industry culture and industry economy: Correlates of tax  
noncompliance in Sweden. Criminology, 24(3):553-574. 
 
Bartel, A.P. & Thomas, L.G. (1985). Direct and indirect effects of regulation: a new look  
at OSHA’s impact. Journal of Law and Economics, 28:1-25. 
 
 256
Baucus, M.S. & Near, J.P. (1991). Can illegal corporate behavior be predicted? An event  
history analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 34(1): 9-36. 
 
Baucus, M. (1994). Pressure, opportunity and predisposition: A multivariate model of  
corporate illegality. Journal of Management, 20(4):699-721. 
 
Block, M.K., Nold, F.C. & Sidak, J.G. (1981). The deterrent effect of antitrust  
enforcement. Journal of Political Economy, 89(3): 429-445. 
 
Blumstein, A., Cohen, J., Roth, J.A. & Visher, C.A. (1986). Introduction: Studying  
criminal careers.  In Criminal careers and “career criminals”: Vol. 1 (pp. 12- 
30).  Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
 
Bowie, N. (1991). The firm as a moral community.  In R.M. Coughlin (Ed),  
Morality, rationality, and efficiency: New perspectives on socio-economics (pp. 
169-183). Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe. 
 
Bowman, E.H. & Haire, M. (1975). A strategic posture toward corporate social  
responsibility. California Management Review, 18(2):2-58. 
 
Braithwaite, J. (1984). Corporate crime in the pharmaceutical industry.  London:  
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Braithwaite, J. (1985). White collar crime. Annual Review of Sociology, 11:1-25. 
 
Braithwaite, J. & Makkai, T. (1991). Testing an expected utility model of corporate  
deterrence.  Law and Society Review, 25(1): 7-40. 
 
Burkett, S.R. & Ward, D.A. (1993). A note on perceptual deterrence, religiously based  
moral condemnation, and social control. Criminology, 21(1):119-134. 
 
Carroll, A.B. (1979). A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social  
performance. Academy of Management Review, 4:497-505. 
 
Carroll, A.B. (1991). Corporate social performance measurement: A commentary on  
methods for evaluating an elusive construct. Research in Corporate Social 
Performance and Policy, 12:385-401. 
 
Carroll, A.B. 
 (1999). Corporate social responsibility. Business and Society, 38(3):268-296. 
 
Chen, K.H. & Metcalf, R.W. (1980). The relationship between pollution control record  
and financial indicators revisited. Accounting Review, 55(1):168-177. 
 
Clarkson, M.B.E. (1995). A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating  




Clifford, M. (1998). Environmental crime: Enforcement, policy, and social  
responsibility. Gaithersburg, Maryland: Aspen Publications  
 
Clinard, M.B. & Quinney, R. (1973). Criminal behavior systems: a typology.  New York:  
Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
 
Clinard, M.B., Yeager, P.C., Brissette, J.M., Petrashek, D. & Harries, E.  (1979). Illegal  
corporate behavior.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
Clinard, M.B. & Yeager, P.C. (1980). Corporate crime.  New York: Free Press. 
 
Clinard, M.B. (1983). Corporate ethics and crime: The role of middle management.   
California: Sage Publications. 
 
Cochran, P.L. & Nigh, D. (1987). Illegal corporate behavior and the question of moral  
agency: An empirical examination. Research in Corporate Social Performance 
and Policy, 9:73-91. 
 
Cohen, M.A. (1999). Chapter 2. In: H. Folmer and T.H. Tietenberg (Eds.), The  
International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 1999/2000: A  
Survey of Current Issues (3) (pp. 44-106). Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
 
Coleman, J.W. (1987). Toward an integrated theory of white-collar crime. American  
Journal of Sociology, 93(2):406-439. 
 
Cooke, W.N. & Gautschi III, F.H. (1980). OSHA plant safety programs and injury  
reduction. Industrial Relations, 20(3): 245-257. 
 
Cullen, J.B., Victor, B. & Stephens, C. (1989). An ethical weather report: Assessing the  
organization’s ethical climate. Organizational Dynamics, 18(2):50-63. 
 
Dalton, D.R. & Kesner, I.F. (1988). On the dynamics of corporate size and illegal  
activity: An empirical assessment. Journal of Business Ethics, 7(11):861-870. 
 
Dawkins, C.E. (2002). Corporate welfare, corporate citizenship, and the question of  
accountability. Business and Society, 41(3):269-291. 
 
Decanio, S.J. & Watkins, W.E. (1998). Investment in energy efficiency: Do the  
characteristics of firms matter? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(1): 
95-107. 
 
Deephouse, D.L. & Carter, S.M. (2005). An examination of differences between  





Deily, M.E. & Gray, W.B. (1991). Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining  
industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 21: 260-274. 
 
Donaldson, T. & Preston, L.E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation:  
Concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of Management Review, 20(1):65-
91. 
 
Dooley, R.S. & Fryxell, G.E. (1999). Are conglomerates less environmentally  
responsible?  An empirical examination of diversification strategy and subsidiary 
pollution in the U.S. chemical industry. Journal of Business Ethics, 21:1-14. 
 
Environmental Council of the States (2001).  State environmental agency contributions to  
enforcement and compliance. Washington, D.C. 
 
Epstein, E.M. (1998). Business ethics and corporate social policy. Business and Society,  
37(1):7-40. 
 
Etzioni, A. (1989). The moral dimension: Toward a new economics. New York: The Free  
Press. 
 
Finkel, S.E. (1995). Causal analysis with panel data. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Finney, H.C. & Lesieur, H.R. (1982). A contingency theory of organizational crime.   
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 1:255-299. 
 
Freedman, M. & Jaggi, B. (1993). Air and water pollution regulation: Accomplishments  
and economic consequences. London: Quorum Books. 
 
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston:  
Pittman/Ballinger (Harper Collins) 
 
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Galakiewicz, J. & Burt, R.S. (1991). Interorganization contagion in corporate  
philanthropy. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(1):88-105. 
 
Gordon, G.G. (1991). Industry determinants of organizational culture. Academy of  
Management Review, 16(2):396-416. 
 
Grant II, D.S, Bergesen, A.J. & Jones, A.W. (2002). Organizational size and pollution:  
The case of the U.S. chemical industry. American Sociological Review, 67:389-
407. 
 
Grant II, D.S. & Jones, A.W. (2003). Are subsidiaries more prone to pollute? New  




Grant II, D.S., Jones, A.W., & Nell, M. (2004). Do facilities with distant headquarters  
pollute more? How civic engagement conditions the environmental performance 
of absentee managed plants. Social Forces, 83(1):189-214. 
 
Graves, S.B. & Waddock, S.A. (1993). Institutional owners and corporate social  
performance: Maybe not so myopic after all.  International Association for 
Business and Society proceedings. 
 
Gray, W.B. & Scholz, J.T. (1993). Does regulatory enforcement work? A panel analysis  
of OSHA enforcement. Law and Society Review, 27(1): 177-213. 
 
Gray, W.B. & Deily, M.E. (1996). Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution regulation  
in the U.S. steel industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
31: 96-111. 
 
Gray, W.B. & Shadbegian, R.J. (2005).When and why do plants comply?  Paper mills in  
the 1980s. Law and Policy, 27(2):238-261. 
 
Gunningham, N., Kagan, R.A. & Thornton, D. (2004). Social license and environmental  
protection: Why businesses go beyond compliance. Law and Social Inquiry, 29: 
307-342. 
 
Griffin, J.J. & Mahon, J.F. (1997). The corporate social performance and corporate  
financial performance debate. Business and Society, 36(1):5-32. 
 
Hammitt, J.K. & Reuter, P. (1989). Illegal hazardous-waste disposal and enforcement in  
the United States: A preliminary assessment. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 
22:101-119. 
 
Harrington, W. (1988). Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of  
Public Economics, 37(1): 29-54. 
 
Hill, C.W., Kelley, P.C. & Agle, B.R. (1992). An empirical examination of the causes of  
corporate wrongdoing in the United States. Human Relations, 45(10):1055-1076. 
 
Hillman, A.J. & Keim, G.D. (2001). Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and  
social issues: What’s the bottom line? Strategic Management Journal, 22(2):125-
140. 
 
Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency.  Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Hochstetler, A. & Copes, H. (2001). Organizational culture and organizational crime.  In  
N. Shover and J.P. Wright (Eds.), Crimes of privilege: Readings in white-collar 





Hunter, S. & Waterman, R.W. (1996). Enforcing the law: The case of the clean water  
acts. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Jamieson, K.M. (1994). The organization of corporate crime: Dynamics of antitrust  
violation.  London: Sage Publications. 
 
Johnson, R.A. & Greening, D.W. (1999). The effects of corporate governance and  
institutional ownership types of corporate social performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 42(5):564-576. 
 
Kagan, R.A., Gunningham, N. & Thornton, D. (2003). Explaining corporate  
environmental performance: How does regulation matter? Law and Society 
Review, 37(1): 51-90. 
 
Keane, C. (1993). The impact of financial performance on frequency of corporate crime:  
a latent variable test of strain theory. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 35:293-
308. 
 
Kieso, D.E. & J.J. Weygandt (1974). Intermediate accounting.  New York: Wiley. 
 
Laplante, B. & Rilstone, P. (1996). Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp  
and paper industry in Quebec. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 31(1):19-36. 
 
Lazear, E.P. (1995). Corporate culture and the diffusion of values.  Trends in business  
organization: Do participation and cooperation increase competitiveness?  In S. 
Horst (Ed.) International Workshop. Tubingen: Mohr (Siebeck). 
 
Lee, M.T. & Ermann, M.D. (1999). Pinto “madness” as a flawed landmark narrative: an  
organizational and network analysis. Social Problems, 46(1):30-47. 
 
Liu. P.C. (1995). Regulator inspection and violation deterrence under Clean Water Act  
regulation of pulp and paper mill water pollution.  Unpublished dissertation, 
Stanford University. 
 
Maignan, I., Ferrell, O.C., & Hult, G.T.M. (1999). Corporate citizenship: Cultural  
antecedents and business benefits. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
27(4):455-469. 
 
Maignan, I. & Ferrell, O.C. (2000). Measuring corporate citizenship in two countries:  
The case of the United States and France. Journal of Business Ethics, 23(3):283-
297. 
 
Maignan, I. & Ferrell, O.C. (2001). Antecedents and benefits of corporate citizenship: an  




Magat, W. & Viscusi, W.K. (1990). Effectiveness of the EPA’s regulatory enforcement:  
The case of industrial effluent standards. Journal of Law and Economics, 33:331-
360. 
Margolis, J.D. & Walsh, J.P. (2003). Misery loves companies: Rethinking social  
initiatives by business. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48:268-305. 
 
Mathews, M.C. (1987). Code of ethics: Organizational behavior and misbehavior.   
Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 9:107-130.  
 
May, P.J. (2004). Compliance motivations: Affirmative and negative bases. Law and  
Society, 38(1):41-68. 
 
McKendall, M.A. & Wagner III, J.A. (1997). Motive, opportunity, choice, and corporate  
illegality. Organization Science: A Journal of the Institute of Management 
Sciences, 8(6):624-648. 
 
McKendall, M., DeMarr, B. & Jones-Rikkers, C. (2002). Ethical compliance programs  
and corporate illegality: Testing the assumptions of the corporate sentencing 
guidelines. Journal of Business Ethics, 37(4):367-383. 
 
Nadeau, L.W. (1997). EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level  
noncompliance. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 34(1): 
54-79.  
 
Paternoster, R. & Simpson S.S. (1996). Sanction threats and appeals to morality: Testing  
a rational choice model of corporate crime. Law and Society Review, 30(3):549-
585. 
 
Paternoster, R., Brame, R., Mazerolle, P. & Piquero, A. (1998). Using the correct  
statistical test for the equality of regression coefficients. Criminology, 36(4):859-
866. 
 
Pearce, F. (2001). Crime and capitalist business corporations.  In N. Shover & J.P.  
Wright (Eds.), Crimes of privilege: Readings in white-collar crime. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Pogarsky, G. (2002). Identifying “deterrable” offenders: Implications for research on  
deterrence. Justice Quarterly, 19(3):431-452. 
 
Robertson, L.S. & Keeve, J.P. (1983). Worker injuries: The effects of workers’  
compensation and OSHA inspections. Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and 
Law, 8(3):581. 
 
Rosen, B.N., Sandler, D.M., & Shani, D. (1991). Social issues and socially responsible  




Ruf, B., Muralidhar, K. & Paul, K. (1993). Eight dimensions of corporate social  
performance: Determination of the relative importance using the analytic 
hierarchy process. Academy of Management proceedings. 
 
Ruser, J.W.  & Smith, R.S. (1991). Reestimating OSHA’s effects: Have the data  
changed? Journal of Human Resources, 26(2):212-235. 
 
Scharfman, M. (1996). The construct validity of the Kinder, Lyndenberg and Domini  
social performance ratings data. Journal of Business Ethics, 5:287-296. 
 
Scholz, J.T. (1984). Cooperation, deterrence, and the ecology of regulatory enforcement.  
Law and Society Review, 18(2): 179-224. 
 
Scholz, J.T. & Gray, W.B. (1990). OSHA enforcement and workplace injuries: A  
behavioral approach to risk assessment. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 3(3): 
283-305. 
 
Sherman, L.W. (1993). Defiance, deterrence, and irrelevance: A theory of the criminal  
sanction. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30: 445-473.  
 
Shover, N. & Bryant, K.M. (1993). Theoretical explanations of corporate crime.  In M.B.  
Blankenship (Ed.), Understanding corporate criminality (pp. 141-176).  New 
York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 
 
Shover, N. & Hochstetler, A. (2002). Cultural explanations and organizational crime.  
Crime, Law and Social Change, 37(1):1-18. 
 
Shover, N. & Routhe, A.S. (2005). Environmental crime.  In M. Tonry (Ed.), Crime and  
Justice: A Review of the Research, 32. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Silberman, J. (2000). Does environmental deterrence work? Evidence and experience say  
yes, but we need to understand how and why. Environmental Law Reporter 
30:10523. 
 
Simpson, S.S. (1986). The decomposition of antitrust: Testing a multi-level, longitudinal  
model of profit-squeeze. American Sociological Review, 51: 859-875. 
 
Simpson, S.S. (1987). Cycles of illegality: Antitrust violations in corporate America.  
Social Forces, 65(4):943-974. 
 
Simpson, S.S. & Koper, C.S. (1992). Deterring corporate crime. Criminology, 30(3): 347- 
375. 
 
Simpson, S.S., Harris, A.R. & Mattson, B.A. (1993). Measuring corporate crime.  In  
M.B. Blankenship (Ed.), Understanding corporate criminality (pp. 115-140).  
New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 
 
 263
Simpson, S.S. (1998). Assessing corporate crime control policies: Criminalization versus  
 cooperation. Kobe University Law Review, 32:101-127. 
 
Simpson, S.S. (2002). Corporate crime, law, and social control. Cambridge, U.K.:  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Smith, N.C. (2003). Corporate social responsibility: Whether or how? California  
Management Review, 45(4): 52-76. 
 
Smith, R.S. (1979). The impact of OSHA inspections on manufacturing injury rates.  
Journal of Human Resources, 14(2):145-170. 
 
Sonnenfeld, J. & Lawrence, P.R. (1978). Why do companies succumb to price fixing?  
Harvard Business Review, 56(4):145-157. 
 
Stanwick, P.A. and Sarah, D. (1998). The determinants of corporate social performance:  
An empirical examination. American Business Review, 16(1):86-92. 
 
Staw, B.M. & Szwajkowski, E. (1975). The scarcity-munificence component of  
organizational environments and the commission of illegal acts. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 20(3):345-355. 
 
Stone, C.D. (1975). Where the law ends: The social control of corporate behavior.  
Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc. 
 
Sutherland, E. (1961). White collar crime. New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston. 
 
Thornton, D., Kagan, R.A. & Gunningham, N. (2003). Sources of corporate  
environmental performance. California Management Review, 46(1): 127-141. 
 
Victor, B. & Cullen, J.B. (1988). The organizational bases of ethical work climates.  
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33:101-125. 
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency: Office of Enforcement and Compliance  
Assurance (1995a). Profile of the iron and steel industry: Sector notebook project.  
Washington D.C. EPA 310-R-95-005  
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency: Office of Enforcement and Compliance  
Assurance (1995b). Profile of the petroleum refining industry: Sector notebook 
project.  Washington, D.C.  EPA 310-R-95-013  
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency: Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
 Assurance (1995c). Profile of the pulp and paper industry: Sector notebook  





United States Environmental Protection Agency: Office of Enforcement and Compliance  
Assurance (2002). Profile of the pulp and paper industry, 2nd ed: Sector notebook  
project.  Washington, D.C.  EPA 310-R-02-002 
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency: Office of Pollution Prevention and  
Toxics (1999). 33/50 program: The final record.  Washington, D.C. 
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency: Office of Pollution Prevention and  
Toxics (2004). Wastewise 2004 annual report.  Washington, D.C. 
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2006). Environmental dictionary.   
http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/. 
 
Vandenbergh, M.P. (2003). Beyond elegance: A testable typology of social norms in  
corporate environmental compliance. Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 
22(1):55-144. 
 
Vandenbergh, M.P. (2004). From smokestack to SUV: The individual as the regulated  
entity in the new era of environmental law. Vanderbilt Law Review, 57(2):515-
626. 
 
Vaughn, D. (1983). Controlling unlawful organizational behavior: Social structure and  
corporate misconduct. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Vaughn, D.  (1996). The Challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and  
deviance at NASA. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Vaughn, D. (2001). Transaction systems and unlawful organizational behavior.  In N.  
Shover & J.P. Wright (Eds.), Crimes of privilege: Readings in white-collar crime. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Victor, B. & Cullen, J.B. (1987). A theory and measure of ethical climate in  
organizations. Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 9:51-71. 
 
Vidovic, M. & Khanna, N. (2005). Can voluntary pollution prevention programs fulfill  
their promises? Further evidence from the EPA’s 33/50 program.  Unpublished 
manuscript. 
 
Viscusi, W.K. (1986). The impact of occupational safety and health regulation, 1973- 
1983. RAND Journal of Economics, 17(4):567-580. 
 
 
Wang, J. & Coffey, B.S. (1992). Board composition and corporate philanthropy. Journal  





Wartick, S.L. and Cochran, P.L. (1985). The evolution of the corporate social  
performance model. Academy of Management Review, 10:758-769. 
 
Weisburd, D., Waring, E. & Chayet, E.F. (2001). White-collar crime and criminal  
careers. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Weisburd, D., Maher, L. & Sherman, L. (1992). Contrasting crime general and crime  
specific theory: The case of hot spots of crime. Advances in Criminological  
Theory, volume 4.   
 
Weisburd, D, Bushway, B., Lum, C. & Yang, S.M. (2004). Trajectories of crime at  
places: A longitudinal study of street segments in the city of Seattle. Criminology, 
42(2):283-321. 
 
Wokutch, R.E. & Spencer, B.A. (1987). Corporate saints and sinners: The effect of  
philanthropic and illegal activity on organizational performance. California 
Management Review, 29(2):62-78. 
 
Wokutch, R.E. & McKinney, E.W. (1991). Behavioral and perceptual measures of  
corporate social performance. Research in Corporate Social Performance and 
Policy, 12:309-330. 
 
Wolfe, R. (1991). The use of content analysis to assess corporate social responsibility.  
Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 12:281-307. 
 
Wolfgang, M.E., Figlio, R.M. & Sellin, T. (1972). Delinquency in a birth cohort.   
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Wood, D.J. (1991). Corporate social performance revisited. Academy of Management  
Review, 16(4):691-718. 
 
Yeager, P.C. (1993). Industrial water pollution.  In M. Tonry (Ed.), Crime and Justice: A  
Review of Research, 18 (pp. 97-148). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Yeager, P.C.  (2005). Understanding corporate lawbreaking: From profit-seeking to law- 
finding.  Unpublished manuscript. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
